US embassy cable - 05BOGOTA7402

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 BOGOTA 007402 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MARR, MOPS, PHUM, SNAR, CO 
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS MEETS WITH PRESIDENT URIBE 
 
REF: SECSTATE 134796 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (U) July 26, 2005, 4:00-5:30 pm, Casa de Narino, Bogota 
 
2. (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
--- 
 
R. Nicholas Burns, U/S for Political Affairs 
Ambassador William B. Wood 
Cynthia Echeverria, P Special Assistant 
Jeffrey DeLaurentis, Polcouns (notetaker) 
Luis Guio, Interpreter 
 
Colombia 
-------- 
 
Alvaro Uribe Velez, President 
Camilo Ospina, Minister of Defense 
Acting Foreign Minister Camilo Reyes 
Presidential Communications Director Jaime Bermudez 
Francisco Gonzalez, MFA (notetaker) 
 
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Summary 
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3. (S) During a warm, productive and candid meeting, U/S 
Burns told President Uribe that President Bush would deliver 
a message of strong, continued support in Crawford on August 
4, in particular regarding GOC counter-narcotics and 
counter-terrorism efforts.  At the same time, noting 
differing views among some members of Congress, Burns pressed 
for more progress on several long-standing human rights 
cases, including on San Jose de Apartado and Mapiripan, to 
strengthen the human rights certification, and urged Uribe to 
rigorously and energetically implement the new justice and 
peace law.  He cautioned that, unless addressed, these 
negative perceptions could affect ongoing U.S. support for 
Colombia.  He called on the President to make a public, 
renewed commitment to expeditiously adjudicate the human 
rights cases in question, and to do everything under his 
executive powers to accelerate progress.  He also urged the 
GOC to respond to concerns that the justice and peace law 
impeded extraditions.  He encouraged Uribe to visit 
Washington en route to the UNGA to make his case directly to 
the Congress on both issues. Uribe assured U/S Burns that his 
government remained committed to protecting human rights and 
that implementation of the new law would be accelerated and 
rigorous.  He had already urged the Prosecutor General to 
make a public statement on GOC efforts to complete its 
investigation on San Jose de Apartado.  On counter-narcotics 
efforts, Uribe said he was looking for new ways to encourage 
families to abandon growing illicit drugs and engage them in 
crop substitution programs.  Burns encouraged newly-appointed 
Minister of Defense Ospina to also visit Washington soon for 
discussions at DOD and State.  Ospina quipped that he was 
Secretary Rumsfeld's deputy in Colombia, "coordinating his 
 
SIPDIS 
third front of the war on terrorism."  Burns thanked Uribe 
for GOC efforts to secure the release of the three U.S. 
hostages.  While acknowledging that the French had launched a 
new campaign to pressure him to negotiate the release of 
Colombian-French hostage Ingrid Bentancourt, Uribe was 
emphatic that he would make no deal that did not include the 
three Americans.  On Venezuela, Uribe was particularly 
candid.  He called Chavez a mix of someone with imperial 
sentiments and drunk with socialism.  He said Chavez has 
dreams of an hemispheric television station and a unified oil 
company, and was looking to create a new coalition to 
confront the U.S.  He urged the U.S. to reach out to those in 
the hemisphere Chavez believes are his friends.  Uribe, in 
resignation, lamented that, given Chavez's efforts to create 
a "new socialism," his total domination over Venezuelan 
institutions, the lack of opposition and checks and balances, 
and the prospects of hyper-inflation, political unrest was 
probably inevitable.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
IDB and Colombian Ambassador to the U.S. Luis Alberto Moreno 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
4. (C) Uribe arrived a few minutes late, explaining that he 
had just finished a telephone call with the president of 
Guyana, lobbying for Ambassador Moreno's candidacy for 
president of the IDB.  The election was the following day and 
Moreno needed one more country to secure a win in the first 
round of voting.  Uribe was convinced that if voting went 
into a second round, Brazil and Venezuela would form a 
coalition on behalf of the Brazilian candidate.  U/S Burns 
said the U.S. was fully behind Moreno and had lobbied 
extensively as well (reftel).  Uribe stressed that he would 
do a terrific job at the IBD but it would be extremely 
difficult to find a suitable replacement for him as 
ambassador to the U.S.  In the middle of the meeting, Uribe 
took a call from his counterpart from Ecuador who pledged to 
support Moreno.  President Palacio told Uribe that Chavez had 
called him earlier in the day asking Ecuador to support the 
Brazilian candidate. 
 
