US embassy cable - 02ABUJA2727

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NIGERIA: KANO GOVERNOR ON OBASANJO PERFORMANCE

Identifier: 02ABUJA2727
Wikileaks: View 02ABUJA2727 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Abuja
Created: 2002-09-23 15:54:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PREL NI
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002727 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2012 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, NI 
SUBJECT: NIGERIA:  KANO GOVERNOR ON OBASANJO PERFORMANCE 
 
 
Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter.  Reasons 1.5 (B & 
D). 
 
 
1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  During a September 5 call on Ambassador 
Jeter, Kano State Governor Rabiu Kwankwaso offered his 
assessment of the Obasanjo Presidency and urged continued 
USG support for Nigerian democratization.  Kwankwaso, 
Nigeria's youngest state governor and at the helm of the 
nation's largest state in population and territory, was 
confident of his own standing and appears well-positioned 
for the upcoming round of elections.  End Summary. 
 
 
2.  (C)  Kano State Governor Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso, 
accompanied by the Special Advisor for Metropolitan Affairs 
Akilu Indabawa and the state's Health Commissioner, paid a 
call on Ambassador Jeter on 5 September during one of the 
Governor's visits to Abuja.  Responding to Ambassador 
Jeter's questions, Kwankwaso and his companions expounded 
on the current political problems facing the Obasanjo 
Presidency. 
 
 
3.  (C)  Kwankaso said that many of Nigeria's problems 
stemmed from the pace of transition from military to 
civilian rule.  Obasanjo had been out of touch with 
politicians since stepping down as military ruler in 1979 
and that fact, coupled with his incarceration and possible 
torture late in the Abacha regime, meant that he was not 
sufficiently involved in politics and was thus ill-prepared 
to assume leadership of the country. 
 
 
4.  (C)  Further, Kwankwaso noted, the pot was boiling 
because Nigeria had never successfully had a transition 
between two democratically-elected civilian governments. 
In some ways, conducting credible elections in 2003 will be 
more difficult than in 1999.  Moreover, the failure of past 
democratic experiments has dissuaded many able people from 
political participation.  This has had a leveling effect on 
the quality of governance and political discourse in the 
country.  In Kwankwaso's assessment, the 2003 elections and 
the subseqquent round in 2007 will likely continue to 
attract the self-interested politicians who dominate 
Nigerian politics today.  For instance, the genesis of the 
impeachment crisis is the lack of understanding among 
relatively inexperienced politicians of the appropriate 
relationship between political parties and the government. 
Kwankwaso said that the presidential system lessens party 
control over the workings of government and was radically 
different from the parliamentary system, where party 
loyalty is a necessity in defining and directing the 
government's goals.  Rather than building civil society, 
the USG focus its assistance on fostering a deeper 
understanding of the role of the parties in a presidential 
system, the Kano Governor explained. 
 
 
5.  (C)  Kwankwaso believed Obasanjo was a sincere patriot 
with Nigeria's best interests at heart, but the uneven 
wisdom of his appointments and the structure of the 
Presidency "reflects on the quality of his leadership." 
The Governor rightly pointed out that some among the 
Cabinet were "losers in their own districts," unable to be 
elected on their own merits.  Others were appointed by 
Obasanjo to balance the myriad competing political, 
regional and ethnic interests in Nigeria.  Unfortunately, 
in Kwankwaso's opinion, Obasanjo's assessment of these 
interests was off the mark, based on his own incomplete 
understanding of political developments in Nigeria in 
recent years.  Kwankwaso identified the most serious 
problem for the Presidency as communications, both 
domestically and with the outside world. 
 
 
6.  (C)  The Health Commissioner commented the number of 
Ministers and Special Advisors in the Presidency, which he 
figured at about 100, created an uncontrollable 
bureaucracy.  With each person pursuing his own interests, 
no one was looking out for the interests of the President. 
Kwankwaso asked rhetorically, "Where have the Ministers and 
Advisors been while the Legislature was calling for 
Obasanjo's impeachment?  Invisible!"  While each one should 
be selling the merits of Obasanjo's leadership and 
highlighting his accomplishments, they have all gone 
aground, waiting for the air to clear and figuring how to 
maximize their own individual interests in the aftermath. 
 
 
7.  (C)  Communications with the public has been no better. 
In Kano, Kwankwaso complained, it was Kano State personnel 
who identified projects initiated by Federal authorities in 
order to publicize them to the voters.  "The Ministers 
should be touting the government's accomplishments to the 
electorate in order to improve the image of their boss," 
Kwankwaso lamented.  Instead, when anyone gets credit, it 
is usually the Minister rather than the Administration. 
 
 
8.  (C)  On the upcoming elections, and despite his 
criticism of the President, Kwankwaso was confident that he 
could deliver Kano to Obasanjo, regardless of who runs 
against him.  The Health Commissioner commented, however, 
that Obasanjo was making a serious mistake by ignoring the 
North.  "Kano is the most populous state in the country, 
and the Hausa-Fulani are the most populous tribe," he said. 
He was perplexed by Obasanjo's perceived inattention to the 
political needs of this important region.  When Ambassador 
Jeter asked whether press reports that the President was 
losing support in the north because of his prosecution of 
Mohammed Abacha, Kwankwaso sniffed, "Keeping him in jail 
bothers no one."  Contending that Kano indigenes had no 
love for the Abacha family, he said that, conversely, 
letting Abacha out could be a blow to Obasanjo's popularity 
and credibility.  And in response to Ambassador's question 
about House of Representatives Speaker Na'abba's chances 
for reelection, Kwankwaso pointedly asked, "Do you want him 
to return?"  The implication that the Governor could derail 
Na'abba's political career was seconded by Indabawa, who 
commented that anyone supported by Kwankwaso was virtually 
assured of election. 
 
 
9.  (C)  COMMENT:  Kwankwaso appeared relaxed and confident 
about his future political prospects and prowess.  Like 
other Northerners who back Obasanjo, Kwankwaso is not 
enamored with the President and is full of criticism of his 
Administration; however he likely views the President as a 
known quantity and the lesser evil among the many possible 
candidates.  His assessment of the weaknesses of Obasanjo's 
Administration is telling and tracks with our own: a 
Presidency staffed with too many uncoordinated Special 
Assistants and Advisors, most with no clear mandate about 
their respective portfolios, no vision or clear message, 
and an extraordinary inability to sell the man who leads 
the nation from Aso Rock. 
ANDREWS 

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