US embassy cable - 05ANKARA4556

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DAS BRYZA PRESSES TURKISH MFA FOR CLOSE CONSULTATION ON SHARED PRIORITIES

Identifier: 05ANKARA4556
Wikileaks: View 05ANKARA4556 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ankara
Created: 2005-08-04 13:55:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV MASS MARR PINS TU IZ AF CY
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 ANKARA 004556 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/FO AND EUR/SE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MASS, MARR, PINS, TU, IZ, AF, CY 
SUBJECT: DAS BRYZA PRESSES TURKISH MFA FOR CLOSE 
CONSULTATION ON SHARED PRIORITIES 
 
REF: ANKARA 4486 
 
Classified By: CDA Nancy McEldowney; reasons: E.O. 12958, 1.4 (b) and ( 
d). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: During a series of introductory meetings and 
a lunch with Turkish MFA officials on August 1, EUR DAS Matt 
Bryza welcomed the recent positive turn in bilateral 
relations and pressed for a structured approach to rebuilding 
US-Turkey partnership through agreement on a shared strategic 
vision and implementation of that vision through a regular 
series of meetings and exchanges.  He praised Turkey's second 
command of ISAF in Afghanistan and called for expanded 
cooperation there; noted our increasingly concurrent vision 
for Iraq's future; underscored the need for Turkey to join 
the international community in isolating Syria and to press 
Iran to live up to its nuclear commitments and urged Turkey 
to actively support the democratic process in the Caucasus 
and Central Asia.  There was complete agreement on the 
Turkish side for the need to develop mechanisms for closer 
coordination.  Undersecretary Ali Tuygan and Director General 
for Bilateral Relations Selahattin Alpar characterized 
Turkey's relationship with Syria and Iran as necessary for 
Turkey keep a pulse on the Middle East and warned against the 
dangers of isolation.  There was general agreement on both 
sides that we share the same goals in Iraq, Syria and Iran 
but disagree on some of the tactics.  END SUMMARY. 
 
A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR JOINT ACTION 
 
2. (U) In meetings with Undersecretary Ali Tuygan, Deputy 
Undersecretary (U/S) for Bilateral Affairs Ertugrul Apakan, 
Deputy U/S for Multilateral and International Security 
Affairs Nabi Sensoy, Director General (DG) for Bilateral 
Affairs Selahattin Alpar and at a lunch hosted by Deputy U/S 
Apakan and Deputy Directors General (DDG) for Iraq, the 
Middle East and the Caucasus, Bryza recognized the positive 
turn in bilateral relations in recent months, highlighting 
the utility of the early June visit of Prime Minister Erdogan 
and Foreign Minister Gul to Washington.  He outlined the need 
to articulate a shared strategic vision of common interests 
and shared values, which could occur at the Under Secretary 
level, and regular meetings at lower levels to implement our 
strategy and achieve specific goals on: Iraq; the Broader 
Middle East and Central Asia; the Caucasus and Black Sea; 
Turkey's EU accession and Cyprus; economics, trade, and 
energy; and Afghanistan. 
 
3. (U) Across the board, MFA officials voiced their support 
for this concept.  U/S Tuygan stressed there is "no strategic 
division between the US and Turkey," and suggested putting a 
framework on paper -- not a formal document to be signed -- 
but rather as a guide to organize consultations.  Deputy U/S 
Sensoy said both Turkey and the US should emphasize the 
generally positive aspects of the relationship, not the few 
areas where "we don't see eye to eye."  Sensoy said that 
communicating on a regular basis would not be enough.  It was 
important to take each others comments into consideration for 
action.  Deputy U/S Apakan said Turkey looks to the US to 
broaden the relationship with respect to technology transfer 
-- where the US government should lead the private sector 
forward -- and university and civil society exchanges. 
Apakan was pleased to hear that the US is moving to make US 
funding for the Turkey Fulbright Program the largest in the 
world.  DG Alpar suggested that PM Erdogan and FM Gul could 
initiate the broad process of energizing US-Turkish relations 
through meetings with US officials on the margins of UNGA. 
Both Sensoy and Apakan dismissed the existence of 
anti-Americanism or anti-Semitism in Turkey, with Sensoy 
suggesting that continued American harping on these issues 
could serve to create them. 
 
