US embassy cable - 05PARIS5374

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 005374 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR EB/TRA, EUR/WE, EUR/ERA, AND S/CT 
DHS FOR U/S BEARDSWORTH, TSA-INTL AFFAIRS-DTIEDGE 
BRUSSELS FOR TSA 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAIR, PTER, FR 
SUBJECT:  FRANCE: DHS ACTING U/S BEARDSWORTH MEETS 
OFFICIALS ON PNR DATA AND NO-FLY ISSUES 
 
REF: PARIS 4921 
 
NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION 
 
1. (SBU) Summary.  In his meetings with French officials, 
U/S Beardsworth highlighted the positive uses of Passenger 
Name Record (PNR) data and engendered an appreciation of 
how PNR data can help advance our mutual interest of 
denying terrorists freedom to travel while protecting 
privacy and facilitating the legitimate movement of people 
and goods.   U/S Beardsworth also responded to French 
concerns about the No-Fly system, pointing to its overall 
success and committed to take steps to improve the 
communications and processes in place with respect to 
French No Fly situations. End Summary 
 
2.  (SBU) In addition to meeting with Ambassador Stapleton 
and members of the country team, Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) Acting Under Secretary for Border and 
Transportation Security Randy Beardsworth met with French 
officials in Paris July 20, 2005.  U/S Beardsworth attended 
two separate meetings, the first hosted by the Secretariat 
Gnrale de la Defense Nationale (SGDN) with officials 
primarily from SGDN and the Ministry of Interior (MOI); the 
second with Claude Gueant, MOI Chief of Cabinet.  The 
meeting at the SGDN, the Prime Minister's coordinating body 
for national defense and counter-terrorism, included the 
following officials: Francis Delon, SGDN Secretary General; 
Jerome Leonnet, the PM's Technical Counselor for Security 
(SGDN); Col. Gratien Maire, the PM's Deputy Director of 
Military Affairs(SGDN);  Eric Lebedel, Director of 
International and Strategic Affairs(SGDN); Alain Coursaget, 
, 
Deputy Director of Protection and State Security(SGDN); 
Jean-Philippe Grelot, Counselor for Defense Affairs(SGDN); 
Col. Henri Schlienger, Protection and State Security(SGDN); 
Michel Gaudin, Director General of the National Police 
(MOI); Stephane Fratacci, Director of the Office of Public 
Liberties and Legal Affairs (MOI); Pierre Debue, Central 
Director of the Border Police (MOI); Christophe Chaboud, 
head of the Anti-Terrorist Co-Ordination Cell (MOI); 
Francois Darcy, head of the Office of International and 
European Affairs (MOI); Pascal-Jean Perron, Director of 
Economic and Financial Affairs (Ministry of Finance); 
Michel Wachenheim, Director General of Civil Aviation; and 
Paul Schwach, Director of Strategic and Technical Affairs, 
Civil Aviation. 
 
3. (SBU) The most substantive discussions took place at the 
meeting hosted by the SGDN.  The French began by a 
discussion of their anti-terrorist planning system, noting 
that they had raised the threat level after the London 
subway bombings.  It consisted of five warning levels and a 
"toolkit" of around 500 measures that could be applied 
either globally or sector-specifically in response to 
threats.  They were currently considering whether and when 
to change the warning level, and how to balance increased 
security against the extra costs and danger of creating 
complacency in the public.  U/S Beardsworth described the 
U.S. system as very similar, and noted that the U.S. was 
grappling with the same kind of issues in setting its 
threat levels. 
 
4. (SBU) U/S Beardsworth then described the recent re- 
organization of DHS as a result of its second-stage review 
process, which involved 18 working groups in 5 strategic 
areas: Preparedness, Border Control and Immigration, 
Transportation Security, Information Sharing, and Business 
Processes.  He emphasized a number of changes that would 
lead to increased efficiency and coherence: the creation of 
a Director of Preparedness, a new Department level Policy 
office, and of a new Intelligence position reporting 
directly to the Secretary.  He reassured the French 
officials that TSA would continue to have operational 
responsibility for transportation security issues. 
 
