US embassy cable - 05NAIROBI3173

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 003173 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2025 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KE, SU 
SUBJECT: SUDAN: A/S NEWMAN AND SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE 
WINTER MEET GEN. SUMBEIYWO 
 
Classified By: AF A/S Constance Newman 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY. AF A/S Newman and Special Representative 
Winter met Gen. Sumbeiywo on August 4 in Nairobi to discuss 
the way forward in Sudan following the death of John Garang. 
Newman, Winter and Sumbeiywo compared views on the challenges 
facing new SPLM Chairman Salva Kiir and his capacity to meet 
those challenges. Sumbeiywo thinks that Kiir faces some 
political challenges of a type he has not been accustomed to 
dealing with. Sumbeiywo also gave his take on relations 
between Kiir and other top SPLM officials. Finally, they 
agreed that ideally, after Garang's funeral Kiir should 
travel to Khartoum to be sworn in as First Vice President and 
hold a few meetings of the Presidency before appointing a 
deputy for the GOSS who can manage affairs in the South while 
the GNU is formed. END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (SBU) A/S Newman praised Sumbeiywo's role in the process 
and said his involvement was more important than ever. She 
reiterated the U.S. commitment to do whatever it can to 
ensure that implementation of the CPA stays on track. Newman 
noted that the rest of the money promised to Sumbeiywo to 
support his involvement had been approved and would be 
disbursed shortly. Winter concurred that Subeiywo has a key 
role to play and asked for his views on the situation. He 
said he was a bit more worried about the future after events 
in the past couple of days, including Kiir's comment that he 
expected implementation to "start over." (reported Septel) 
 
3. (C) Sumbeiywo reassured Newman and Winter that Kiir likely 
only meant that the SPLM and GOS would have to react to the 
new situation and start the process from that point. 
Sumbeiywo is optimistic about implementation, but noted that 
everyone should remember that Kiir is a very different person 
than Garang. Sumbeiywo believes Kiir commitment to unity may 
be less strong than Garang's, but that his overriding 
interest is allowing self-determination for the South. He 
related previous conversations with Kiir that led him to 
believe Kiir is more willing to decentralize decision making 
in the SPLM. Sumbeiywo commented that Garang only trusted 
Nhial Deng and Pagan Amum, but Kiir would likely change the 
circle and delegate more decisions. 
 
4. (C) Sumbeiywo expressed concern about Kiir's ability to 
operate in the Khartoum political environment. He said that 
Kiir has "enormous military capacity" but that he needs 
people with political savvy to advise him. Sumbeiywo isn't 
sure who Kiir really listens too except for former President 
of Kenya Moi and Bishop Taban of Yei. He noted that Garang 
had structures that connected him to political figures 
throughout Sudan and it wasn't clear if Kiir would inherit 
those structures. Kiir also lacks the contacts with regional 
heads of state that Garang had, according to Sumbeiywo. 
Sumbeiywo predicted that Kiir would have a "rough time" in 
Khartoum. 
 
5. (C) How Kiir deals with the Khartoum political environment 
will, in part, depend on how he takes advice from other SPLM 
leaders. Nhial Deng was Garang's chief operative in Khartoum, 
but Sumbeiywo said there is bad blood between Deng and Kiir. 
Sumbeiywo proceeded to provide his take on Kiir's 
relationship with a number of SPLM officials. 
 
-- Pagan Amum: There is bad blood between Kiir and Amum. Amum 
is seen as a Garang loyalist, but will likely have a role in 
the future because he is too talented to be excluded. 
 
-- Kuol Manyang: A total Garang man. Salva has complained 
about him in the past, but Manyang is likely to be loyal to 
Kiir. 
 
-- Lam Akol: Described as a "lightweight." 
 
-- Oyai Deng: A hard liner and more of a field operative than 
a politician. 
 
-- Edward Lino: A Garang man. Can be difficult, but his 
skills are needed. 
 
-- James Wani Igga: A lightweight but deals well with Kiir. 
 
6. (C) Newman, Winter and Sumbeiywo agreed that Kiir needs to 
go to Khartoum soon after the funeral to be sworn in as First 
Vice President. Sumbeiywo believes Kiir will not name a 
deputy for the GOSS until after he is sworn in as First Vice 
President. He believes that Kiir should spend a little time 
in Khartoum establishing his role in the GNU Presidency 
before returning south to name a deputy. Once a deputy is in 
place to manage things in the South Kiir can return north to 
form the GNU, after which the GOSS can be created.  Sumbeiywo 
said he has heard that Kiir might name Riek Machar the Vice 
President of the GOSS which would appease the Nuers, but 
cause other problems because Machar may not follow orders. 
7. (C) Sumbeiywo is uncertain of Kiir's ability to influence 
the situation in Darfur, given the weakness in his 
relationship with regional leaders. However, all agreed that 
Kiir understands the gravity of the situation and the 
relationship between Darfur and the implementation of the 
CPA. 
 
8. Khartoum minimize considered. 
BELLAMY