US embassy cable - 05NDJAMENA1209

C O N F I D E N T I A L  NDJAMENA 001209 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, D, DRL, H, INR, INR/GGI, 
PRM, USAID/OTI AND USAID/W FOR DAFURRMT; LONDON AND PARIS 
FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR CAMPBELL, 
ADDIS/NAIROBI/KAMPALA FOR REFCOORDS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PREF, CD, SU, Darfur Policy and Rebels 
SUBJECT: DISCUSSING DARFUR WITH DEBY 
 
 
Classified By: Political/Economic Officer Kathleen FitzGibbon for reaso 
ns 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C)  Summary: President Idriss Deby outlined Chad's 
perspective on the upcoming round of negotiations on Darfur 
in a meeting on July 29 with Ambassador John Yates, the U.S. 
Special Representative to the talks.  Deby expressed his 
concerns with the African Union's lack of consultation and 
acceptance of the views of Chad, as the co-mediator, and the 
proposals of other partners.  He also shared his doubts about 
how representative the movements' leadership was and 
emphasized the importance of resolving divisions within the 
movements prior to the next round of talks.  Finally, Deby 
stated the need to expand the mandate of the AU forces to 
protect civilians.  The meeting appeared to settle some of 
Chad's angst over challenges to its role as co-mediator in 
the peace process.  The Chad mediation team is traveling to 
Addis Ababa on August 3 for meetings with the AU. 
Nonetheless, we urge a consultative visit to Chad by Dr. 
Salim Salim similar to those undertaken by his predecessor 
prior to the next round of talks.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (C)  On July 29, Ambassador Wall, Special Representative 
for the Darfur Peace Talks Ambassador John Yates, and P/E 
Officer met with President Idriss Deby to solicit Chad's 
views on the Darfur peace process.  Chad's mediation team, 
General Mahamat Ali Abdullah and Allam-mi Ahmad, and Cabinet 
Director Mahamat Ali Annadif and Presidential Secretary 
Brahim Deby participated in the meeting. 
 
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THE TROUBLE WITH THE AFRICAN UNION... 
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3.  (C) President Idriss Deby, well in command of the details 
of the Darfur situation, stated that Chad will continue its 
co-mediation role in the peace process and views the coming 
discussions of political questions essential to the 
resolution of the crisis.  Deby noted the continued negative 
evolution of the situation with the African Union.  He said 
that Chad's involvement in the resolution of the conflict 
pre-dated the AU's and outlined the process through which 
Chad became a co-mediator with the AU.  Chad has the 
advantage of knowing the key players and the terrain better 
than the staff at the AU.  However, the AU continues to 
ignore Chad's written strategy proposals and does not listen 
to advice, particularly about personalities and events on the 
ground, according to Deby.  He counseled that the AU must be 
willing to take into account the views and proposals of other 
partners. 
 
4.  (C)  Deby gave as an example a five-point plan for the 
resolution of the Darfur situation put forward by Sudanese 
President Bashir in Tripoli.  The plan called for autonomy 
for Darfur, an wealth-sharing formula, participation by the 
rebels in the government and in the management of the 
country, reconstruction and development in Darfur, and the 
return of refugees to Sudan in five years.  Deby stated that 
the plan was presented in front of five heads of state, 
including those of Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, and Chad.  (Note: 
He could not remember the fifth.  End Note.)  Chad's 
frustration with the AU's inability to make concrete 
decisions stems from the "incalculable consequences" that the 
presence of the Sudanese refugees is taking on the country's 
economy, environment, and stability, according to Deby.  He 
noted that the conflict in Darfur threatens to drag the whole 
region into a war like the one in Africa's Great Lakes region. 
 
5. (C)  In an effort to prepare for the next round of 
discussions, Chad's mediation team, Allam-mi and Ali, will 
head to Addis Ababa on August 3 to consult with the AU.  It 
is not clear if Salim Salim will be there, according to 
Allam-mi. 
 
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DIVISIONS WITHIN AND BETWEEN THE MOVEMENTS 
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6.  (C)  Deby discussed the divisions within the rebel 
movements.  He expressed his conviction that the rebel 
leaders at the negotiating table do not represent their 
movements on the ground.  He questioned what Dr. Khalil 
 
Ibrahim, Abdelwahid Nur, and Mini Minawi have done in the 
field over the past two years and whom each of the three 
actually represents now.  Deby pointed out that they stand in 
contrast to Dr. John Garang.  Deby said "hotel rebels" do not 
represent those on the ground, especially if they are afraid 
to go to the field or enter into dialogue with the field 
commanders. 
 