------------------------- 
U.S. Support for Colombia 
------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Uribe expressed appreciation for U/S Burn's visit as 
well as for ongoing support from the U.S., including the 
Congress and the embassy.  "With the difficulties we face on 
a daily basis, U.S. assistance has been critical and I have 
no words to express my gratitude."  U/S Burns underscored 
that the GOC had made tremendous progress fighting drugs and 
terrorism under Uribe's leadership, and U.S. support would 
continue as a result.  Uribe acknowledged that the numbers of 
kidnappings, homicides, and drugs eradicated or seized 
remained high in absolute terms, but the numbers were 
decreasing in relative terms and the trend lines were good. 
That said, while the reduction in coca production was 
positive, he wanted to make an even greater effort in 2005 to 
achieve an even steeper decline.  We are winning the war, he 
said, but have not won yet and need to stay the course.  The 
Ambassador noted that 100,000 hectares of cocaine had been 
sprayed in 2005 so far, putting us 25 percent ahead of last 
year when total hectares sprayed reached 135,000.  U/S Burns 
noted that the Afghans in comparison had destroyed only 216 
and a half hectares thus far.  Our aim is to destroy drugs, 
said Uribe, and the GOC was also ready to provide Afghanistan 
technical assistance and experience. 
 
6. (C) Uribe reviewed GOC strategy for fighting 
narcotraffickers.  This included using aerial and manual 
eradication, extradition, and crop substitution (i.e. 
alternative development initiatives).  The GOC had the 
political will to make adjustments to be even more effective. 
 For instance, this year GOC officials had accelerated manual 
eradication to complement aerial efforts.  So far, they had 
eradicated 11,000 hectares with prospects to achieve 30,000 
hectares by the end of the year. 
 
7. (C) Uribe said he wanted to reward communities who 
assisted military and police forces discover illicit drug 
storage facilities hidden in the jungle.  He was also looking 
at ways to encourage families to abandon growing illicit 
drugs and engage them in a program of crop substitution. 
(Note: Uribe reportedly made ad hoc comments during a town 
hall discussion last weekend in the department of Meta that 
the GOC would buy illegal crops of coca directly from farmers 
in exchange for a promise from them to never grow coca again. 
 This has met with criticism from the Colombian Congress and 
presidential candidates.  GOC officials subsequently 
clarified Uribe's remarks by saying the GOC would pay for 
information from farmers about the production and storage of 
cocaine.)  Uribe understood the idea was controversial but 
believed it could provide results.  The Ambassador responded 
that a reward for information that helped locate and seize 
drugs was a solid proposal but purchasing drugs from growers 
was another matter.  The UN was already prepared to publicly 
criticize the idea.  He told Uribe the USG would think about 
innovative ways to encourage small farmers to abandon growing 
illicit drugs and come back with some proposals.  Perhaps a 
credible non-governmental organization could help.  U/S Burns 
said he would also alert the President and Secretary that 
this was on Uribe's mind. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
August 4 Meeting at Crawford/Split View from Washington 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
8. (C) U/S Burns said the President was looking forward to 
the meeting in Crawford and he had come to Colombia, in part, 
to discuss how to ensure a positive result.  Uribe would hear 
a message of strong, continued support from President Bush, 
in particular regarding GOC counter-narcotic and 
counter-terrorism efforts.  Uribe repeated that he wanted 
even better results. 
9. (C) Burns noted that the view was different from some on 
Capitol Hill and in the human rights community.  Concern over 
the lack of progress on several prominent, longstanding human 
rights cases, coupled with a perception that the new Law on 
Justice and Peace governing AUC demobilizations was too 
lenient, was raising questions about GOC commitment to 
improving human rights in the country.  Burns cautioned that 
these negative perceptions in the Congress could affect 
ongoing U.S. support for the successor to Plan Colombia.  He 
suggested Uribe arrive in Crawford with a sense of his 
strategy over the next five to six years for Plan Colombia 
follow on.  Beyond the concerns on human rights and the law, 
the budget for foreign assistance would be leaner in coming 
years.  Multi-year commitments would not be possible.  The 
case for ongoing support at similar levels would have to be 
made annually. 
 
