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| Identifier: | 02AMMAN5485 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 02AMMAN5485 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Amman |
| Created: | 2002-09-24 07:47:00 |
| Classification: | UNCLASSIFIED |
| Tags: | ETRD EINV JO IS |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 AMMAN 005485 SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA DAS CHENEY STATE PASS USTR FOR NED SAUMS, DOUG BELL STATE PASS USAID FOR MSCOVILL USDOC FOR 4520/ITA/MAC/ONE/P.THANOS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ETRD, EINV, JO, IS SUBJECT: JORDAN AND THE QIZ EXPERIENCE REFS: A) AMMAN 3761; B) 01 AMMAN 5728 1. The Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZ) initiative has had a net positive, and increasingly widely-felt, effect on Jordan's economy, political dynamics, and social structure. While the success of the initiative to date is irrefutable, the QIZ's will have to face a number of hurdles in the near future. These include continuing regional instability, the rise of competing tariff preference programs in other parts of the world, and the wholesale reconfiguration of the global textile market in 2005 with the advent of the WTO's multifiber arrangement (MFA). The QIZ's are well-equipped to meet these challenges and, in combination with Jordan's Free Trade Agreement with the U.S., will maintain a place for Jordan in the global textile production market. WHAT THE INITIATIVE IS 2. The QIZ initiative was created by Presidential proclamation in November 1998. It extended benefits of the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement to certain industrial zones in Jordan identified and agreed upon by the U.S., Israeli, and Jordanian governments. Goods produced in such zones were given duty-free access to the U.S., provided a certain percentage of the value added of the good came from the QIZ, Israel, and/or the West Bank/Gaza, in the following proportions: 11.7% QIZ origin; 11.7% Israeli origin; 11.6% QIZ/Israeli/WB/Gaza origin. The balance of the value of the good could be from anywhere in the world. In February 1999, the Israeli and Jordanian governments amended these percentages on a temporary basis, reducing the required Israeli input to 7% for high-tech goods and 8% for all other goods for five years. (Note: The QIZ concept has been on offer to Egypt as well since 1998, but Egypt has not yet requested QIZ designation for any industrial parks. End note.) The initiative was designed to provide an incentive for Jordanian and Israeli businesses to develop partnerships or even joint ventures in QIZ parks, thus creating a constituency in favor of normalization within both countries' business communities. ECONOMIC IMPACT 3. The QIZ's have enjoyed enormous economic success, due in large part to the initiative's unforeseen attractiveness to foreign textile producers who came to the QIZ's both to escape quota ceilings in their own countries and to take advantage of tariff breaks of 30% or more on a wide range of apparel products. The speed and effectiveness with which the QIZ's have sparked export-led growth in Jordan is impressive: in 1999, total Jordanian exports to the U.S. were barely $13 million. In 2002, QIZ exports to the U.S. are estimated to reach $400 million. Because of the QIZ's, the U.S. is now Jordan's largest export market, and Israel (Jordan's other market for QIZ goods) is Jordan's fifth largest export market. The initiative has created over 21,000 new jobs directly, and an unknown level of indirect employment. The QIZ's have also attracted over $200 million in new investment from some 11 countries, including Jordan, Israel, the U.S., the UAE, India, Pakistan, and China/Hong Kong/Taiwan. While the bulk of QIZ investment initially came from East Asia, there are now as many Jordanian QIZ exporters as there are from any other investing country. 4. These national-level figures come into even sharper focus at a regional level. QIZ parks are routinely becoming engines of growth in their communities. The QIZ in Irbid, Jordan's third-largest city, draws laborers from a half- dozen nearby communities, and QIZ exports from the Al Hassan Industrial Estate account for 80% of the park's exports. Previously, Al Hassan was primarily home to small industrial and engineering concerns linked to the Iraqi market. In Zarqa, Jordan's biggest industrial governorate, the impact is even more noticeable. The private sector-run QIZ park in nearby Al Dulayl, despite a slow start, is now the clear production leader for the region. Al Dulayl's exports account for 50% of all exports from the governorate. Even regions without functioning QIZ parks benefit from the program. The port of Aqaba receives most of the imports of inputs for QIZ goods, and fully 40% of QIZ exports use Aqaba as well. This translates into jobs for truckers and port workers, jobs which had been scarce in the years following imposition of sanctions on Iraq. 5. At the local level, the QIZ initiative is having perhaps its strongest, yet least-publicized, impact. In Irbid, QIZ exporters put $2 million in wages into the local economy each month. The multiplier effect of these wages is felt in the retail sector, the transportation sector, and the food and personal services sectors in the city and beyond, to name just a few. While no systematic study of these ancillary benefits has been undertaken, the anecdotal evidence of increased income growth can be seen on the streets in new goods in shops, new business and residential construction, and the like. 6. The QIZ experience has also had