5. (SBU) U/S Beardsworth began his presentation on PNR data 
by providing an overview of how it related to the No-Fly 
(NF) list, which is a compilation of individuals suspected 
of having a terrorist nexus.  He explained that PNR data is 
not used to populate the NF list, nor has it been used to 
divert aircraft.  APIS data, a manifest of passengers 
traveling to the U.S., is checked against the NF list in 
determining potential diversions of aircraft.  While APIS 
data is a highly successful tool for identifying known 
persons of interest, it does not identify those who are 
unknown.  The PNR database develops relationships between 
these knowns and unknowns through common patterns and 
relationships between data elements.  For example, the PNR 
database is able to red flag passengers who have a 
questionable travel itinerary or who paid for their travel 
through questionable sources. 
 
6. (SBU) U/S Beardsworth pointed out how successful the No- 
Fly screening process has been overall.  Of the 750 million 
passengers flying into or within the U.S., U/S Beardsworth 
noted that there were 202 "encounters" from the 30,000 
names on the NF list, a sub-set of the 400,000 names on 
terrorist watch lists.  Of the 202 cases, in 120 cases the 
individual did not board the aircraft.  Of the remaining 82 
who flew, DHS had reviewed its information and had 
downgraded the individual for that flight, allowing the 
flight to proceed.  As for the remaining 28 cases, only 
eight resulted in diversion of the aircraft.  Of those 
eight cases, six involved individuals the United States 
categorically did not want to be on board the aircraft. 
One case involved an individual in the unfortunate 
circumstance of having the same name and date of birth as a 
terrorist; and in the final case a passport known to be 
stolen and in use by terrorists was used - but in this case 
the rightful original holder was the passenger in question. 
U/S Beardsworth summarized that DHS had avoided flight 
diversions in all but a very few cases of grave concern. 
 
7. (SBU) Michel Wachenheim, DGAC stated that the most 
recent NF diversion on July 8 of an Air France flight also 
raised a number of questions (Reftel): Why did it take so 
long to identify a problem with the passenger involved, 
since the U.S. had AMADEUS reservation data "days" ahead of 
time and three APIS transmissions before departure?  What 
was the explanation for three Air France NF incidents in 
the past three months?  What of the economic implications 
of repeated diversions of Air France flights?  France 
wanted to respect its obligations under the NF system, but 
we needed to look at how it was being implemented, and to 
avoid wherever possible last-minute decisions to divert 
aircraft.  He suggested that perhaps the U.S. and French 
intelligence services needed to share more information on 
NF nominees, especially since they could well pose a danger 
beyond air transportation. 
 
8. (SBU) U/S Beardsworth replied that these were all 
excellent points.  He elaborated that it was very important 
to share information to the maximum extent possible, and we 
had already agreed to provide the NF list to the French. 
We also needed to look at terrorist travel as a broader 
issue.  Just as the international community works together 
to deny financial resources to terrorist organizations, so 
does the international community need to prevent terrorists 
from international travel without the appropriate scrutiny 
and oversight. 
 
9. (SBU) SG Delon said that nonetheless the system had to 
be credible, and that he felt the image of Air France was 
at stake in these repeated diversions.  U/S Beardsworth 
replied that he understood this concern, and that he was 
going to explore adopting special measures to help minimize 
future diversions of French flights, and to provide full 
and accurate information as quickly as possible in 
potential NF cases. 
 
10. (SBU) Turning to PNR data, U/S Beardsworth discussed 
the ongoing case of a suspected cell of terrorists in Lodi, 
California.  The case demonstrated that the unique aspects 
of the PNR database allowed for queries that uncovered key 
linkages between individuals that otherwise would not have 
been made, thus expanding the Joint Terrorism Task Force 
(JTTF) investigation.  In response to the recent terrorist 
incident in London on July 7, a PNR database search was 
configured in a matter of hours that was tailored to 
identifying potential terrorists linked to those attacks. 
PNR data had also proved its worth identifying travel 
agencies with a history of facilitating the travel of those 
using lost or stolen passports, or other fraudulent 
documents. 
 
11. (SBU) SG Delon said he fully understood the value of 
the database, but pointed out that it raised privacy 
concerns in European countries.  U/S Beardsworth replied 
that he had recently met with EU parliamentarians to 
address these concerns, and that the U.S. was fully 
committed to the Undertakings, a set a agreements for data 
privacy measures agreed to by the U.S. and EU.  These 
included various safeguards that have been built into the 
PNR database, such as filters and audit functions, that 
ensure PNR data is protected from those without a need to 
see it.  In fact, our rules offered a stronger system of 
protection than that available in many European countries. 
DGPN Gaudin for his part said the French police authorities 
looked on using PNR in France with "a favorable eye," 
provided issues of judicial supervision and privacy of data 
could be resolved. 
 