7.  (C) In addition, Deby asked how the peace process will 
move forward when the two rebel movements have different 
political objectives.  The Justice and Equality Movement 
(JEM) seeks power at the national level and would like to see 
Bashir leave office.  The Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) is 
calling for the development of Darfur, participation in 
governance, and the coexistence of different communities. 
Deby questioned whether this would mean negotiating with each 
movement separately, i.e., one set of negotiations between 
the GOS and SLM and one set between the GOS and JEM. 
 
8.  (C)  Deby's last point concerned the role of Libya.  He 
acknowledged that as an AU member and a neighboring country, 
Libya has a role in the talks.  However, he expressed concern 
about the members and leaders of the rebel movements 
traveling to Tripoli without any of the international 
partners present. 
 
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MODALITIES OF UPCOMING TALKS 
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9.  (C)  Ambassador Yates told Deby that the United States 
recognizes and appreciates Chad's key role in the peace 
process and its position as a co-mediator.  He reiterated 
Secretary Rice's hope that a political agreement could be 
 
SIPDIS 
finished by the end of the year.  He noted the U.S. concern 
that the establishment of the Government of National Unity in 
Sudan not be upset by the absence of an agreement on Darfur. 
Yates said that the Secretary's and the Deputy Secretary's 
visits to Darfur underscore the priority the United States 
places on obtaining peace in Darfur.  Yates agreed that the 
SLM has too many divisions.  He told Deby that the United 
States has contacts with the various rebel leaders and also 
is urging the resolution to SLM's leadership issues. 
Ambassador Yates outlined the AU's current ideas on ways in 
which to accelerate the next round of talks.  For example, 
the AU is thinking about running concurrent negotiating 
committees on power sharing, wealth sharing, and security 
arrangements.  In addition, the AU wants to limit the size of 
the official delegations to a maximum of 25. 
 
10.  (C)  Deby responded, noting that ten to fifteen 
delegates per movement should be enough.  Deby advised that a 
leader of each delegation must be designated to make 
decisions on behalf of the group.  Deby complained that the 
various rebel leaders, Abdelwahid, Mini, and Khalil attend 
openings and then leave.  More importantly, the negotiators 
at the table must represent and be accepted by those in 
Darfur, and various ethnic groups must be adequately 
represented by the movements.  Deby questioned whether Dr. 
Khalil Ibrahim represents anyone in the field.  He also 
stated that the United States, the EU, France, and other 
partners need to place the same pressure on the parties and 
that the AU, Nigeria, and Chad act consistently to provide 
coherence to the process in the future. 
 
11.  (C)  Ambassador Yates agreed, explaining that this was 
the underlying purpose of his trip to Addis Ababa, Khartoum, 
and N'Djamena.  Deby appreciated Yates's point that he had 
chosen these capitals, not Tripoli or Asmara, for this round 
on consultations.  Yates cautioned, however, that he is 
realistic about the pace of progress in the next round, given 
that it took 30 days to negotiate three pages of text.  Yates 
noted that much work needs to be done before the next round, 
the members of the movements must be prepared, and the AU 
needs to prepare as much as possible in advance.  Deby 
agreed, expressing again his concern with the movements' 
internal problems.  Yates also expressed appreciation for 
Chad's assistance in the Rwandan airlift.  Deby stated that 
it is critical to augment the AU forces on the ground.  Deby 
added that the AU protection force needs an expanded mandate 
to include protection of civilians.  He noted that right now, 
the AU monitors are very expensive, given the number of 
 
protection force members designated to protect the current 
number of monitors and the cost of the deployment. 
 
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COMMENT 
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12.  (C)  Deby demonstrated a detailed understanding of 
obstacles facing the Abuja peace process.  He appeared 
pleased that Ambassador Yates included Chad in consultations 
on the upcoming round of negotiations.  The travel of the 
Chad mediators to Addis Ababa is a positive step toward 
ironing out some of the problems that occurred in Abuja.  We 
note, however, that given the lack of an AU presence in Chad, 
a visit by Dr. Salim Salim to N'Djamena for consultations is 
important.  His predecessor made several visits to Chad to 
coordinate mediation efforts and take stock of the situation 
on the ground.  Deby's criticisms of Dr. Khalil Ibrahim and 
JEM are not new and the representation of both movements at 
the negotiating table is an issue that will continue to 
plague the talks.  This is an issue that the AU needs to 
tackle directly. 
 
13.  (U)  Ambassador Yates did not have an opportunity to 
clear this cable prior to departure. 
 
14.  (U) Khartoum and Tripoli Minimize Considered. 
WALL 
 
 
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