proven structural benefits. It is creating a trained industrial labor force on a large scale for the first time ever. It has also given government and private-sector actors a crash-course in investment promotion. The improvement in Jordan's ability to sell itself to foreign investors, particularly in the private sector, has been marked in the past three years. The private sector-run Al Tajammouat QIZ outside Amman is the best example. A relative late-comer to the QIZ game, Tajammouat's management has aggressively marketed the park in East and South Asia. As a result, Tajammouat is now home to more QIZ exporters than any other QIZ park (including the original park in Irbid). In fact, Tajammouat's investment promotion officers have helped train the usually lackadaisical Jordan Investment Board in promoting the QIZ's. Finally, the initiative is providing technology transfer, helping to create in Jordan a cadre of business managers, accountants, line supervisors, and workers who understand global standards for quality, timeliness of delivery, and dependability. Such tech transfer is also visible in the creation of these new, modern industrial parks themselves, which will help Jordan to attract non-QIZ businesses in the future to take advantage of the FTA. THE POLITICAL IMPACT 7. The political impact of the QIZ's has been more measured, but notable nevertheless. At a macro level, the QIZ's have helped to moderate somewhat debate over normalization. As early as 2000, it was not uncommon to see editorials sharply criticizing QIZ's because of the Israeli content requirement, calls for the discontinuation of the program, blackballing of businesses investing in QIZ's, and the like. With the success of the initiative, notably the jobs it has created, that criticism has all but disappeared from the English-language press, and is far more muted in even the more vitriolic Arabic papers. It is becoming increasingly difficult for the Muslim Brotherhood, for example, to call for the destruction of an initiative that is providing good incomes for thousands of families, many of them in traditionally poor, conservative communities. Even at the lowest points of the Intifada, when Jordanian opposition groups were calling for breaking of diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv, the QIZ's were given barely a mention. While there is still underlying discomfort with QIZ's among many conservative Jordanians, and while many Jordanian businessmen still shy away from QIZ investment (either in opposition to Israeli participation or fear of being blackballed for dealing with Israel), the public debate over the relative merits of the QIZ's seems to have been won by moderate elements. THE SOCIAL IMPACT 8. This is perhaps the most interesting, unforeseen, impact of the QIZ's. Some 70% of QIZ workers are women, and a significant percentage of those are new entrants into the workforce. In addition, many of these women come from small, traditional villages. Scores of women interviewed by the embassy reported an improved sense of self-worth, a greater feeling of independence, and a greater degree of overall satisfaction compared to their previous work in the home. This increased sense of empowerment has found form in, among other things, women's discussion groups formed at some factories in at least one QIZ park, where women say they can talk about social and political issues that would be frowned upon back in the village. Limited interviews with families have shown that, in many cases, a number of women in the same family often take jobs in QIZ's , thereby greatly increasing family income - especially in families where the males have been jobless for some time. The base rate for a QIZ worker is Jordan's minimum wage of about $112/month, but in reality labor competition has driven those rates up to as much as $200-$250/month. These changes have of course created some stresses, notably in families where women out-earn men, and in conservative family units where the patriarch may force women in the family to quit jobs or control their income through the use of direct- deposit into patriarch-controlled bank accounts. In addition, many young women who take QIZ jobs leave the workforce upon marriage, creating a turnover and training problem. These attitudes, though, are beginning to shift. ISSUES AHEAD 9. The Jordanian government will have to face a number of procedural and structural issues to maintain the health of the QIZ's in the coming years. Most immediately, they will need to renegotiate input percentages with the Israeli government. The 8% input level reverts to 11% in February 2004, and current investors are already howling about the negative impacts of returning to the higher levels. Jordan has an interest in, de minimus, maintaining the 8% level, or in restructuring the percentages to allow for more flexible application of the Israeli input rule - both to keep current investors and attract new ones. To their credit, the Jordanian government has for the first time framed this issue in terms of benefit to Israel of restructuring the regime, arguing that doing so will substantially increase investment and broaden production into new product lines, which would mean more business for Israeli firms as volumes increase. 