US embassy cable - 02COLOMBO1787

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GSL/LTTE prisoner exchange seems set; Both sides begin to grapple with complex MIA issues

Identifier: 02COLOMBO1787
Wikileaks: View 02COLOMBO1787 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Colombo
Created: 2002-09-25 10:49:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PTER PINS PHUM CE LTTE
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001787 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, DRL; NSC FOR E. MILLARD 
 
NEW DELHI PLS PASS TO AMBASSADOR WILLS 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL:  09-25-12 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PINS, PHUM, CE, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT:  GSL/LTTE prisoner exchange seems set; Both 
sides begin to grapple with complex MIA issues 
 
Refs:  Colombo 1778, and previous 
 
(U) Classified by W. Lewis Amselem, Charge d'Affaires. 
Reasons 1.5 (b, d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  The GSL and the Tamil Tigers seem set 
to conduct a prisoner exchange soon.  In a related 
development, MIA issues were discussed during the recent 
talks in Thailand, with the two sides agreeing to review 
the issue again.  Newly on the radar screen is 
discussion of a possible general amnesty for conflict- 
related crimes or even formation of a "truth and 
reconciliation" process down the road.  The fact that 
these sensitive issues are even under discussion 
highlights just how far the peace process has moved the 
debate.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------- 
Prisoner Exchange seems set 
--------------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) The Sri Lankan government and the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) seem set to conduct a 
prisoner exchange soon.  The GSL has publicly indicated 
that it plans to release 13 LTTE operatives in exchange 
for seven military personnel held by the LTTE.  Defense 
Secretary Austin Fernando has publicly said the exchange 
 
SIPDIS 
appears ready to go forward on September 28.  If the 
prisoner exchange takes place, it would the first 
release orchestrated between the two sides since 
January 2002 when the LTTE released 10 prisoners (seven 
civilians and three soldiers) as a confidence-building 
gesture. 
 
3.  (C) The prisoner exchange has been under discussion 
for months, and has involved the Norwegian government 
facilitation channel and ICRC.  The LTTE originally 
requested the release of over 20 of its cadre from 
government jails.  The government balked at this number, 
after discovering that several of those mentioned on the 
LTTE's list had been involved in serious terrorist 
offenses, including one individual who was directly 
linked with the attempted assassination of President 
Kumaratunga in December 1999.  The GSL whittled the 
number to be released down to 13, one of them being a 
LTTE cadre named "Kennedy," who was allegedly the leader 
of a suicide attack on a government base in Jaffna in 
1994.  On the LTTE's part, the group claimed that it 
only had seven GSL prisoners in custody total and was 
willing to release all of them. 
 
4.  (SBU) (((Note:  Even with the prospective release of 
the 13 LTTE operatives, an estimated 800 or so Tamils 
still remain incarcerated under provisions of the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act -- PTA.  These Tamils are 
accused of LTTE terrorist-related activities.  Tamil 
politicians ritually demand that these suspects be 
released and that the PTA be revoked.))) 
 
---------------------- 
MIA issues to the fore 
---------------------- 
 
5.  (C) In a related development, Missing in Action 
(MIA) issues were also discussed during the recent talks 
in Thailand.  Rauf Hakeem, the Muslim leader who was a 
member of the GSL's team at the talks, told Charge 
during their September 24 meeting that the GSL side had 
queried the LTTE side about working together on MIA 
issues (see Reftel for more on the Hakeem meeting). 
(Note:  Groups in the south claim that there are 
hundreds of GSL soldiers and some Sri Lankan civilians 
unaccounted for.)  According to Hakeem, Anton 
Balasingham, the LTTE's chief negotiator, used the 
occasion to assert that the LTTE had offered the GSL the 
opportunity to check out battlefields for bodies right 
after military engagements.  He asserted, however, that 
the government, then-controlled by President 
Kumaratunga, had peremptorily refused these offers 
because of its "war-like nature."  Given Balasingham's 
testy response, the GSL agreed to discuss the issue in 
the future, after Balasingham had met with his 
leadership. 
 
6.  (C) The MIA issue is an emotive one in the south. 
Jehan Perera, the head of a pro-peace process think- 
tank, told polchief on September 25 that the relatives 
of the MIAs "are well organized and politically 
engaged."  Pressure on politicians to obtain answers on 
MIA issues is "immense," he noted.  In a recent 
conversation with Charge, Milinda Moragoda, a minister 
and key member of the GSL's peace process team, remarked 
that the MIA issue was important to many of his 
constituents. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Possible Amnesty, "Truth Commission"? 
------------------------------------- 
 
7.  (C) Newly on the radar screen is discussion of a 
possible general amnesty for conflict-related crimes or 
even formation of a "truth and reconciliation" process 
down the road.  Charge discussed the emergence of such 
issues with Norwegian Ambassador Jon Westborg, who was 
present at the Thai talks.  Westborg observed that the 
discussion of MIA issues in Thailand (reviewed above) 
became somewhat stilted when the LTTE began to realize 
that the MIA issue was more complex than it originally 
appeared.  Balasingham, for one, quickly became 
cognizant that the whole question of MIA issues had 
ramifications for the LTTE in that the group could open 
itself up to a process it had little control of if it 
was not careful.  Given these complexities and potential 
ramifications, Westborg noted that the two sides would 
have to carefully mull over their views on the MIA issue 
and its potential linkages to other complex issues, such 
as a possible general amnesty. 
 
8.  (C) Sri Lankans, in general, do not appear to have 
given much thought to the amnesty/"truth" commission 
issue.  Jehan Perera told polchief that Sri Lankans have 
been so busy just enmeshing themselves in a peace 
process that they have not really focused on such 
issues.  He noted that the whole issue is bound to be 
controversial because it involves "some sort of 
forgiveness for the other sides' crimes."  Perera said 
he and other civil society advocates would favor 
formation of a South Africa-style "truth and 
reconciliation" commission in which human rights 
offenders had to admit their guilt or face punishment. 
Ambassador Westborg told Charge, however, that he 
thought Sri Lankan culture was more suited to something 
a bit less confrontational.  A process in which families 
simply found out information on what happened to their 
loved ones might be more acceptable, he speculated. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
9.  (C) The fact that all of these issues are even under 
discussion highlights just how far the peace process has 
moved the debate.  As Jehan Perera noted above, Sri 
Lankans have been so busy just trying to survive the 
conflict that they have not had the time to really 
consider the potential ramifications of MIA or amnesty- 
related issues.  With the peace process making fast 
progress, however, the short-term blinders are now being 
taken off and the realization is settling in that 
complex matters of this sort need to be grappled with if 
the process is to move forward.  Based on our soundings, 
the GSL will probably pick up on these issues quickly. 
The LTTE, however, is notoriously slow on the uptake, 
which might make progress difficult.  The LTTE would 
almost certainly have problems confronting its bloody 
past, for example, as the group has shown little 
capacity for self-reflection.  End Comment. 
 
10.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
AMSELEM 

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