US embassy cable - 05ANKARA4486

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 004486 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2006 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, TU, CY, EUN, EU Accession 
SUBJECT: TURKEY-EU: AKP GOVERNMENT SIGNS ADDITIONAL 
PROTOCOL, REFUSES TO RECOGNIZE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS 
 
 
(U) Classified by CDA Nancy McEldowney; reasons: E.O. 12958 
1.4 (b,d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: By its July 29 signing of an additional 
protocol extending the 1963 EEC-Turkey Ankara Agreement to 
the EU's 10 newest members, Turkey appeared to have fulfilled 
the remaining pre-condition for an Oct. 3 start to accession 
negotiations.  However, the ability of the UK as EU 
Presidency to hold down EU member states' reaction to an 
attached Turkish declaration that does not recognize the 
Republic of Cyprus and Turkey's determination not to open its 
ports to Greek Cypriot vessels absent a lifting of the Greek 
Cypriot embargo on northern Cyprus is unclear at this stage. 
End summary. 
 
2. (U) In signing an additional protocol ("Adaptation 
Protocol") to the 1963 EEC-Turkey Ankara Agreement July 29, 
Turkey's AKP government extended the Agreement's reach to the 
EU's 10 newest members, including the Republic of Cyprus. 
 
3. (U) At the same time, the AKP government issued a six-part 
declaration (text below, para 8) re-affirming  long-standing 
Turkish positions that: (1) Turkey will continue to support 
the UNSYG's efforts toward a comprehensive Cyprus settlement 
leading to a new bi-zonal partnership state; (2) the Republic 
of Cyprus referred to in the protocol is not the partnership 
state founded in 1960; (3) the Greek Cypriot authorities' 
legal and administrative authority extends only over the 
territory south of the buffer zone, Turkey will continue to 
consider that the Greek Cypriots have no authority over the 
Turkish Cypriot people, and Turkey will treat the Greek 
Cypriot authorities' actions according to these two 
considerations; (4) Turkey's signature, ratification, and 
implementation of the protocol does not signify recognition 
in any manner of the Republic of Cyprus referred to in the 
protocol and Turkey's rights and obligations under the 1960 
Treaties of Guarantee, Alliance, and Establishment continue; 
(5) Turkey's relationship with the "TRNC" remains unchanged. 
 
4. (C) Discussing the Turkish declaration on the margins of 
an Aug. 1 meeting with EUR DAS Bryza, a visibly nervous 
deputy U/S Apakan, the MFA's Cyprus wallah, said Turkey had 
been obliged to issue the declaration but had striven to be 
as nuanced and non-confrontational as possible.  Neither he 
nor DG (A/S equivalent) for the Americas Alpar could gauge 
what the EU reaction might be, but instead both wrapped 
themselves in wishful thinking that the EU would not react 
harshly or even issue a comment supplementary to the UK 
Presidency's July 29 response that the EU recognizes only the 
Republic of Cyprus. 
 
5. (C) Asked how the EU might react to exclusion of Cypriot 
vessels from Turkish ports, Apakan argued that the Customs 
Union does not cover transportation or other services, i.e., 
Turkish trucks are restricted in their transport of goods to 
EU markets.  Therefore, the EU should not balk.  Furthermore, 
the Greek Cypriots have restricted Turkish Cypriot commerce 
since 1963.  The Greek Cypriots claim to represent the whole 
island and the EU recognizes the Greek Cypriots as the 
Republic of Cyprus.  How can the EU permit an embargo on one 
of its parts, Apakan asked.  In any event, Greek Cypriot 
goods can enter Turkey.  And if the Greek Cypriots end their 
embargo on the north, then, he opined, the Turkish government 
might well reconsider its position on port access.  In this 
regard, Turkey's end-May proposal to open all ports in Cyprus 
to all goods was a reflection of Turkey's constructive 
willingness to find a solution. 
 
6. (U) In a statement following Turkey's signing, FonMin Gul 
reiterated that, by signing the additional protocol, the 
Turkish government considers it has fulfilled all 
pre-conditions for accession negotiations to begin Oct. 3. 
However, Gul added that the AKP government will submit the 
protocol for parliamentary approval after Parliament 
reconvenes Oct. 1, thus appearing to signal the EU that 
Turkey has "options" if the negotiations do not start on Oct. 
3. Turkish press broadly reported EU Enlargement Commissioner 
Rehn's Aug. 1 statement that no obstacles remain to opening 
accession negotiations Oct. 3.  However, they have begun to 
pick up reports quoting French PM de Villepin saying that 
Turkey will have to recognize the Republic of Cyprus before 
talks can begin Oct. 3 and that the start date could 
otherwise be delayed.  The de Villepin statement is likely 
further to goad those in Turkey, e.g., CHP on the left and 
MHP on the right, who have accused the AKP government of 
selling out national interests by signing the additional 
protocol. 
 
 
7. (U) Text of "Declaration by Turkey on Cyprus" (MFA English 
version): 
 
1.  Turkey remains committed to finding a political 
settlement of the Cyprus issue and has clearly demonstrated 
its resolve in this regard.  Accordingly, Turkey will 
continue to support the efforts of the UN Secretary-General 
towards achieving a comprehensive settlement which will lead 
to the establishment of a new bi-zonal partnership State.  A 
just and lasting settlement would greatly contribute to 
peace, stability and harmonious relations in the region. 
 
2.  The Republic of Cyprus referred to in the Protocol is not 
the original partnership State established in 1960. 
 
3.  Turkey will thus continue to regard the Greek Cypriot 
authorities as exercising authority, control and jurisdiction 
only in the territory south of the buffer zone, as is 
currently the case, and as not representing the Turkish 
Cypriot people and will treat the acts performed by them 
accordingly. 
 
4.  Turkey declares that signature, ratification and 
implementation of this Protocol neither amount to any form of 
recognition of the Republic of Cyprus referred to in the 
Protocol; nor prejudice Turkey's rights and obligations 
emanating from the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of 
Alliance, and the Treaty of Establishment of 1960. 
 
5.  Turkey reaffirms that its existing relationship with the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus remains unchanged by 
becoming a party to the Protocol. 
 
6.  Pending a comprehensive settlement, the position of 
Turkey on Cyprus will remain unchanged.  Turkey expresses its 
readiness to establish relations with the new partnership 
State which will emerge following a comprehensive settlement 
in Cyprus. 
 
 
MCELDOWNEY