US embassy cable - 05PARIS5307

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VILLEPIN STIRS THE POT ON TURKISH EU ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS

Identifier: 05PARIS5307
Wikileaks: View 05PARIS5307 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Paris
Created: 2005-08-03 11:13:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV FR TU EUN
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

031113Z Aug 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 005307 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, FR, TU, EUN 
SUBJECT: VILLEPIN STIRS THE POT ON TURKISH EU ACCESSION 
NEGOTIATIONS 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 4486 
 
     B. PARIS 4235 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah B. Rosenblatt for re 
asons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C)  SUMMARY: In an August 2 radio interview, PM Villepin 
appeared to raise the bar for French support for the opening 
of accession negotiations with Turkey scheduled to begin 
October 3, saying that, "It doesn't appear to me conceivable 
that such a negotiation process can be opened with a country 
that doesn't recognize all the member states of the EU" 
(i.e., Cyprus).  Villepin's position was reportedly supported 
by President Chirac that morning during the last meeting of 
the Council of Ministers prior to the summer break.  MFA 
DAS-equivalent for enlargement (DAS-equivalent) Caroline 
Ferrari told us the same afternoon that while the remarks 
only represented Villepin's initial reaction to Turkey's 
declaration, France would want time to share its "analysis" 
with its European partners before deciding how to proceed. 
The MFA spokeswoman refused to be drawn out on the issue 
during yesterday afternoon's press briefing.  It is not clear 
at this point how far France is prepared to go, although 
Villepin's declaration appears to be a repositioning 
following the negative French referendum vote as well as 
prepositioning for the 2007 French Presidential elections. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
August 2 Remarks - Moving the Goal Posts? 
----------------------------------------- 
 
2. (U) During an August 2 appearance on Europe 1 radio, when 
asked whether Turkey's declaration on Cyprus in conjunction 
with its signing of the protocol to the Ankara Agreement 
would affect the scheduled October 3 opening of accession 
negotiations with Turkey, PM Dominique de Villepin responded: 
"To me, it doesn't appear conceivable that such a process of 
negotiations could be opened with a country that doesn't 
recognize each of the EU member states.. . .To re-enter in a 
negotiation process, whatever be the form, that of course 
supposes the recognition of each of the members with whom you 
want to work.  Thus there is the principle that appears to me 
must be defended and it's what France will put forward to 
Turkey and to the other EU member states during the next 
meetings in September." 
 
3. (U) When pressed on whether negotiations really might not 
open on October 3, Villepin responded, "Yes.  I believe these 
things should be clear.  But we'll talk about this first with 
the EU member states.  You know, France is a country that 
cares about working in the family that is the EU.  There are 
the meetings of FMs at the beginning of September, there will 
be the exchanges between Heads of State.  Beginning from 
there, we will determine the French position, and I say it 
here: it does not appear to me advisable to enter into a 
negotiating process before Turkey has clearly indicated its 
will to recognize each of the members of the EU." 
 
4. (C) French AFP quickly picked up on the story, noting that 
Villepin would not back the opening of negotiations with 
Turkey if the latter did not recognize Cyprus first, a 
criterion that was not/not included in the Dec. 2004 decision 
setting the conditions for Turkey to begin negotiations.  By 
the afternoon, AFP was reporting an embarrassed Commission 
response and quoting an anonymous European diplomat as saying 
"it's the first time that this condition has been posed to 
Ankara to open the membership negotiations.  To my knowledge, 
not even Cyprus or Greece have gone so far publicly." 
 
Without Completely Closing the Door (Yet) 
----------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) Responding to our request for clarification, Caroline 
Ferrari, MFA Deputy Director for European enlargement, tried 
to shift some of the blame to Turkey by arguing that Turkey's 
decision to issue a "unilateral declaration" accompanying its 
protocol signature had highlighted its non-recognition of 
Cyprus.  It called into question the basis for the EU's 
decision to open accession negotiations October 3.  She 
claimed France had been angered by Turkey's declaration. 
COREPER would meet on August 24 to discuss the declaration 
and to assess whether the Turkish declaration was 
incompatible with the protocol signature.  She added that the 
EU Foreign Ministers would be meeting on September 1 to 
discuss the issue further.  Asked whether France intended to 
block the opening of accession negotiations unless Turkey 
formally recognized Cyprus, Ferrari responded, "We want to 
discuss our analysis with our European partners." 
 
6. (U) In the afternoon press briefing, MFA spokeswoman 
Cecile Pozzo di Borgo refused any commentary on the issue, 
while citing the upcoming European meetings at which the 
French would discuss the issue with their European partners. 
 
But a Shift in the Making 
------------------------- 
7.  (C) There had already been some signs of a changing 
French position on Turkey even prior to Villepin's radio 
interview in the wake of the negative French referendum vote. 
British Embassy contacts told us that Chirac was very 
negative in his June 14 meeting with Blair in assessing the 
potential impact on European public opinion of opening 
membership negotiations with Turkey (ref B).  In addition, 
public remarks by Chirac and Villepin since the referendum, 
while not explicitly naming Turkey, appear in retrospect 
aimed at setting the stage for a change in position. Chirac, 
in a speech given during the June European Council, asked how 
the Union could continue to expand without having "the 
institutions capable of making the enlarged Union function 
efficiently."  Villepin went a step farther in a June 15 
address to the National Assembly, saying that, "while 
respecting our commitments, we should definitely open a 
period of reflection with our partners on the forms of future 
enlargements." 
 
8.  (C) The message was left ambiguous at the time, with 
Douste-Blazy telling the Foreign Affairs Committee of the 
National Assembly on June 21 that it would not be accurate to 
affirm that Chirac had changed his view favoring Turkey's 
accession.  Only a day later, however, European Affairs 
Minister Colonna and Chirac confidante, in remarks to the 
National Assembly's EU Delegation, said that negotiations 
with Turkey "will not necessarily finish with membership; a 
privileged partnership is always an option." 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
9. (C)  In late July, in conjunction with a conversation on 
visiting German CDU chief Merkel's visit to Paris, Rainier 
Daussonville, Villepin's technical counselor for European 
Affairs, told us that a move by Turkey to loudly broadcast 
its non-recognition of Cyprus in conjunction with its 
signature would be "a problem."  It now appears that his boss 
has gone ahead and moved this problem into the public sphere. 
 Although it is not yet clear at this point to what extent 
France intends to follow through on its words with other EU 
member states, GOF motives are transparent.  First, Chirac 
and Villepin are repositioning French policy toward EU 
enlargement to take account of the failure of the EU 
constitutional referendum.  Unease about enlargement was 
clearly major factor in its defeat (which Chirac failed to 
neutralize through the amendment to the French constitution 
that will make future accessions subject to popular 
referenda).  Second, Villepin/Chirac are also prepositioning 
themselves for the 2007 Presidential elections in an attempt 
to prevent Interior Minister Sarkozy, a long-time opponent of 
Turkish membership in the EU, from gaining popular advantage 
on an emotive issue.  Finally, we would not rule out a 
tactical consideration: a rash reaction from Turkey that 
would spare the EU (and France) a difficult decision at this 
time and shift the onus for failure onto the Turks.  End 
Comment. 
STAPLETON 

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