US embassy cable - 05BRUSSELS2918

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 002918 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/ERA AND S/CRS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, FR, EUN, KCRS, USEU BRUSSELS 
SUBJECT: S/CRS DEEPENS EU CIVILIAN CRISIS RESPONSE CONTACTS 
 
1. (SBU)  Summary: On 25 July, staff from the Office of the 
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) met 
with various EU bodies dealing with civilian crisis 
management.  Director of Planning Barbara Stephenson 
emphasized to the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis 
Management (CIVCOM) that "conceptual convergence" with likely 
partners such as the EU, NATO, and the UN is a top priority 
for S/CRS planning efforts.  Stephenson also discussed with 
the director and staff of the civ-mil cell their role in 
coordinating EU crisis response measures, including an EU 
operations center.  Stephenson then met with members of DG E 
IX (the Council Secretariat,s civilian crisis management 
unit) to hear about EUJUST LEX, the EU,s rule of law and 
police mission in Iraq, and to share ideas on furthering 
U.S.-EU cooperation efforts.  They concluded that in-depth 
discussion would be hampered by the lack of a U.S.-EU 
security agreement permitting the sharing of classified 
materials.  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) Director of Planning Barbara Stephenson and 
Associate Director for Planning and International Relations 
Matthew Cordova from S/CRS met July 25 with several EU 
Council bodies to present information, share perspectives, 
and exchange ideas on the issue of civilian crisis response 
planning.  They met first with member state representatives 
of the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management 
(CIVCOM) and gave a presentation of the S/CRS planning 
framework for conflict transformation before participating in 
a Q&A session. 
 
3. (SBU) Asked about cooperation with NATO on crisis 
response, Stephenson said that while the US conducts 
operations that are military in nature through the Alliance, 
there are areas where cooperation can be taken forward 
regarding civilian crisis response.  This would include 
cooperation between the U.S. and the EU, between the EU and 
NATO, and within NATO.  She mentioned that one opportunity 
for the EU could be to observe or participate in future 
Multinational Interagency Group (MNIG) exercises.  These 
crisis response exercises, which give a lead role to 
civilians, will include a significant rule of law component. 
In response to questions concerning resources, Stephenson 
said early consultation is key, both inside and outside USG, 
to synthesize objectives when personnel and funding from 
different sources are brought together to respond to crises. 
She also emphasized that achieving "conceptual convergence" 
with likely partners such as the EU, NATO, and the UN is the 
top priority for S/CRS planning efforts and international 
outreach in the next six months. 
 
4. (SBU) Stephenson met subsequently with senior staff of the 
newly operational civilian-military cell, which, according to 
its terms of reference, assists in crisis response strategic 
contingency planning for civilian, military, and integrated 
operations.  Eight of its twenty-nine officers also serve as 
the core staff for an eventual EU operations center, which 
can be augmented by an additional hundred or so officers if 
it is activated to run an autonomous EU operation when no 
national HQ can be identified.  The staff said it is working 
closely with DG E IX (the civilian crisis management unit 
within the Council Secretariat) to ensure that the 
objectives, documents, training, and other elements of the 
military Headline Goal 2010 and the civilian Headline Goal 
2008 are compatible and mutually reinforcing. 
 
5. (SBU) The head of the civ-mil cell, Brigadier General 
Horst-Heinrich Brauss explained that the Headline Goal 2010 
strives to develop capabilities that match the ambitions of 
the European Security Strategy and to enable the EU to carry 
out the so-called Petersberg tasks (peacekeeping operations, 
humanitarian and rescue missions, and other crisis management 
tasks for combat forces) through the establishment of the 
European Defense Agency, deployable battlegroups, and other 
milestones.  Headline Goal 2008 calls for "integrated 
civilian crisis management packages" (consisting of experts 
in police, rule of law, civil administration, civil 
protection, monitoring, and other support tasks) that can 
deploy by themselves or in close coordination with military 
efforts.  Its key aims include drawing up a Capabilities 
Requirements List and illustrative training scenarios, for 
which the cell has been providing input.  Cooperation between 
the civilian and military aspects of crisis management 
planning is facilitated by the fact that both units work in 
the same building and can therefore establish personal 
connections. 
 