12. (SBU) SG Delon said that it would be helpful to have 
more information in writing on how the U.S. system actually 
worked; there were many points that needed to be clarified 
on what data the USG wanted and how we would use it. In 
particular, more information on physical and electronic 
access, audit and tracability, and retention of records 
could help resolve European privacy concerns.  Michel 
Wachenheim worried that providing PNR data would create an 
additional economic burden on French airlines, and might 
increase the number of potential no-fly cases. U/S 
Beardsworth replied that economic issues were indeed 
important, and that we were working to ease the burden on 
airlines by moving to a system of earlier transmission of 
APIS data, and by trying to encourage harmonization of EU 
and U.S. standards on PNR data.  There was however no 
systematic link between PNR data and the no-fly system, or 
indeed to other law enforcement or intelligence databases. 
 
13. (SBU) U/S Beardsworth said he would provide written 
material that would address SG Delon's questions, and 
suggested that the French might benefit from sending 
someone for a week in order to observe exactly how we use 
PNR data, as well as the effective implementation of 
protective safeguards for privacy of data.  SG Delon 
thanked him for the offer, concluding that there was still 
much work to do to improve our cooperation on air security 
and anti-terrorism. 
 
14. (SBU) In a separate meeting at the Ministry of the 
Interior, U/S Beardsworth discussed PNR issues with Claude 
Guant, Head of the Interior Minister's Cabinet.  David 
Martinon, the Minister's Diplomatic Advisor was also 
present.  He made the same points regarding PNR detailed in 
the paragraphs above.  Mr. Guant commented that France was 
conscious of the changing nature of the terrorist threat: 
terrorists had moved to a more "industrial" organization 
that required new and more systematic tools than 
traditional investigative work could provide.  Tracking 
travel was potentially of great interest in this respect. 
 
15. (SBU) U/S Beardsworth replied that the U.S. was 
increasingly making a distinction between identifying 
people who were threats through intelligence, and screening 
g 
larger numbers of people who could be worth interviewing 
because they might possess useful information.  It was 
important to deny terrorists access to travel, he noted, as 
we are denying them access to financial resources.  He 
emphasized his willingness to consider special arrangements 
if necessary to improve the handling of no-fly cases in 
France.  He repeated his suggestion that the French 
consider sending a technical person to see how the PNR 
system worked in practice.  Mr. Guant expressed interest 
in this idea. 
 
16. (SBU) Mr. Guant also indicated that the French had 
recently decided to meet VWP deadlines for passports with 
digital photos, and that an e-passport would eventually 
follow.  He also hinted that the ministry may have more 
ambitious plans, and might be looking at whether they could 
meet the October 2005 VWP deadline for beginning production 
of a passport with an electronic chip. 
17. (SBU) Finally, in a short meeting with Air France Vice- 
- 
President for External Relations Guy Tardieu, U/S 
Beardsworth responded to a number of concerns provoked by 
the latest no-fly diversion of an Air France flight. 
Tardieu emphasized that it was very important for Air 
France to avoid future diversions if possible, and wanted 
to work with TSA more intensively and at an earlier stage 
of the process.  Air France's reputation was at stake, and 
the USG needed to be especially careful about public 
communication during diversions, so that Air France was not 
unfairly blamed.  U/S Beardsworth reassured Tardieu that he 
would look into developing special measures to respond to 
his concerns.  Tardieu suggested that more French-speaking 
TSA staff in France could be helpful.  Air France had found 
 
SIPDIS 
direct communications with English-speaking staff at TSA's 
operations center difficult during flight diversions. 
18. (U) Acting U/S Beardsworth was accompanied to the 
meetings by: Dennis Sequeira, Director, Europe & 
Multilateral Affairs, DHS Office of International Affairs; 
Erik Shoberg, Policy Advisor, DHS Office of Customs and 
Border Protection; Jill Drury, Policy Advisor and TSA 
liaison to Brussels; and Executive Assistant David von 
Damm.  Deirdre Mahon, DHS Representative, Embassy Paris; 
Nouri Larbi, TSA Representative, Embassy Paris; and Mark 
Motley, Embassy Paris, (notetaker) also participated. 
 
19. (U) This message has been cleared by U/S Beardsworth. 
STAPLETON