US embassy cable - 05PARIS5350

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 005350 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2014 
TAGS: PREL, FR, EUN 
SUBJECT: FURTHER CLARIFICATION OF VILLEPIN'S STATEMENT ON 
TURKEY-EU NEGOTIATIONS 
 
REF: PARIS 5307 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reaso 
ns 1.4 (B & D). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  Challenged to explain Prime Minister de 
Villepin's August 2 remarks on Turkish accession to the EU 
(reftel), MFA Acting European Director and Assistant to the 
PM's EU Advisor defended them as a justified response to the 
Turkish statement on its non-recognition of Cyprus.  Both 
officials told Pol Deputy Aug. 4 that Villepin's radio 
comments were intended to make clear to Turkey and French 
public opinion that the final results of beginning EU 
accession negotiations with Turkey should not be taken for 
granted, without foreclosing eventual Turkish accession 
either.  Our interlocutors predictably downplayed the 
importance of jockeying between Prime Minister de Villepin 
and Interior Minister Sarkozy in advance of the 2007 
presidential elections, while noting the strong opposition of 
the government's center-right electoral base to eventual 
Turkish accession.  Neither interlocutor contended that 
France intends to block the opening of accession negotiations 
on Oct. 3; Villepin had not referred to any "precondition," 
it was pointed out.  They were careful to state that France's 
position needed to be defined in consultation with its 
European partners, and that Villepin had after all identified 
a real problem that would need to be solved before any 
eventual Turkish EU accession.  We will continue to monitor 
this closely, of course, but as of now, what we are being 
told is that the GOF bottom line is not to require Turkish 
recognition of Cyprus before Oct. 3.  Rather, the GOF will 
insist that the EU make clear to the Turks at an early stage, 
perhaps at the very outset, of the need to resolve the Cyprus 
issue in the course of negotiations.  Significantly, FM 
Douste-Blazy, in a Le Monde interview dated August 5, 
addresses the Turkish accession issue in a slightly less 
provocative way than Villepin did in his radio interview two 
days before.  The MFA had already in its hands a report of 
EUR PDAS Volker's discussions with the French Embassy.  End 
Summary. 
 
2.  (C) In the August absence of higher-ranking officials, 
Pol Deputy met separately August 4 with Acting European 
Cooperation Director Caroline Ferrari and PM Economic Advisor 
Assistant Rainier d'Haussonville to seek an explanation for 
Villepin's August 2 statement on possible new conditions for 
the opening of EU accession negotiations with Turkey on 
October 3 (reftel).  He sought confirmation that ambiguities 
in the French position -- notwithstanding the hard line taken 
vis-a-vis French public opinion and internal political 
jockeying -- did not mean France would insist on setting new 
preconditions or would close the door on opening 
negotiations.  Ferrari was cognizant of USG concerns, and 
specifically of PDAS Volker's contacts in Washington August 3 
with the French Embassy on the subject. 
 
Turks guilty, French serious 
---------------------------- 
 
3. (C) Ferrari blamed Turkey for creating "confusion" with 
its unilateral statement after both France and the Presidency 
had warned Ankara against it.  France had been forced to 
respond, with PM Villepin communicating his "thinking" on the 
subject.  Asked whether it was true that President Chirac, as 
reported in the press, had supported Villepin's statement in 
the August meeting of the Council of Ministers, she affirmed 
that this was indeed the case. (Note:  When asked to confirm, 
the Elysee spokesperson had responded "no comment."  Ferrari 
explained that confirmation of Chirac's position was left to 
the Prime Minister's spokesperson, presumably so as not to 
contradict earlier Presidential statements in favor of 
Turkish accession).  She was nonetheless careful to state 
that France's "position" still needed to be defined in 
consultation with its European partners.  The Turkish 
statement was a "new" element that would need to be taken 
into consideration. 
 
4.  (C) D'Haussonville said Villepin had identified a real 
problem that would need to be solved before any eventual 
Turkish EU accession.  Like Ferrari, he argued that Turkey's 
statement represented a new, if not surprising, element, the 
legal and other ramifications of which needed to be studied 
and discussed with France's other EU partners.  In responding 
to the Turkish declaration, Villepin was also making clear to 
the French people that any negotiations with Turkey would be 
rigorous.  To be credible, negotiations could not be viewed 
as a mere formality with a pre-determined outcome. 
 
Avoiding the words "new preconditions" 
-------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) Asked whether this meant that France was not then 
intent on setting new preconditions for the opening of 
negotiations, d'Haussonville pointed out that Villepin had 
not once used the word "precondition."  He added that 
Villepin's statements in no way contradicted previously 
expressed French views on eventual Turkish EU accession. 
France had always insisted that any negotiations be rigorous 
and serious and that the accession of Turkey be in France's 
and in Europe's interest.  He did not object when Pol Deputy 
interpreted his statements as meaning that France might well 
insist that the EU make certain things clear to Turkey at the 
beginning or in the course of negotiations, but likely would 
not attempt to add new preconditions or delay the opening of 
negotiations. 
 
Political jockeying secondary, domestic concerns real 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
6. (C) Asked about domestic considerations, Ferrari responded 
that the government had to take into account the results of 
the failed EU constitutional referendum.  The French people 
had made clear their concerns about Europe's borders.  She 
brushed off Pol Deputy's interjection that the French 
constitutional amendment subjecting future new EU members 
(after Bulgaria and Romania) to a popular referendum appeared 
to provide all the protection needed.  She also insisted that 
French reticence could not be interpreted as anti-Muslim in 
nature.  She finally conceded that domestic politics were 
also in play, noting that the centrist UDF, the most 
pro-European party on the right, opposed Turkish membership 
in the EU, as did most of the governing center-right UMP. 
 
7.  (C) D'Haussonville repeated many of Ferrari's arguments, 
noting the need to take into account French unease with 
enlargement.  He said it would be impossible to interpret 
France's position as anti-Muslim, given that Turkey was a 
secular state.  He downplayed the importance of maneuvering 
in advance of the 2007 Presidential elections, insisting that 
they were still far off.  Likewise, he brushed off jockeying 
between Villepin and Sarkozy, arguing that former PM and 
Chirac confidante Alain Juppe had expressed -- before Sarkozy 
-- his opposition to Turkish membership.  This was a view 
shared by most in the UMP, whether pro- or anti-Sarkozy. 
 
Next steps 
---------- 
 
8.  (C) On process, Ferrari said the Commission had proposed 
a negotiating framework in early July which had yet to be 
approved by the Council.  So far, COREPER had held one 
superficial debate.  She claimed the issue was not yet on the 
agenda for the August 25 COREPER meeting.  The informal 
Gymnich meeting of Foreign Ministers would thus present the 
first real opportunity for more discussion, although it was 
not empowered to take any decisions.  The only requirement 
was that a decision be reached by October 2. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
9.  (C) We noted previously that Villepin's remarks appeared 
to reflect both a repositioning of French policy following 
the referendum and prepositioning in advance of the 2007 
Presidential elections (reftel).  The Financial Times of 
August 4 asserts that Villepin was thinking particularly 
about the latter, and they're probably right.  Villepin is 
seeking to register as the leader the French people (and 
voter) who can count on him to be tough on Turkey, even if 
that means ruffling feathers in the EU. He is also assuring 
them that the road ahead is a long one without a 
predetermined outcome.  Our official interpreters are 
implying that he will not go beyond that between now and Oct. 
3.  We will continue to monitor closely. 
STAPLETON