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Concern about Progress on Human Rights 
-------------------------------------- 
 
10. (C) Burns reiterated the concern of some that the GOC was 
not acting quickly and concretely enough in adjudicating 
outstanding human rights cases, in particular regarding 
Mapiripan, now seven years old, Arauca, and the February 
massacre in San Jose de Apartado.  He recommended Uribe 
authorize a public statement that the GOC would make a 
renewed effort to act quickly in successfully bringing these 
cases to conclusion.  While recognizing that several were 
being adjudicated in the courts, Burns also urged Uribe do 
everything under his executive powers and discretion to 
accelerate progress.  The Secretary still had to certify to 
Congress on the human rights situation and had already 
delayed it in the hopes further progress could be reported. 
Without a credible certification, there was a danger that 
some members of Congress would attach additional restrictions 
to future aid to Colombia.  The Department needed "to see in 
your statements and actions a renewed determination and 
commitment to address these cases," he said. 
 
11. (C) Uribe said he understood the situation.  He was 
confident the new Fiscal (Prosecutor General) would do 
everything he could to accelerate the ongoing investigations. 
 He had already asked the outgoing Fiscal to make a public 
statement in the next few days on the status of the GOC 
investigation on San Jose de Apartado.  He also defended his 
Administration's record, noting that the number of such 
incidents had been dramatically reduced under his presidency 
and that the GOC response had been thoroughly transparent. 
He again committed to call the Prosecutor General to ensure a 
statement on San Jose de Apartado was released before 
Crawford. 
 
------------------------- 
Law for Justice and Peace 
------------------------- 
 
12. (C) Uribe told the U/S that he had met with Spanish judge 
Balthazar Garzon and other leaders for three hours during his 
recent visit in Spain to discuss the law.  Garzon had said 
the law was too lenient because there was no balance between 
the gravity of the crime and the length of the sentence. 
Uribe agreed but told Garzon it was the price of a peace 
process.  It had to be compared to previous demobilization 
laws in Colombia which had no justice component, and laws 
dealing with other peace processes around the world.  For the 
first time, the GOC secured approval of a law for peace with 
justice, he insisted.  There was no pardon for atrocities; 
the concept of justice and reparations was on the books in 
Colombia for the first time.  Uribe also insisted that the 
law would apply to all illegal armed groups who wanted to 
demobilize.  He stressed that many complained the law was too 
tough for the guerrillas and too weak for the paramilitaries. 
 The guerrillas continued to insist they would accept only 
amnesty and no jail time.  In his view, the law struck a 
balance equally applicable to all illegal armed groups.   At 
the same time, he acknowledged that compromises had to be 
made.  The investigatory scheme set out in the law was 
satisfactory to get to the truth, but in a country which used 
to average over 30,000 assassinations a year, to investigate 
everything was an unrealistic dream. 
13. (C) U/S Burns said he had met with human rights NGOs 
earlier in the day.  Many were critical of the law and 
believed it endorsed impunity.  He had responded that the 
U.S. supported the law, and was convinced it would be 
effective with rigorous and energetic implementation.  The 
GOC had to ensure the law was aggressively applied.   Uribe 
agreed and per U.S. suggestions, would demand that the law's 
implementation be accelerated and rigorous.  He had already 
communicated this to Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo. 
 Ambassador also suggested that, as the GOC defines the 
process, it make its decisions public.  The GOC had to be 
pro-active in explaining how it intended to implement the 
law.  Critics were filling the void while the GOC remained 
silent.  For example, a local NGO told U/S Burns there would 
be no meaningful investigation under the law.  You can answer 
this, said the Ambassador.  U/S Burns also encouraged Uribe 
to come to Washington on his way to the UNGA in mid-September 
to make his case to the Congress.  Uribe agreed. 
 
14. (C) U/S Burns said the impact on extraditions was another 
concern on the law.  It would be useful for the GOC to 
respond to NGO assertions that law impeded extraditions. 
Uribe insisted that it did not/not impede extraditions and 
the GOC would continue extraditing criminals to the U.S.  He 
acknowledged, however, that there would be some instances 
when he would delay extraditions, in particular for 
paramilitary "ringleaders,"  as a lever for their future 
behavior.  U/S Burns insisted that the U.S. wanted to see 
anyone who violated U.S. law or harmed U.S. citizens remain 
subject to extradition. 
 
