US embassy cable - 02AMMAN5527

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 005527 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2012 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, JO 
SUBJECT: HAMZA MANSOUR AND THE IAF/MB:  MODERATE LEADERSHIP 
STRETCHED BETWEEN ITS FOLLOWING AND THE GOJ 
 
REF: AMMAN 04236 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR EDWARD W. GNEHM.  REASONS: 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
1 (C) SUMMARY.  Since his July 17 meeting with R Special 
Coordinator Christopher Ross (reftel), Islamic Action Front 
Secretary General Sheikh Hamza Mansour has endured harsh 
 
SIPDIS 
criticism from those in and around the IAF/Muslim Brotherhood 
for "speaking with the enemy."  Mansour's recent appearances 
and press interviews, combined with information from embassy 
sources, indicate that he is making an effort to remain in 
line (at least publicly) with the more radical views of the 
rank and file MB membership.  His position appears to be 
representative of the MB leadership's increasingly 
uncomfortable relationship with the more militant MB 
membership.  There are also rumors of a power struggle within 
the "moderate" leadership of the MB, and Mansour may be 
attempting to assure his internal leadership position by 
maintaining his support from the rank and file.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------------ 
FALLOUT FROM MEETING WITH ROSS 
------------------------------ 
 
2. (C)  On July 17 Ambassador Ross met with Mansour and two 
other Islamic Action Front leaders (reftel).  In recent 
memory, Mansour has been the only member of the IAF 
leadership to meet with embassy officials.  Despite his 
public invectives against the USG, Mansour has consistently 
affirmed the value of dialogue between the USG and the MB. 
In the face of harsh criticism in the local media by MB 
commentators, Mansour has been publicly unapologetic for 
"meeting with the enemy behind the back of the GOJ." 
 
3. (C)  Notwithstanding his defense of the July 17 meeting 
with USG officials, Mansour spoke at a rally at the MB center 
in early August.  According to London based Al-Sharq 
Al-Awsat, Mansour told the crowd that the "operation" (i.e. 
suicide bombing) against the Hebrew University (which killed 
eight, including four AMCITS) cost USD 50,000 and that such 
large costs necessitate giving large financial aid to the 
Palestinian people to carry out similar operations in the 
future.  (Note:  The article did not directly quote Mansour, 
but paraphrased him.  Post has had no contact with Mansour 
since his July 17 meeting with Ambassador Ross, and has 
therefore not been able to express outrage at such comments 
directly or get his version of what was actually said). 
 
------------------------ 
"MANSOUR DIDN'T MEAN IT" 
------------------------ 
 
4. (C) On August 18, poloff met with Ibrahim Gharaibeh 
(strictly protect) an East Banker and former member of the 
MB.  Gharaibeh, currently in a master's degree program that 
focuses on elderly care, said that he left the MB because it 
"stopped focusing on charity and became a movement purely 
concerned with politics."  According to Gharaibeh, the MB 
leadership is "very smart, and wiser than its following," and 
is pursuing a (comment: relatively) moderate course on 
domestic and foreign politics.  Gharaibeh said that, within 
the leadership, Mansour is more moderate than most.  In order 
to keep his support among the ranks of the MB however, he 
makes speeches "on a hot level," that feed the rank and 
file's appetite for invective against the USG.  In the end, 
according to Gharaibeh, Mansour "doesn't always mean" what he 
is saying publicly.  "If the moderate leaders spoke their 
true thoughts to the average MB member, they would be 
burned," Gharaibeh said. 
 
5. (C)  Gharaibeh said the current MB leadership has adopted 
short-term strategies to maintain control of the organization 
in the face of formidable extremist sentiment within the MB. 
Privately, moderates are debating the merits and morality of 
suicide bombings.  Publicly, they are lambasting the USG and 
supporting "martyrdom" operations against Israel.  While 
Gharaibeh does not believe that the moderates, as a group, 
are in serious danger of losing control of the MB, he does 
believe that some "moderates" are tarring others with the 
pro-USG brush in an attempt to gain rank and file support. 
This, he says, is the kind of dynamic that creates an 
environment in which Mansour publicly praises the Hebrew 
University attack. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
MB LEADERSHIP'S LONG-STANDING COOPERATION 
WITH GOJ BECOMING TOO HEAVY A BURDEN? 
---------------------------------------- 
 
6.  (C)  On September 22 poloff met with human rights 
advocate Sa'eda Kilani.  (Note: although Kilani is a human 
rights advocate, her family is well-connected within the 
judiciary and security services here).  Kilani's commentary 
on Mansour echoed that of Gharaibeh's.  "The IAF and MB 
leadership have cooperated with the government regarding 
extremists, such as Ba'athists and communists, for decades, 
but the (IAF/MB) leadership is stressed right now." 
7.  (C) One root cause of this "stress" Kilani noted, is the 
lack of channels through which the MB leadership can get out 
its message.  "Right now, the only political organizations 
left are the professional associations," Kilani said, "and 
that is not enough. The opposition are left more frustrated 
and are losing faith in their leaders." 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
8. (C)  The MB leadership's inner-workings are not always 
easy to understand, but the recent activity by Mansour seems 
to indicate that the "moderate" leadership of the MB/IAF is, 
at the least, having difficulty managing its increasingly 
frustrated following. 
GNEHM