CONVERGING VIEWS ON IRAQ 
 
4. (C) During a luncheon discussion on Iraq, DDG for the 
Middle East Safak Gokturk noted his pleasure that the US and 
Turkey not only shared the same goals in Iraq, but 
increasingly agreed on the steps required to achieve them. 
He said the Iraqi constitution must focus on the Iraq of the 
future, not today, which, in his view would look more like 
the US than Europe.  The primary question, he asked, is 
whether it will be possible to commit Sunnis to the 
democratic process within the US election timetable.  He 
urged close cooperation on security issues, and on ensuring 
the constitution is adopted by a clear majority to 
demonstrate a broad Iraqi belief that there was no turning 
back.  In response to Bryza's question on how to achieve this 
goal, Gokturk said Turkey, the US and Iraq could cooperate 
through efforts such as Turkey's project to bring Shia 
Turkmen and Sunni Turkmen leaders of Tal Afar together to 
calm tensions and stem the movement of insurgents toward 
Baghdad.  (Comment: To the best of our knowledge, despite its 
efforts, Ankara was never able to bring the leaders of these 
two communities to Turkey.  End Comment.)  Gokturk welcomed 
the appointment of Ambassador Khalilzad, who "knows Turkey 
well" and whom he believes will strengthen our joint efforts 
in Iraq.  He urged cooperation to engage Sunnis and warned 
that if they were not given a strong role in re-shaping the 
country, Iraq could break apart.  He added that because they 
provide the link between the Kurds and the Shias, Sunnis must 
participate at a level higher than their demographic 
representation. 
 
5. (C) To increase bilateral cooperation on Iraq, Deputy DG 
Alpar suggested meetings between Turkey's Special 
Representative for Iraq Osman Koruturk, and Deputy 
Undersecretary Ahmet Uzumcu and their US counterparts every 
three months to discuss mechanisms to achieve the goals 
outlined by Gokturk.  He noted, however, that Koruturk was 
likely to be appointed ambassador to a Western European 
country soon and his deputy, Ethem Tokdemir, would head to 
Asia, perhaps to Afghanistan and said the exchanges should be 
continued with their successors.  In response to Charge's 
point that international support of Iraq's economic 
development was critical, and that efforts like the Turkish 
Business Conference for Iraq were valuable, Alpar complained 
that Turkey's current trade with Iraq still lagged 
considerably behind its level before the first Gulf War. 
Deputy U/S Apakan urged consideration of the work in Iraq as 
nation-restoring, not nation-building.  All Iraqi ethnic 
groups felt an Iraqi identity that was stronger than their 
Sunni, Shia or other ethnic or religious identity. 
 
PKK - US TIMETABLE FOR ACTION TOO LATE? 
 
6. (C) Turning to the PKK, Gokturk suggested a disconnect 
between the increased PKK activity currently taking place in 
Turkey and the US time frame for completion of the Iraqi 
political process and possible action against the PKK.  He 
urged consideration of actions that could be taken in the 
interim period.  In a separate meeting, Alpar said the US 
needed to understand Turkish sensitivities on the PKK and 
lamented the recent press photo showing a PKK flag flying 
over a building in Kirkuk and suggested that this 
demonstrated US tolerance for the terrorist organization. 
Bryza reiterated US opposition to the PKK and said he would 
look into the flag issue.  (Note: Turkish press reported on 
Aug. 1 that the Kurdistan Democratic Solution Party (KDSP), a 
PKK Front Organization, opened an office in Kirkuk.  Post is 
working to confirm whether this is a new or pre-existing 
office.  End note.)  Bryza countered that the US and Turkey 
needed to consider a broad approach against the PKK that 
focused not only on Iraq, but on Europe and Turkey as well. 
He hoped the GOT recognized that a full-scale US military 
assault against the PKK was not the answer to resolving the 
PKK problem; Turkish interlocutors agreed. 
 
