US embassy cable - 05RANGOON893

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SENIOR GOB OFFICIALS ADDRESS SUNDRY BILATERAL ISSUES

Identifier: 05RANGOON893
Wikileaks: View 05RANGOON893 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Rangoon
Created: 2005-08-02 11:09:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PHUM PREL CASC BM TT
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000893 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV; PACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PREL, CASC, BM, TT 
SUBJECT: SENIOR GOB OFFICIALS ADDRESS SUNDRY BILATERAL 
ISSUES 
 
REF: A. RANGOON 888 
     B. RANGOON 887 
 
Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  At an August 1 farewell event, the COM 
pressed Deputy FM Maung Myint and the GOB to release ASSK and 
other political prisoners and allow their participation in 
the political process; urged the GOB to forget asking for 
"patience" and to make fundamental changes now; and requested 
that the MFA be more responsive on Amcit issues raised by the 
Embassy.  We don't expect many of our messages to reach the 
SPDC, but the dialogue was a rare one and the DFM may have 
some influence, albeit small, on the regime's top generals. 
End Summary. 
 
2. (C) On August 1, Deputy Foreign Minister Maung Myint 
hosted a farewell event for the COM, providing us an 
increasingly rare opportunity for direct discussions with the 
GOB on substantive policy issues (reftels cover discussions 
on the ASEAN Chair issue and efforts to block the G-4 UNSC 
reform resolution).  A/DCM attended and additional MFA 
officials included DG for Political Affairs, Thaung Tun 
(former DCM in Washington); DG for Protocol, Thura U Aung 
Htet; Brig-Gen Kyaw Kyaw (DG-designate for Protocol); and DG 
for Planning and Administration, U Linn Myaing (former 
Ambassador to Washington). 
 
DETENTION OF ASSK AND OTHER DEMOCRACY LEADERS 
 
3. (C) The DFM acknowledged that Burma's image is one of a 
closed society, but said that the regime's National 
Convention would set the country back on track.  "We can't 
allow any disruption to this process," he said, referring to 
Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK) and other detained leaders of the 
democratic opposition.  The COM said that the best thing 
Burma could do would be to free ASSK and other detainees, 
observing that "without them, you'll never have a credible 
process."  The DFM complained that the GOB had invited ASSK 
to the Convention, but she and her NLD party "refused."  The 
COM dismissed this standard regime argument and stated, "It's 
impossible to participate from jail." 
 
VISIT OF EAST TIMOR FM RAMOS-HORTA 
 
4. (C) Addressing the SPDC's decision to receive East Timor 
Foreign Minister Jose Ramos-Horta, a vocal critic of the 
regime's human rights abuses who visited July 21-24, DFM 
Maung Myint said that the visit was desirable because the 
Nobel Laureate "opposes economic sanctions."  DG for 
Political Affairs Thaung Tun told A/DCM that he had briefed 
Ramos-Horta on Burma's political situation and asked the FM 
"not to request a visit to ASSK, because the answer will be 
'no'."  He said that Ramos-Horta, who met with Prime Minister 
General Soe Win, discussed establishing relations with Burma 
and East Timor's membership in ASEAN--and also left a letter 
for ASSK, "which we (the GOB) will deliver." 
 
PRESSURE AGAINST THE SPDC 
 
5. (C) The DFM appealed for "patience" from the U.S. in 
letting the GOB resolve its political problems, and 
complained that Burma gets singled out for poor treatment, 
adding that "everyone talks to (Pakistan's President) 
Musharraf, but not to us."  The COM replied that 43 years of 
military rule, including 17 years by the current regime, has 
usurped all patience; the GOB itself has moved the country 
backwards and the time for fundamental change is long 
overdue.  "You need to reach out and have a dialogue," said 
the COM, "that's how other countries are dealing with their 
crises."  The DFM accepted this point, and surprisingly 
responded, "The (SPDC) generals are not very clever in this 
regard." 
 
AMCIT ISSUES 
 
6. (C) The COM raised three ongoing cases involving U.S. 
citizens and appealed to the DFM for improved communication 
and responsiveness.  DFM Maung Myint indicated that he was 
fully briefed on each of the three cases and promised an 
imminent response to each.  He did not comment immediately on 
two of the cases (a 20-year prison sentence for possession of 
a small quantity of drugs; and a complex immigration fraud 
allegation). 
 
7. (C) However, regarding the third case--which involves the 
GOB's cancellation of the re-entry visa for an Embassy 
contract employee who teaches at our American Center--the DFM 
said "she violated restrictions on political activities." 
The COM appealed for the teacher's return and the DFM said he 
would address the case in a subsequent meeting.  The DG for 
Political Affairs told A/DCM that the employee had been 
deported because "she was teaching members of the NLD party." 
 A/DCM observed that the NLD is a legal political party and 
that language instruction at the American Center is open to 
all members of the public.  The DG, however, demurred and 
replied, "this is not my issue, it's for our Consular Affairs 
division." 
 
COMMENT: MORE DIALOGUE? 
 
8. (C) Although we expect few of our messages will be 
transmitted to the SPDC's senior leaders, we viewed this 
opportunity as a valuable one to deliver key policy messages 
to a senior GOB official.  DFM Maung Myint is a career 
military officer--he held the rank of Brigadier General prior 
to his MFA appointment in 2004--and he is showing some signs 
of having influence, or at least input, on various regime 
decisions.  The COM pressed for a regular dialogue and Maung 
Myint agreed.  We'll continue, as always, to seek out similar 
opportunities.  End Comment. 
Martinez 

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