US embassy cable - 05HARARE1095

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 001095 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR U/S BURNS, AF A/S NEWMAN/DAS WOODS; NSC FOR 
ABRAMS, COURVILLE, USAID FOR NATSIOS, PIERSON 
DEPARTMENT PASS EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/02/2015 
TAGS: ECON, EAID, PREL, PGOV, PHUM, ZI, Restore Order/Murambatsvina 
SUBJECT: UNDP RESREP ON NEXT STEPS FOLLOWING TIBAIJUKA 
REPORT RELEASE 
 
 
Classified By: CDA Eric Schultz, reason 1.4 (b) (d) 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (C) UNDP Resrep Agostinho Zacharias briefed the donor 
community July 28 on the UN,s next steps following the 
release last week of UN Special Envoy Tibaijuka,s report on 
Operation Restore Order.  Zacharias said the goal was to work 
with the GOZ to end further demolitions and to provide relief 
to the victims.  He appealed for donor support.  In a 
separate meeting with the CDA August 1, Zacharias said the 
GOZ was increasingly cooperative with relief efforts and was 
privately admitting the operation had been a mistake. 
Zacharias added that the transition process in Zimbabwe was 
underway and that this view should animate the international 
community,s dealings with the GOZ and would be central to 
the proposed trip by Secretary General Annan to Zimbabwe. 
End Summary. 
 
-------------- 
Donor Briefing 
-------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Zacharias told the donor community that the UN would 
focus on implementing the recommendations in Tibaijuka,s 
report.  The first step in that process had been to establish 
UN-GOZ working groups at the policy level and at the 
technical level.  The UN,s goals for the working groups were 
threefold: stop further demolitions, convince the GOZ to 
recognize the humanitarian consequences of the operation, and 
secure unimpeded access to victims.  The Canadian 
representative asked if donors could be included in the 
working groups.  Zacharias replied that he would ask the GOZ. 
 
 
3. (SBU) Zacharias said the UN also planned to establish a 
liaison officer in his office who would spearhead a 
coordinated approach to improving the operating environment 
for NGOs.  He asked donors to fund the position.  The British 
DFID representative said his country would consider the 
request.  Zacharias also announced that the UN had 
established two task forces in New York to assist him and his 
team in implementing Tibaijuka,s recommendations.  He 
stressed that his office had the lead; the task forces were 
to provide assistance: one with political issues; the other 
with humanitarian issues. 
 
4. (SBU) Zacharias said the UN would be further modifying the 
&flash appeal8 for $10 million that it had recently issued. 
 The appeal would still be for three months but would now be 
a &joint appeal8 with the GOZ and would reflect government 
input.  Zacharias said the amount would also likely rise.  He 
hoped to release the appeal by the end of the first week of 
August.  (N.B. IOM representatives told us August 1 that the 
appeal was now up to $18 million; see septel).  A second 
appeal was planned for three months from now, which would 
address the longer-term consequences of Operation Restore 
Order.  USAID Director noted that while donors were committed 
to providing humanitarian assistance, they would not be 
sympathetic to such a long-term appeal, especially for 
rebuilding housing, absent a dramatically different approach 
by the GOZ. 
 
------------------------- 
Separate Meeting With CDA 
------------------------- 
 
5. (C) In a separate meeting with CDA August 1, Zacharias 
said the report,s release had not affected his access to 
senior GOZ officials.  In fact, the GOZ was if anything even 
more cooperative.  They appeared to realize that Operation 
Restore Order had been a mistake.  The CDA noted that to date 
the GOZ had refused to accept the report, let alone agree to 
act on its recommendations.  Zacharias acknowledged the 
point.  Part of the purpose of the working groups was to get 
them to admit the operation had been a mistake by recognizing 
its humanitarian consequences. 
 
6. (C) Moreover, Zacharias said he had met with Security 
Minister Mutasa on July 29, who had not only acknowledged 
that mistakes had been made but had offered GOZ cooperation 
for UN efforts to provide temporary housing for the 
operation,s victims.  Mutasa had suggested that IOM initiate 
a pilot program to provide tents in his home district of 
Headlands.  IOM had then traveled to Headlands July 30 with 
Mutasa, Agriculture Minister Made, and Justice Minister 
Chinimasa.  IOM had reported back to Zacharias that Mutasa 
had repeated his characterization of the operation as a 
mistake in public and had called on the local security forces 
to cooperate with relief efforts. 
 
7. (C) The CDA said that if the GOZ were going to publicly 
acknowledge the operation to have been a mistake, they would 
need someone to blame.  Zacharias agreed, noting that he had 
heard that President Mugabe had upbraided Local Government 
Minister Chombo on two separate occasions for allowing the 
operation to get out of control.  He was a likely fall guy. 
Personally, Zacharias said he hoped that the Governor of 
Manicaland (Mutare) where some of the worst abuses had 
occurred would be offered up for prosecution.  (N.B. An 
unabashed booster of Restore Order who earlier had publicly 
and privately taken credit for its conception, Mutasa would 
be another scapegoat candidate.) 
 
8. (C) Zacharias said he had also heard that the Mujurus were 
spreading the word that they had had nothing to do with the 
operation and were claiming it had been a plot to discredit 
them.  The CDA said that was highly unlikely but that their 
disavowal was entirely predictable.  Increasingly it seemed 
that everything was being filtered through the prism of 
succession politics.  Zacharias agreed, noting that his view 
was that the transition process had begun when Mugabe had 
chosen Joyce Mujuru as Vice President and heir apparent last 
December.  It might take until 2008, but Mugabe was clearly 
on his way out and less involved in day-to-day governance. 
 
9. (C) Zacharias said he felt that this view, that the 
transition was underway, should be central to defining the 
objectives for the Secretary General,s eventual trip to 
Zimbabwe.  In that regard, he asked the CDA,s advice on what 
Annan should try to accomplish.  The CDA responded that the 
overriding objective should be to speed the transition.  The 
longer the transition took, the more damage it would do to 
the country.  More specifically, Annan should press for ways 
to ensure the transition was open and democratic.  To that 
end, he should press for measures to reduce government 
control, such as reopening newspapers, depoliticizing the 
judiciary, liberalizing the economy, and establishing an 
independent electoral body. 
 
10. (C) Zacharias said he planned to ask for the views of 
other key international players, including the UK, and South 
Africa.  The CDA asked if he included Nigerian President 
Obasanjo.  Zacharias said Obasanjo,s relationship with the 
GOZ was such that he was not a major player.  That said, 
Obasanjo,s request to former Mozambiquan President Chissano 
to attempt a mediation role had been welcome and showed 
promise.  Zacharias, a Mozambiquan national, said Chissano 
had already asked for his advice on how to proceed. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
11. (C) We would agree with Zacharias that the transition has 
begun here but do not necessarily share his view that the 
international community should therefore look past the 
current situation.  In the near term, it is essential that 
the pressure be kept on the regime to ensure that Mugabe goes 
sooner rather than later, that the transition is open and 
democratic, and that whoever succeeds him rejects his 
policies.  The Secretary General,s visit, for which there is 
as yet no date, can play a key role in that regard, 
especially by also keeping the pressure on regional leaders 
such as South Africa to play more constructive roles in 
ending the Zimbabwe crisis. 
SCHULTZ