US embassy cable - 05BRUSSELS2923

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 002923 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/ERA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2015 
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, EUN, USEU BRUSSELS 
SUBJECT: THE STRUCTURE AND PROGRESS OF THE EU'S CIV-MIL CELL 
 
Classified By: USEU Poloff Lee Litzenberger for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
1. (C/NF) Summary: The EU has created a civilian-military 
cell designed to enhance its strategic and operational 
planning capabilities without detracting from NATO,s role as 
"the natural choice" for a military operation involving the 
European and American allies."  Declared operational on 1 
June 2005, it consists of two components: a branch of 
civilian and military planners who do strategic advance 
planning for civilian, military, and civilian-military ESDP 
operations, and a permanent military staff able to rapidly 
set up and run an operations center in the event of an EU 
Council-authorized autonomous EU operation.  It is currently 
working with DG E IX, the civilian crisis management unit in 
the Council Secretariat, to ensure compatible development of 
military and civilian capabilities (as laid out in the 
military Headline Goal 2010 and civilian Headline Goal 2008). 
It has also been designated as the primary planning body 
responsible for the upcoming EU-led civilian monitoring 
mission to Aceh.  The cell,s director acknowledges 
shortcomings in coordination and capabilities, but this may 
be due to the limited amount of time the cell has been 
functioning rather than a lack of political will to see the 
cell become an effective crisis management tool for the EU. 
End summary. 
 
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Background 
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2. (C/NF) The EU,s civilian-military cell was created as a 
compromise negotiated by the UK, France, and Germany and was 
endorsed by the European Council in December 2003.  France 
and Germany, along with Belgium and Luxembourg, had 
previously called for an independent EU operational 
headquarters in April 2003, but the UK opposed the measure in 
keeping with its preference to advance the European Security 
and Defense Policy (ESDP) in ways that would not detract from 
NATO.  The cell was established within the EU Military Staff 
(EUMS) of the Council Secretariat but is expected to work 
across the EU with civilian units like DG E IX in order to 
anticipate crises and "develop expertise in managing the 
civilian/military interface" of crisis response issues. The 
cell has a planning branch that assists the EUMS and DG E IX 
with strategic advance planning for civilian, military, and 
joint ESDP operations.  It also houses a permanent ops center 
staff responsible for generating the capacity to rapidly set 
up and run an ops center in the event of an autonomous EU 
operation, which occurs if: 1) NATO as a whole chooses not to 
engage; 2) the EU opts not to make use of NATO assets and 
capabilities through Berlin Plus arrangements; and 3) no 
national HQ is identified for the operation.  The civ-mil 
cell was declared operational on 1 June 2005. 
 
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Mission and Structure 
--------------------- 
 
3. (C/NF) The mission and structure of the civ-mil cell are 
essentially twofold.  On the strategic level, the 17 civilian 
and military planners of the strategic planning branch assist 
the EUMS and DG E with advance planning and coordination for 
ESDP operations, whether they are civilian, military, or 
integrated.  It does so at the initiative of Secretary 
General/High Representative Javier Solana or the Political 
and Security Committee (PSC). On the operational level, the 
cell includes a permanent staff of eight military officers 
(double-hatted from the EUMS) who can, in the event of an 
autonomous EU operation, reinforce a national HQ or generate 
the capacity to set up and run an independent operations 
center.  They also serve as a "housekeeping" team to maintain 
the premises when the ops center is not in use.  Including 
the director of the cell (currently Brigadier General 
Horst-Heinrich Brauss) and three deputies, the cell totals 29 
positions, which are staffed on a three-year rotational basis. 
 
4. (C/NF) If the Council decides to activate the ops center, 
the permanent staff increases by up to 50 civilian and 
military planners who are deployed under the operations 
commander (for the military component) or DG E (for the 
civilian component).  The ops center becomes fully 
operational when additional augmentees from EUMS, DG E, and 
member states are added to the staff, the maximum of which is 
supposed to be 89 according to trilateral working documents. 
On July 25, however, General Brauss told USG officials that 
it could exceed 100 personnel, possibly in reference to the 
rest of the civ-mil cell staff who could join the ops center 
roster. 
 
