US embassy cable - 05PRAGUE1146

S E C R E T PRAGUE 001146 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2015 
TAGS: ETTC, EZ, KSTC, PARM, PREL, PTER, VM 
SUBJECT: ASDD-01 TO VIETNAM: POINTS DELIVERED, LITTLE 
PROGRESS 
 
REF: A. STATE 140227 
 
     B. PRAGUE 106 
     C. PRAGUE 1104 
     D. STATE 131474 
     E. PRAGUE 892 
     F. 04 PRAGUE 1064 
 
Classified By: Political-Military Officer Brian Greaney 
for reasons 1.4 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (g) 
 
1) (S/NF) Summary: The Czech MFA continues to withhold its 
agreement to the transfer of an ASDD-01 passive surveillance 
system to Vietnam. MFA contacts acknowledge defense 
cooperation between China and Vietnam could in theory lead to 
exchange of military material. It appears the MFA's 
opposition will not be effective in the long run, due to 
counter arguments with the GOCR that proliferation of ASDD-01 
technology from Vietnam to China is a technical 
impossibility. End summary. 
 
2) (S/NF) Pol-Mil off August 2 delivered Ref A points (on 
U.S. opposition to a Czech sale of an ASDD-01 to Vietnam) to 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director of Common Foreign and 
Security Policy Petr Kaiser (strictly protect). As 
intelligence information about military cooperation between 
China and Vietnam was not authorized for release to the 
Czechs, Pol-Mil Off provided information gleaned from Google. 
Kaiser acknowledged his suspicion that the political 
relationship between China and Vietnam did not preclude the 
potential for proliferation of military equipment. He 
mentioned a similar concern had been expressed in EU 
discussions about the China arms embargo. 
 
3) (S/NF) Kaiser said the MFA, despite deadlines for action, 
continued to withhold its consent to the transfer. 
Chinese-Vietnamese relations are within the Czech MFA's area 
of expertise in the licensing process. However Kaiser also 
predicted the MFA would be unable to hold up the deal 
indefinitely because of arguments by technical experts within 
the Ministry of Defense that the ASDD-01 system had adequate 
protections against proliferation. He said the MFA did not 
have the technical expertise to question the validity of 
strong assertions by experts in favor of the deal. 
 
4) (S/NF) Comment: We (the USG) have been unable to develop a 
list of foreign policy reasons applicable to Vietnam that the 
Czech MFA could use to oppose a transfer. Proponents and 
opponents of the deal are now divided by a question of fact, 
rather than policy. MFA concerns are being undermined by 
assertions within the GOCR that proliferation to China is 
almost certainly a technical impossibility (limited technical 
details were reported Ref B).  Neither Embassy Prague nor the 
Czech MFA has the technical expertise to effectively raise 
doubt about such arguments. We will be asking the USAF-led 
VERA-E evaluation team currently visiting the Czech Republic 
for a debrief. While we hope the team will have been able to 
learn something about ERA's counterproliferation measures, 
this is merely a small step in the right direction. Unless we 
are willing to develop and deliver technical arguments about 
anti-proliferation safeguards, it is very likely that an 
ASDD-01 will go to Vietnam. The other alternative is to raise 
the level at which U.S. objections are delivered. Combining 
these two tactics, Post again suggests that as part of 
bilateral U.S.-Czech pol-mil talks tentatively scheduled for 
the Fall, we should  schedule consultations between U.S. 
technical and policy experts and their Czech counterparts. 
CABANISS