US embassy cable - 05HARARE1115

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HARARE 001115 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR U/S BURNS, AF A/S NEWMAN/DAS WOODS; NSC FOR 
ABRAMS, COURVILLE, USAID FOR NATSIOS, PIERSON 
DEPARTMENT PASS EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/05/2015 
TAGS: ECON, EAID, PREL, PGOV, PHUM, OVIP, ZI 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR AMBASSADOR HALL,S VISIT TO 
ZIMBABWE 
 
 
Classified By: CDA Eric Schultz, reason 1.4 (b) (d) 
 
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Overview 
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1. (SBU) The US Mission in Harare, Zimbabwe welcomes your 
August 9-13 visit.  You are coming at a critical time in 
Zimbabwe,s independent history.  Once the breadbasket of 
Southern Africa the country is now a basket case.  The 
political, economic, and humanitarian crises that have 
gripped the country the last six years have all intensified 
in 2005 and are threatening to spin out of control, 
especially the latter two. 
 
2. (C) Bilateral relations remain strained by the Mugabe 
regime,s repressive policies.  U.S. policy toward Zimbabwe 
remains to isolate the regime.  On Wednesday of this week we 
announced new financial sanctions.  Tougher travel 
restrictions are also in the works.  While we have sought to 
isolate the government we have simultaneously sought to 
assist the Zimbabwean people in their time of need.  The U.S. 
has been the largest donor of humanitarian assistance to 
Zimbabwe over the past six years.  We have been particularly 
generous with respect to food and HIV/AIDs assistance. 
 
3. (SBU) We would like you to focus your visit on the 
alarming food situation in the country and on the aftermath 
of Operation Restore Order, the GOZ,s latest act of 
repression.  In the words of Secretary Rice, it is an 
&outpost of evil8 as the operation, which destroyed the 
homes and livelihoods of 700,000 people, made manifest.  Our 
goals for your visit are to convince the GOZ to be more 
transparent about its needs and plans for addressing the 
country,s massive food shortage and to make clear to the 
Zimbabwean people and the world at large that if asked we are 
ready to provide food assistance. 
 
4. (C) The GOZ is an extremely difficult government to work 
with.  They have publicly blamed Western sanctions for their 
economic difficulties and have attributed those sanctions to 
Western ire over the seizure of land from white farmers. 
Along with the UK, we are their favorite targets.  The 
government has muzzled most of the country,s independent 
press and the local media playing field is heavily tilted in 
the GOZ,s favor.  For that reason, we recommend that you 
hold your press conference in Johannesburg after your visit 
and limit your press exposure while in Zimbabwe. 
 
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Humanitarian Crisis 
------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) Zimbabwe has faced growing food insecurity over the 
last few years due principally to the disruptive effects of 
its fast-track land reform program.  Drought and government 
overregulation and mismanagement of the economy have also 
been factors.  Maize (corn) is the staple crop and the 
harvest this year will likely be one of the worst since 
independence.  Reliable estimates put it at 400,000 metric 
tons (MTS), a fourth of the country,s food needs.  The 
government has acknowledged that it needs to import 1.2 
million MTs of maize to meet the country,s needs.  The GOZ 
has told the World Food Program and us that while they will 
accept food assistance, they have the situation in hand and 
will not ask for it.  The GOZ claims that they have 
contracted with South African suppliers for the delivery of 
all of the needed maize at favorable prices.  Imports did 
increase in May and June to around 100,000 MTs, but have 
since fallen off and there remain major questions about the 
government,s ability to import all of the needed food. 
 
6. (SBU) The Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee 
estimates that nearly 3 million of the country,s 11.6 
million people will be food insecure by the end of the year, 
but independent experts believe the true number of food 
insecure people will be much larger, possibly as many as 6 
million people.  WFP is concerned at the pace of donor 
contributions.  They acknowledge that greater transparency on 
the part of the GOZ would be a spur to donations and have 
encouraged such transparency but to little effect.  In the 
absence of GOZ cooperation, WFP has reworked its regional 
food appeal to include an additional 300,000 MTs of food aid 
for Zimbabwe. 
 
7. (SBU) The humanitarian crisis has been exacerbated by 
&Operation Murambatsvina,8 or &Restore Order8, which made 
hundreds of thousands homeless in Zimbabwe,s coldest months 
of the year without access to food, water, sanitation, health 
care or education.  The UN Special Envoy, Anna Tibaijuka, 
found that it was carried out in an indiscriminate and 
unjustified manner with indifference to human suffering and 
without regard for local and international law.  The result 
of the Government of Zimbabwe,s actions is an enormous, 
man-made humanitarian tragedy.  The International Office for 
Migration (IOM) estimates that 40,000 households 
(approximately 200,000 people) require urgent humanitarian 
assistance.  Approximately half of these 40,000 households 
(20,000) are living out in the open and need temporary 
shelter.  Zimbabwe has one of the highest HIV/AIDS prevalence 
rates in the world, with a prevalence rate of 24.6% among the 
adult population, and many of the operation,s victims are 
part of the country,s most vulnerable groups, including the 
HIV positive.  The US has contributed nearly $2 million 
dollars to assist these victims, mostly provided through IOM. 
 
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Political Situation 
------------------- 
 
8. (C) In December, 2004 President Mugabe chose Joyce Mujuru, 
the wife of the former commander of Zimbabwe,s Defense 
Forces to be one of his two Vice Presidents and his heir 
apparent.  In doing so, the 82-year old Mugabe set in motion 
the transition to the country,s post-Mugabe future.  The 
pace of that transition is not yet clear, but it is widely 
expected that Mugabe will step down as President by 2008, 
when the next elections are to be held.  Mugabe chose Joyce 
Mujuru over the man who had been seen for many years as his 
likely successor, former Speaker of Parliament Emmerson 
Mnangagwa.  Mnangagwa,s supporters are not yet reconciled to 
the Mujuru,s ascendancy.  Several prominent supporters have 
recently left the ruling ZANU-PF party and have talked about 
creating a &third force8 in Zimbabwean politics. 
 
