US embassy cable - 05THEHAGUE2156

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NETHERLANDS/HUMAN RIGHTS: WORKING TOGETHER ON HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL AND IN THIRD COMMITTEE

Identifier: 05THEHAGUE2156
Wikileaks: View 05THEHAGUE2156 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy The Hague
Created: 2005-08-05 09:33:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PHUM PGOV NL USUN
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002156 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PGOV, NL, USUN 
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/HUMAN RIGHTS:  WORKING TOGETHER ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL AND IN THIRD COMMITTEE 
 
REF: SICADE-FALLS-SCHOFER E-MAIL 8/3/05 
 
Classified By: DCM CHAT BLAKEMAN FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: The Dutch support the establishment of a 
Human Rights Council to replace the Commission on Human 
Rights (CHR), but have specific questions regarding numbers 
and criteria for membership.  The Dutch believe that the new 
Council should be a standing body with the status of a 
"principle organ" of the UN.  During the upcoming Third 
Committee session, the EU will seek U.S. support for 
resolutions on Burma, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, and 
possibly DPRK and Sudan.  The Dutch have asked whether the 
U.S. would support an EU resolution on Zimbabwe; please see 
guidance request in para 7.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) DCM took advantage of an August 3 introductory call on 
Piet de Klerk, the Dutch MFA's Special Ambassador for Human 
Rights, to discuss current proposals for a new Human Rights 
Council (to replace the UN Commission on Human Rights) and 
the Third Committee agenda for the upcoming UNGA.  (Note: 
Guantanamo discussion reported septel.) 
De Klerk was accompanied by Anneke Adema (Director of the 
MFA's Human Rights Department) and Guillaume Teerling (Desk 
Officer in the Human Rights Department); POLCOUNS accompanied 
DCM. 
 
HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL:  MOVING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION 
 
3. (C) De Klerk and Adema agreed that, in principle, the 
Dutch supported the objectives of the Ping report and U.S. 
proposals for creating a new "Human Rights Council" to 
replace the UN Commission on Human Rights.  Thinking on this 
new body, they said, appeared to be "shaping up" nicely and 
gaining support.  On the specific question of numbers, the 
Dutch understood the U.S. desire to keep membership 
restricted, but worried that "20-30" was too low; the SYG's 
range of "30-50" appeared more realistic.  Dutch concerns in 
this area, they stressed, are purely practical -- as a small 
nation, the odds of being elected to the Council are more 
favorable with a larger membership.  At the same time, the 
Dutch were looking favorably at the idea of combining the 
Western and Eastern European groups -- even though this could 
work against them getting elected -- because it sent a 
positive signal about the end of Cold-War divisions in Europe. 
 
4. (C) Commenting on the U.S. proposal to limit membership in 
the new body to UNGA members not under UNSC sanctions, de 
Klerk observed that the Dutch would also like to see some 
"positive" incentives for membership.  These might take the 
form of "pledges" taken by candidates for membership -- for 
example, to sign international Human Rights agreements and 
uphold their principles.  DCM reiterated that the U.S. was 
only looking at a "very narrow" basis for denying membership, 
i.e., states should not be under sanctions.  POLCOUNS asked 
how the additional Dutch "incentives" would work given the 
continuing relevance of regional groupings; would all states 
in all groups be expected to make the same commitments?  De 
Klerk and Adema acknowledged that their ideas in this area 
were still not fully developed, and stressed that such 
pledges or other commitments would be primarily "moral" in 
nature rather than obligatory. 
 
5. (C) De Klerk and Adema said that the Dutch supported 
making the Human Rights Council a "principal organ" of the UN 
system.  Adema added that it would send the right signal to 
have all three "pillars" of the international system -- 
cooperation, development, and human rights -- identified with 
similar "organs."  De Klerk suggested that calling the new 
body a "council" would raise its status "into the Security 
Council range."  Both stressed that making the new Council a 
standing body and giving it the power to react quickly to 
crises and emergencies would be essential to its success. 
Pressed on what sort of actions they envisioned being taken 
by the new Council, Adema and de Klerk agreed that these 
should primarily involve drawing attention to human rights 
concerns, tasking the HR commissioner and rapporteurs, and 
referring the most serious issues to the Security Council. 
 
THIRD COMMITTEE AGENDA 
 
6. (C) Turning to the Third Committee, Adema said that the 
Dutch hoped to work closely with the U.S. in the upcoming 
round to ensure that the U.S. and EU coordinated their 
efforts effectively.  The EU, she said, expected to put 
forward resolutions on Burma, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and 
possibly the DPRK and Sudan.  On DPRK, she stressed that the 
EU was still considering whether it was worthwhile to pursue 
a resolution both in New York and Geneva, or just the latter. 
 She noted that the EU was considering putting forward some 
African resolutions, including on Sudan, but hoped to 
coordinate first with the African Union (which was proving 
problematic.)  Drawing from ref, DCM observed that the U.S. 
felt that Sudan was an currently more of an issue for the 
Security Council than the Third Committee.  In response, 
Adema observed that failure to address the Human Rights 
aspects of the Sudan situation by those bodies explicitly 
tasked with Human Rights responsibilities -- whether the 
Third Committee, the CHR, or the new Human Rights Council -- 
would only undercut the credibility of those bodies over the 
long term.  DCM asked whether the EU was considering putting 
forward a resolution on Belarus, noting (per ref) that the 
U.S. considered the CHR resolution with a special rapporteur 
to be sufficient at this time.  Adema did not push back. 
 
7. (C)  Following the meeting, POLCOUNS was contacted by 
Guillaume Teerling, who asked whether the U.S. would be 
prepared to support an EU Third Committee resolution on 
Zimbabwe.  He stressed that, while the coinciding Zimbabwean 
elections made such a resolution politically impractical 
during the CHR, the EU now believes that such a resolution is 
necessary in light of the devastating effects of operation 
restore order.  Post would appreciate guidance on how to 
respond. 
BLAKEMAN 

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