6.  (SBU) Brauss said that the civ-mil cell, with its 
civilian planners working alongside military officers, 
embodies the EU,s desire to institutionalize the integrated 
approach of its European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). 
He noted, however, that coordination across the 
Council-Commission divide has been difficult to accomplish 
but is important given that the Commission controls the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) budget that 
finances civilian ESDP operations.  The cell is also located 
within, and shares personnel with, the EU Military Staff, and 
this has been a sticking point for those wishing to see equal 
emphasis on the civilian aspect of the cell. 
 
7.  (SBU) General Brauss was insistent on the need for the EU 
to have the capability to plan and run integrated operations. 
 He characterized himself as a committed Atlanticist, but 
defended the concept of an EU ops center.  He said that it 
would be technically possible for the EU to turn to NATO for 
planning assets via Berlin Plus arrangements but the process 
had proven difficult and cumbersome when implemented for the 
EUFOR takeover in Bosnia.  He also argued that the military 
planning structures at SHAPE are not necessarily suited for 
the agile and flexible planning required for short-fuse 
integrated missions.  Brauss was hopeful that the projected 
permanent EU-NATO liaison cells would provide the mechanism 
to ensure broader EU-NATO coordination in crisis management. 
(Note:  Planning for the reciprocal liaison cells is in the 
final stages.  On 29 July, NATO SYG Jaap de Hoop Scheffer 
sent SG/HR Solana the Terms of Reference document and a 
letter indicating NATO is prepared to agree to the EU team's 
proposals (sent to NATO in December) and to "(implement) the 
agreements in parallel once the details of the staffing 
arrangements have been settled in both organizations."  End 
note.) 
 
8. (SBU) Another problem Brauss discussed with S/CRS was the 
formal channel through which the cell is supposed to receive 
its orders to initiate strategic contingency planning.  He 
called it "ideal" if SG/HR Solana or the Political and 
Security Committee (PSC) had the time to direct the cell,s 
work by receiving input from member states and consulting the 
early warning watch list compiled by the Council 
Secretariat,s Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN), but more 
 
SIPDIS 
often than not the cell,s planning was dictated by 
unforeseen crises or appeals.  He cited the example of Aceh, 
a civilian monitoring mission for which the cell has been 
given primary planning responsibility, which originated from 
a request "out of the blue" by UNSR Ahtisaari, not by member 
states or SITCEN.  Brauss said that the cell has already 
drawn up a crisis management concept for the 
ceasefire-monitoring mission despite the fact that the 
details of the ceasefire have yet to be finalized. 
 
9. (SBU)  Stephenson then met with EU JUST LEX Head of 
Mission Stephen White and DG E IX Deputy Director Veronica 
Cody.  White shared some of the principles underlying the 
Iraq mission, which is the first EU mission to combine EU 
civilian crisis response "instruments" (in this case, rule of 
law and police).  Based on his experience in Northern 
Ireland, White designed the program to train police and 
judges together to foster trust and cooperation, and he 
focused on three objectives: 1) make security paramount for 
everyone involved, from trainers to trainees; 2) involve 
Iraqis throughout every stage of the mission; and 3) remain 
flexible and responsive to changes in the environment. 
 
10. (SBU)  Cody and Stephenson shared ideas about how the EU 
and the U.S. could further cooperation on civilian crisis 
response.  Cody identified personnel exchanges as being 
helpful (including having Americans attend courses at the 
newly established European Security and Defense College, 
though it has yet to accept third party participants), and 
offered to provide top EU speakers for the USNATO-USEU 
pol-mil conference on October 12-14.  She also said that DG E 
IX has an interest in collaboration in gaming and experiments 
to improve strategic design and advanced civilian-military 
planning for transitional security and the rule of law.  Cody 
and Stephenson agreed that more digital video conferences 
should take place between DG E IX and S/CRS, but they 
concluded that in-depth discussions would be hampered by the 
lack of a U.S.-EU security agreement permitting the sharing 
of classified materials. 
 
11. (SBU)  Comment: These meetings provided useful firsthand 
insights on how the EU views its aspirations and capabilities 
for civilian crisis management.  EU officials appear aware of 
and open to some form of EU-U.S. and EU-NATO cooperation 
given their limited experience and resources.  That said, 
they will want to move forward and keep developing their own 
mechanisms for planning and implementation.  We should work 
closely with them to coordinate in ways that meet our 
requirements and those of NATO in this area.  Such 
collaboration may also serve to as a bridge linking EU and 
NATO operations in the future. End comment. 
 
MCKINLEY 
.