7. (C) Deputy U/S Sensoy told Bryza during an office call 
that Turkey expected US assistance to close down PKK front 
operations in Iraq, including the KDSP, the Iraq Democratic 
Restructuring Party, the Mesopotamian News Agency and the 
Voice of Kurdish Youth.  Bryza responded that while the US 
shares Turkey's concerns regarding the PKK presence in Iraq, 
the US and Turkey would have to work with the sovereign 
government of Iraq (including the KRG) to address this 
problem.  At lunch, Bryza stated the US had launched a 
process to break down the PKK terrorist problem into discreet 
and digestible components in Europe, Turkey and Iraq.  In 
Iraq, all such efforts must proceed from the premise of 
strengthening the country's territorial integrity, and 
recognizing the sovereignty of the Iraqi government. 
Trilateral channels provided perhaps the best hope for 
working through these tough issues. 
 
US SHOULD DO MORE TO SUPPORT NORTHERN CYPRUS 
 
8. (C)  Deputy U/S Apakan, during an office call, emphasized 
to Bryza that Turkey had exerted substantial efforts to press 
for a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus issue, and urged 
the US to do more to break the isolation of northern Cyprus. 
He said that "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) 
President" Talat, in Ankara that day, was trying to make 
peace; the US should support him, i.e., by receiving him in 
Washington.  Above all, he said, the US should not let the 
Greek Cypriots off the hook, and should avoid taking at face 
value any Greek Cypriot proposals to adjust the Annan Plan. 
Referring to a July 29 declaration that Turkey's decision 
that same day to extend its EU Customs Agreement to the 10 
newest members was not recognition of the Republic of Cyprus 
(reftel), Apakan claimed Turkey was obliged to issue the 
declaration but, in doing so, had tried to be as 
non-confrontational as possible.  He expressed hope that the 
EU would not respond harshly.  On relations with Greece, 
Apakan said Turkey is hopeful that its offers of confidence 
building measures, "good chemistry" between PMs Erdogan and 
Karamanlis, excellent relations between municipalities and 
between Greek Islands and Turkey's Aegean provinces, as well 
as booming two-way trade and financial relations, will 
positively impact the broader relationship. 
 
KEEPING AN EYE ON SYRIA AND IRAN 
 
9. (C) U/S Tuygan defended Turkey's relations with Syria, 
saying the government had not treated Assad as special but 
that his "charming wife" has the Turkish media on her side 
and she is "good public diplomacy."  Offering Saddam Hussein 
as a model, he warned that isolation can "impact the 
mentality of a leader."  Due to his isolation, Saddam did not 
have anyone to contradict him and keep him in line.  Tuygan 
stressed that Turkey could and would reinforce the goals of 
the international community in its dealings with Damascus. 
Bryza recognized Turkey's sovereign right to conduct 
diplomatic relations with its neighbor, but suggested that 
Ankara avoid grand symbolic gestures that would undermine the 
international consensus to isolate Assad.  During lunch, DDG 
for Iran and South Asia, Aydin Evirgen said the US and Turkey 
agree on the goal with Iran but have different view on how to 
get there.  He acknowledged that Ahmadinejad's election as 
President was a surprise to Turkey and that "no one knows 
well what he will do."  Now that the conservatives dominate 
the Iranian political spectrum, Evirgen said he expected them 
to behave more rigidly, but urged against outside efforts to 
foster internal turmoil.  In his view, he said, it is clear 
that the desire for reform is deeply rooted in society.  If 
outsiders push too hard, they could create problems. 
 
10. (C) Evirgen predicted that the Iranian government would 
"play with the economy" and will resist efforts to stop 
Irans' uranium enrichment program.  According to Evirgen, the 
gulf countries are increasingly concerned and Turkey is 
advising the Iranians to be completely transparent and fully 
cooperative, and not to produce nuclear weapons.  He 
reiterated Turkey's support for the EU-3 negotiation process. 
 DG Alpar, who recently served as Turkey's Ambassador to 
Iran, said Iran was famous for taking steps backwards. 
Iran's goal is to be a regional power and it wants the 
capability to produce bombs to confirm its equality on the 
world stage with Israel, India and Pakistan.  Evirgen added 
that it important for the international community to keep up 
the pressure, but to do so without cornering Iran because 
"they don't like to be trapped." 
 