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MOD Visit to Washington 
----------------------- 
 
15. (C) U/S Burns said the U.S. was ready to discuss enhanced 
mil-to-mil relations when GOC officials were ready. He 
encouraged newly-appointed Minister of Defense Camilo Ospina 
to visit Washington soon for discussions at DoD and State. 
Ospina readily agreed and Burns said he would take back 
Ospina's interest to Secretary Rumsfeld.  (Note: In a 
subsequent conversation with the Ambassador, Ospina said 
Colombia wants the deepest possible defense relationship, but 
that there continued to be a dispute within the government as 
to timing.  In general, the GOC is of the view that nothing 
important should happen before the Constitutional Court on 
re-election, mid- to late-September.  President Uribe and 
Ospina expect to have their thinking sorted out before the 
meeting with President Bush in Crawford.) 
 
--------------------------------- 
U.S. Hostages/Humanitarian Accord 
--------------------------------- 
 
16. (C) U/S Burns thanked President Uribe for ongoing GOC 
efforts to secure the release of the three U.S. hostages held 
by the FARC for over two years.  Anything more the GOC could 
do would be greatly appreciated.  Burns said the U.S. would 
continue to rely on the GOC's guidance and wisdom and was 
prepared to help in any way.  Uribe responded that the GOC 
continued to work closely with the Embassy.  If there were 
any military operation the U.S. believed should be undertaken 
to secure the hostages' release, his forces would "stand 
shoulder to shoulder with the U.S." in carrying it out. 
 
17. (C) Uribe said he was scheduled to meet the mother of 
Colombian-French hostage Ingrid Betancourt later in the day. 
French Prime Minister Dominique De Villepan was pushing him 
hard to negotiate Betancourt's release as part of a 
humanitarian exchange.  He stated emphatically that he would 
not go forward with any deal that did not include the three 
Americans.  Uribe stressed that he would refuse any exchange 
that included GOC-held FARC members guilty of crimes under 
the Colombian Constitution.  He would also insist that FARC 
prisoners released as part of an humanitarian exchange be 
immediately deported to France with GOF guarantees that they 
did not return to Colombia and re-join FARC ranks.  Uribe 
promised to keep Ambassador Wood apprised of all details on 
any negotiations that could affect the U.S. hostages.  He 
also predicted that the FARC would be more inclined to 
negotiate seriously now for such an exchange if the 
Constitutional Court approved presidential re-election. 
However, the FARC would wait until a new government was in 
place if re-election was shot down by the court. 
 
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Venezuela 
--------- 
18. (C) U/S Burns told Uribe that the Secretary appreciated 
hearing his views on how to handle Chavez during her April 
visit.  She was determined not to make Chavez into something 
bigger by responding to every jab.  President Bush was also 
focused on Venezuela and looked forward to a discussion at 
Crawford.  The U.S. had no ministerial contact with the GOV 
at this point and welcomed Uribe's insights. 
 
19. (S) Uribe noted that Chavez had been quieter in the last 
two months and had, for example, agreed to extradite FARC 
leader Chiguiro to Colombia without a formal GOC request. 
Nonetheless, he did not trust Chavez.  He never talked to him 
alone; he always brought along Foreign Minister Barco or some 
other witness.  On GOV links to the FARC, Uribe said Chavez 
has told him that he does not protect the guerrillas but 
could not deny that some in his political organization 
supported them.  Uribe complained that Chavez had little 
opposition now.  There was no balance of power within the 
government.  All decisions were ultimately made by him. 
Uribe stressed that Chavez had an effective stump speech: he 
claims to be distributing the country's oil wealth through 
subsidies to the populace while previous governments stole 
it.  This was a powerful message and hard to contradict. 
Uribe also expressed surprise that the Venezuelan business 
community was not more jittery, given Chavez's efforts to 
create a "new socialism."  The Venezuelan economy could also 
move into hyper-inflation, he predicted.  Already, inflation 
had increased to 17-20%, compared to 5% in Colombia. 
 
20. (S) According to Uribe, Chavez was a mix of someone with 
imperial sentiments, drunk with socialism.  He believed that 
Chavez, with presumed support from President Lula, hoped to 
create a new coalition to confront the U.S.  He has may 
dreams, said Uribe, including a hemispheric television 
station (Telesur) and the unification of oil companies on the 
continent into a regional "petrosur."  He encouraged the U.S. 
to improve relations with Uruguay and others in the region 
Chavez believed were his supporters. 
 
21. (S) Finally, Uribe said he was becoming more and more 
resigned to the notion that, given the current situation in 
Venezuela, political unrest was inevitable. 
DRUCKER