9. (C) Beyond personal ambition, ethnic politics will play a 
key role in the succession struggle.  The Mujurus, like 
Mugabe, come from the Zezerou, a sub-set of the county,s 
majority Shona.  Mugabe and the Zezerou have dominated 
ZANU-PF and the country,s political life since independence 
through an elaborate patronage system that is deteriorating 
with economic decline, as well as through violence and 
repression.  Mnangagwa is an ethnic Karanga, like the Zezerou 
a part of the country,s majority Shona population.  The 
Karanga are restive at the prospect of continued Zezerou 
predominance, as is the third major part of the Shona, the 
Manicas, who predominate in the Eastern Highlands you will 
visit.  The country,s other major ethnic group, the Ndebele, 
comprise roughly a third of the population and are 
concentrated in the country,s southwest.  The government 
suppressed the Ndebele in the 1980s and killed tens of 
thousands of civilians in the process.  The Ndebele are now 
the most reliable bloc of opposition voters. 
 
10. (C) The other key political event of the past six months 
was the March 2005 parliamentary elections.  Notwithstanding 
the sharp divisions within ZANU-PF, the ruling party 
significantly strengthened its position, taking 78 out of 120 
elected seats (another thirty are appointed by the president 
giving ZANU-PF the two-thirds majority needed to amend the 
constitution at will).  In the absence of international 
observers, the Embassy mounted a major observation effort in 
conjunction with like-minded nations.  As a result of our 
direct observations we condemned the elections.  Not only did 
the government heavily tilt the playing field but it also 
appears to have rigged the results in a number of 
constituencies and has ignored requests to release the 
polling data.  The country,s democratic forces, including 
especially the opposition Movement for Democratic Change 
(MDC), have not recovered from the March electoral defeat, 
and have remained unable to coordinate their activities or 
demonstrate leadership to Zimbabwe,s disaffected masses. 
 
11. (C) Following the parliamentary elections, with its 
two-thirds majority secure, many observers expected the GOZ 
to moderate its policies and reach out to the international 
community.  Instead, the GOZ has continued to employ 
repressive tactics against the country,s democratic forces, 
including restricting the independent media and harassing 
those non-government organizations (NGOs) pushing for greater 
democratic space.  The GOZ also launched Operation Restore 
Order, which though it appears to have strengthened their 
hold on the country has cost them support both 
internationally and regionally.  In particular, Tibaijuka,s 
report, written by an African at the behest of an African UN 
Secretary General has put added pressure on South African 
 
SIPDIS 
President Mbeki and other regional leaders to reign-in 
Mugabe. 
 
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Economic Situation 
------------------ 
 
12. (SBU) Economically, Zimbabwe is rapidly melting down. 
The IMF team that came in May 2005 to conduct an Article IV 
inspection predicted that GDP would drop by 7 percent, a 
seventh consecutive year of decline while sub-Saharan Africa 
as a whole has recorded an average gross domestic product 
(GDP) growth rate of 3.4% over that time span.  The IMF also 
estimated the GOZ,s budget deficit at 14.5 percent and 
predicted inflation would top 300 percent this year.  Worse, 
the IMF team said the government appeared unconcerned about 
his state of affairs and unwilling to consider policy changes 
to improve the country,s economic outlook. 
 
13. (SBU) Three interlinked shortages have contributed to the 
sense that the economy is in freefall: food, fuel, and 
foreign exchange.  We discussed the food situation above. 
The fuel crisis is equally dire.  The country has literally 
been bereft of fuel for months.  The price on the black 
market is up to z$80,000 a liter, eight times the official 
price (roughly U.S. $10 a gallon) and even at that price is 
almost impossible to find.  Economic activity is grinding to 
a halt as a result of the fuel shortages.  The country is not 
only desperately short of food and fuel it also lacks the 
foreign exchange needed to buy them.  The IMF estimated 
effective reserves at zero.  With no access to balance of 
payments support, the country is caught in a vicious circle 
of declining exports leading to less foreign exchange leading 
to further declines in exports. 
 
14. (SBU) The GOZ has sought external support as a way out of 
its self-created crisis.  Mugabe returned essentially empty 
handed from his recent visit to China, putting even greater 
emphasis on the negotiations with the South Africans for a 
bridge loan.  The SAG has agreed to the loan, which must 
still be debated and approved by the South African 
Parliament, but is reportedly considering placing economic 
and political conditions on the loan, which would mark a 
major departure in SAG-GOZ relations. 
 
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Conclusion 
---------- 
 
15. (C) The turn to repression symbolized by Operation 
Restore Order has cost the regime support internationally, 
regionally, and domestically.  The Europeans have stiffened 
their resolve and even the region may finally have had enough 
if recent signals from South Africa are to be believed.  ZANU 
itself is riven with dissension, exacerbated by the 
succession struggle and the decline of patronage, waiting 
only for Mugabe,s passing or incapacitation to burst forth. 
For its part, the MDC bides its time, convinced that the 
regime will implode and that it will pick up the pieces.  The 
country,s future remains unpredictable but one thing seems 
clear after this winter, the restoration of democracy and 
prosperity in Zimbabwe will be more difficult, especially as 
what remains of the educated populace appears increasingly 
ready to throw in the towel and emigrate.  The remainder of 
the population, psychologically scarred but unable to leave, 
is hunkering down and trying to survive what could be a very 
bad next few years. 
SCHULTZ