10. More generally, Jordan must cope with the rise of competing tariff preference programs in other parts of the world. The Caribbean Basin Initiative and the Africa Growth and Opportunities Act are both fighting to attract the same pool of new investors from South and East Asia. Jordan will need to do an even better job selling itself, and will need to further improve the functionality of the QIZ paperwork process, to ensure they can continue to attract those investors. So far, Jordan has been fairly successful at trumping these two competitors. Another concern for Jordan is the possibility of a Turkish-Israeli QIZ. Domestic U.S. textile concerns make it unlikely that any such QIZ would include the textile sector, but a Turkish QIZ could steal potential higher-end manufacturers away from Jordan down the road - investors Jordan has not been successful in attracting so far. 11. Politically, the QIZ's will continue to be affected by instability in the region. Instability in either Iraq or in the West Bank/Israel has a negative affect on attracting new investors. This has been particularly true in the West Bank, where spikes in Israeli/Palestinian violence have correlated exactly with drop off's in new investor interest. However, none of the turmoil to date has affected existing investor interest. None of the spikes in violence resulted in lost production or sustained lost access to Israeli inputs or the port of Haifa. Partly as a result of the ability of QIZ producers to thrive even during instability in the West Bank, new investor interest has traditionally returned to the QIZ's about three months after each spike in violence. In the long term, both Jordan and Israel have an interest in making sure QIZ production is unaffected by instability in the West Bank. Thus we can expect both sides to work hard to make sure access to inputs is maintained and the northern border crossing to Haifa remains open. 12. Internally, Jordan's biggest challenge will be continuing to be able to provide a trained industrial labor force to a growing list of interested investors. Industrial labor training programs in Jordan are underfunded and poorly targeted. Most investors train their own employees, and wage competition has started to be felt in the more established QIZ's in Irbid, Zarqa and Amman as the most highly trained workers can now command more than double the normal wage. While a labor squeeze is not yet a serious problem, it may not be far off, and could slow investment interest in the country. The kingdom recently took initial steps to improve and expand industrial labor training through a joint Labor Ministry/Armed Forces training program, but much more needs to be done. On a related note, the QIZ's continue to experience periodic isolated episodes of labor complaints, usually surrounding payment of wages to expatriate workers. While these incidents remain few, they are still an irritant that the GOJ will need to monitor and take corrective action on as necessary to avoid any labor stigma being attached to the QIZ's. 13. The biggest structural challenge for the QIZ's, though, is the entry into force of the WTO multifiber arrangement in 2005. On January 1 of that year, quotas on textile imports into the U.S. will be eliminated, which will give low-cost, high volume producers like China and Pakistan a massive advantage in the textile sector. Jordan's challenge will be to maintain its current investors and try to attract new ones in a far more competitive global textile market. A number of potential new investors interviewed by the Embassy have indicated that, even in the post-2005 environment, they would be interested in establishing facilities in Jordan. Many of them believe that U.S. import quotas will be replaced with increased duties, either under safeguards measures or anti-dumping cases. Should this be the case, Jordan's tariff benefit under the QIZ's will be even more pronounced. In addition, many producers have a policy of diversifying their sources of production to hedge against instability in any one country. Thus it appears Jordan, with aggressive management by the government, will be able to maintain a viable textile sector even after the implementation of the multifiber arrangement in 2005. THE FTA AND THE QIZ'S 14. The U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement will, by 2010, eliminate tariffs on all textile products. Thus, eventually the QIZ's will be anachronistic as the FTA matches tariff breaks and provides for more straight-forward rules of origin (i.e., no Israeli input requirements). Such a distinction will matter little for Jordan's economy or ability to attract investment, as its tariff preferences into the U.S. market relative to third countries will remain the same. However, if Israel hopes to continue to reap the political and economic benefits of the QIZ's it will have to scramble to keep Jordan-based textile producers interested in the QIZ initiative. Such an interest is not nearly so pressing for Jordan, whose main benefit from the QIZ's has been jobs, investment, and technology transfer -- all things that will continue under the FTA. COMMENT 15. The QIZ's are an important success story for Jordan and for the ability of economic cooperation to foster political cooperation. They have also had a number of unintended - and overwhelmingly positive - consequences, from industrial labor force and investment promotion training to women's empowerment. Growth in new businesses has slowed from its early heyday, due in part to continuing regional instability and constraints on availability of trained labor. In addition, the uncertainty of the post-2005 global textile environment is legitimate cause for pause in some Jordanian circles. Nevertheless, the QIZ initiative continues to draw interested textile sector investors and to lay the groundwork for attracting investors under the FTA. GNEHM
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