PLEADING THE CASE ON ARMENIA 
 
11. (C) Deputy U/S Sensoy spent considerable time during 
Bryza's office call pleading Turkey's case on Armenia.  He 
acknowledged that the events of 1915 were a tragedy, but was 
quick to note that people on both sides of the conflict died. 
 Sensoy emphasized that one must take the historical 
circumstances surrounding those events into consideration in 
an effort to explain, but not to justify, what happened.  He 
also said that the term genocide should only be applied in 
the context of the definition provided by the 1948 
international convention on genocide.  Sensoy requested that 
two Armenian resolutions before the U.S. Congress (HR 185 and 
HR 313) be killed in committee.  He criticized the comments 
of an American Congressman who supports an Armenian genocide 
resolution.  Bryza suggested that Turkey could go a long way 
towards quieting the debate over the Armenian "genocide" by 
recognizing and expressing sorrow for Ottoman Turkey's 
responsibility for the human tragedy of 1915. 
 
12. (C) According to Sensoy, Turkey supports a bilateral 
discussion between Turkey and Armenia on the events of 1915. 
The GOT would welcome third party participation in such 
discussions, but Turkey wants a bilateral dialogue and not an 
international conference.  Sensoy said that Turkey is willing 
to discuss the recognition of Armenia and the opening of the 
Turkish-Armenian border, but it does not want the bilateral 
discussions to start with these two issues.  Bryza noted that 
the White House and State Department are carefully watching 
developments in Congress regarding the Armenian resolutions 
and noted that public statements like the GOT's recent letter 
calling for Turkish-Armenian dialogue helps the 
administration keep these resolutions in committee. 
 
a; 
 
13. (C) Sensoy claimed that the recent postponement of an 
academic conference in Istanbul to discuss the Armenian issue 
was not caused by the Turkish government.  He lamented the 
"unfortunate comments" made at "a senior level," but claimed 
that the government had no legal grounds to close the 
meeting.  (Comments:  Justice Minister Cicek -- who is also 
the official spokesman for the AKP government -- publicly 
accused those who organized the conference of "treason."  End 
Comment.)   Charge and Bryza suggested that the GOT should 
give repeated, public assurances to the conference organizers 
that their actions are not illegal or treasonous. 
 
14. (C) Separately at lunch, DDG for the Caucasus and Central 
Asia Huseyin Avni Karslioglu said Turkey is encouraging the 
Armenians to make a "real move" to open diplomatic relations. 
 He added that, despite differences between the two 
governments, informal and trade relations are very good. 
Bryza noted that for the past 18 months the US had been 
working on a framework for advancing towards a settlement of 
the Nargorno-Karabakh conflict that could facilitate Turkey's 
normalizing relations with Armenia.  The framework could 
involve Armenian withdrawal from the Azerbaijani territories 
it occupies in exchange for eventual consideration of 
Karabakh's status.  In any case, the US encouraged Turkey to 
normalize relations with Armenia as soon as possible. 
 
TURKEY COMMITTED TO AFGHANISTAN 
 
15. (C) At lunch, Evirgen raised Turkey's happiness with the 
progress in Afghanistan but noted that the upcoming 
parliamentary elections will be important to establish a 
permanent governmental structure.  He urged consideration of 
a post-Bonn process.  He noted Tajik and other ethnic group 
concerns about the potential return of the Taliban, but 
dismissed the Taliban's capabilities to launch catastrophic 
attacks as minimal.  He noted Turkey's completion of its ISAF 
VII command and said the government was negotiating with 
France for joint leadership of the Central Region command. 
Turkey is not considering a PRT at this time but may do so 
down the road. Evirgen emphasized the need for Afghanistan to 
have a strong national army and pledged Turkey's continued 
contributions to military training. 
 