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The Present and Future 
---------------------- 
 
5. (C/NF) At the same 25 July meeting, officers from the 
civ-mil cell told senior planners from S/CRS that they are 
currently working with DG E IX to ensure compatibility 
between the objectives, documents, training, and other 
elements of the military Headline Goal 2010 and the civilian 
Headline Goal 2008.  (Note: Headline Goal 2010 strives to 
develop military capabilities that match the ambitions of the 
European Security Strategy through the establishment of the 
European Defense Agency, battlegroups, and other milestones. 
Headline Goal 2008 calls for "integrated civilian crisis 
management packages" consisting of experts in police, rule of 
law, civil administration, civil protection, monitoring, and 
other support tasks that can deploy by themselves or in close 
coordination with military efforts.  Its aims include drawing 
up a Capabilities Requirements List and illustrative training 
scenarios, for which the cell,s officers say they have been 
providing input.  End note.)  They said that cooperation with 
DG E IX has been facilitated by the fact that both units work 
in the same building, although there is still lingering 
concerns that the cell will focus disproportionately on 
military planning due to its location within the EUMS. 
 
6. (C/NF) General Brauss made it clear that the cell still 
lacks coordination and planning capabilities.  He noted that 
it has been difficult bridging the gap between the Council 
and the Commission, which controls the budget for civilian 
ESDP operations. He was insistent on the need for the EU to 
have planning capabilities for integrated operations and 
specifically identified a need for more pol-mil officers to 
help broaden the strategic military perspective. Brauss also 
defended the existence of an independent ops center, pointing 
out that NATO planning via Berlin Plus had proven cumbersome 
when implemented for the EUFOR takeover in Bosnia. He opined 
that SHAPE,s military planning structures are not 
necessarily suited for the flexible planning required for 
short-fuse integrated missions. Brauss expressed hope, 
however, that the projected reciprocal liaison cells within 
SHAPE and the EUMS would ensure broader EU-NATO coordination 
on crisis management. (Note: Planning for the liaison cells 
is in the final stages. On 29 July, NATO SYG Jaap de Hoop 
Scheffer sent SG/HR Solana a letter indicating NATO,s 
readiness to agree to the EU team's proposals (sent to NATO 
in December) and to "(implement) the agreements in parallel 
once the details of the staffing arrangements have been 
settled in both organizations."  End note.) 
 
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The Aceh Mission 
---------------- 
 
7. (C/NF) The civ-mil cell has been assigned primary planning 
responsibility for the upcoming civilian monitoring mission 
to Aceh, which came from a request "out of the blue" from 
UNSR Ahtisaari (operations are usually initiated by member 
states or the Council Secretariat). Brauss said that the cell 
has already developed a crisis management concept to monitor 
a ceasefire that is being negotiated between the Indonesian 
government and GAM rebels. The elements of the ceasefire are 
likely to include demobilization, decommissioning, 
reintegration, human rights, legislative changes, and more. 
The EU-led mission, expected to comprise 250-350 personnel 
from the EU, Norway, Switzerland, and ASEAN countries, is 
scheduled to begin 15 September. An initial monitoring 
presence (IMP) will deploy 15 August to set up logistics, 
accommodations, and security briefings. 
 
8. (C/NF) Comment: In discussions with DG E IX--which has 30 
planners to the cell,s 17--and the Committee for Civilian 
Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM), the cell was portrayed 
as more of a planning instrument than an actor in its own 
right. As for the ops center, the actual facility consists of 
one unfurnished room and some within the EU appear to believe 
that they can prevent its activation by ensuring that a 
national HQ is always made available for an ESDP military 
operation. It seems unlikely, however that the EU would carve 
out space and pledge several million euros to establish a 
facility with communication and computer equipment and allow 
it to remain unused. Even the UK, which initially sought to 
emphasize the precedence of NATO and national HQs for 
military operations, seems to have recognized the value of 
creating a capable planning unit for civilian and integrated 
missions within the EU.  In fact, UK reps have said that 
exercising the civ-mil cell will be one of its priorities 
during its presidency, and the Aceh mission may be a timely 
opportunity to do so. We anticipate that political and 
institutional pressure to activate the ops center once 
created will be irresistible. End comment. 
 
MCKINLEY 
.