16. (C) Calling narcotics one of the most challenging issues 
for the country, Evirgen called for a long-term comprehensive 
strategy that includes alternative livelihoods.  He said 
Turkey had recently decided to become more active in this 
area and had identified new funds to initiate narcotics 
police training and farming programs and welcomed partnership 
with the US.  Evirgen said PM Erdogan had been impressed with 
the level of reconstruction needed during his May visit to 
Afghanistan and returned home enthusiastic about increasing 
Turkey's contribution to that effort.  DG Alpar added that 
Turkish and US companies were working well together in 
Afghanistan, including on USAID supported projects.  Bryza 
welcomed this news, and noted that the US and Turkey have 
worked increasingly well together over the past year.  In 
order to avoid past misunderstandings over Turkey's 
intentions with respect to its relations with General Dostum 
and PRTs and other assistance, Bryza urged close contacts and 
consultations both in Washington and in Ankara. 
 
FOSTERING DEMOCRACY IN THE CAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA 
 
17. (C) Asked by Apakan at lunch to review Turkish policy in 
the Caucasus, Karslioglu criticized Georgian President 
Saakashvili and portrayed Russian policy toward Georgia as 
logical and understandable.  In his view, Saakashvili had 
been wrong to strip Ajara of its autonomy as it led South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia to close up.  "At the same time he 
extends his hand to them, he assembles his army." When he was 
"slapped" by Russia after he pressed his luck in South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia, he "went crying" to the U.S. and other 
"big powers".  In short, Karslioglu asserted, Saakashvili is 
no more than a hyperactive child, but his actions are 
disturbing various ethnic communities in Georgia.  Given its 
active and influential Abkhaz population, Turkey could play a 
good offices role in Abkhazia, but Saakashvili has rejected 
Turkish overtures.  Indeed, the Georgians' seizure of a 
Turkish ship which was sailing between Trabzon and Sukhumi 
just after Turkey made such an overture is an example of 
Saakashvili's irresponsibility.  Moreover, Saakashvili's 
rumored efforts to acquire military hardware wherever he can 
find it is not good for the Georgian economy or for the mood 
in Georgia's various ethnic communities, Karslioglu concluded. 
 
18. (C) Bryza responded that the US considers Saakashvili a 
more careful tactician than others might think, and does not 
agree that he has eliminated Azara's autonomy.  He added that 
the Ajaran "government" under Aslan Abashidze was essentially 
a criminal enterprise, and that the US welcomed the flow of 
Azaran revenue back to Tbilisi.  On South Ossetia, Bryza said 
the US supports an international negotiating process and has 
urged Georgia to flesh out its peace program and convey it to 
its neighbors and the OSCE, then get their buy-in to approach 
Russia.  The US also regularly reminds Tbilisi any unilateral 
use of force will be disastrous, and lead to a devastating 
response by Russia.  Bryza urged Turkey to formalize its 
trade links with Georgia and called on Washington and Ankara 
to build on their existing mil-mil cooperation to support the 
development of democratic processes.  Karslioglu stated that 
Turkey is sending the same message on reconciliation to 
Georgia and elsewhere in the region.  In Azerbaijan, 
Karslioglu said the Turkish government has strongly urged 
President Aliyev to hold democratic elections and is 
considering sending up to "several hundred" observers through 
the OSCE.  Concerned with developments in Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan, Turkey is urging those governments to move the 
democratic process forward. 
 
19. (U) Meeting Participants: 
 
In addition to separate office calls with Undersecretary Ali 
Tuygan, Deputy Undersecretary for Bilateral Affairs Ertugrul 
Apakan, Deputy Undersecretary for Multilateral and 
International Security Affairs Nabi Sensoy and Director 
General for Bilateral Affairs Selahattin Alpar, DAS Bryza had 
lunch with the following MFA officials: 
 
- Deputy Undersecretary Apakan 
- Director General Alpar 
- Assistant to the Special Representative for Iraq Ethem 
Tokdemir 
- Deputy Director General for Iran and South Asia Aydin 
Evirgen 
- Deputy Director General for the Caucasus and Central Asia 
Huseyin Avni Karslioglu 
- Head of Department for North America Meral Barlas 
- Second Secretary in the Department for North American Lale 
Agusman 
 
20. (U) DAS Bryza cleared this message. 
MCELDOWNEY 

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