US embassy cable - 05HANOI1972

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 HANOI 001972 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREF, PREL, PHUM, CB, VM, HUMANR, ETMIN 
SUBJECT:  VIETNAM MFA OFFERS THOUGHTS ON INTERNATIONAL 
MONITORING 
 
REF: Hanoi 1940 and previous. 
 
1. (U) THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST.  PLEASE SEE PARAGRAPH 9. 
 
2. (SBU) Summary: A Ministry of Foreign Affairs officer 
spoke with Embassy Poloff August 2 to offer the MFA's 
support for a USG visit to the Central Highlands to monitor 
the condition of returned ethnic minority migrants; advise 
that the GVN has provided multiple-entry visas to UNHCR's 
Bangkok staff and is willing to allow on-demand visits to 
the Central Highlands; and, request that the USG "clarify" 
its statement to the press last week that the United States 
is prepared to accept all of the migrants returned to 
Vietnam July 20.  He also communicated several unofficial 
points: the GVN is not going to approve an international 
head of the Vietnam UNHCR office resident in Vietnam; the 
USG should work to internationalize the approach to 
monitoring conditions for returned migrants to avoid turning 
it into a bilateral issue; and, that the GVN considers its 
willingness to allow access to the Central Highlands by 
Embassies and Missions as well as UNHCR's Bangkok and Hanoi 
staff to be a sufficient response to the demand that Vietnam 
permit international monitoring of the situation in the 
Central Highlands.  Finally, he warned that the U.S. focus 
on replacing the existing Vietnamese UNHCR Vietnam Chief of 
Mission with a foreigner is perceived as offensive and 
racist by some in the Vietnamese leadership.  Embassy 
recommends a number of proposed next steps (see para. 9). 
These include adjusting U.S. policy to consider accepting 
regular visits by foreign Missions and UNHCR staff from 
Bangkok and Vietnam as meeting our demand for "international 
monitoring" in the Central Highlands.  End Summary. 
 
3. (SBU) Poloff spoke with an MFA contact on August 2.  The 
contact had three official points to convey: 
 
-- The U.S. Embassy spokesman's quote in the press last week 
that the United States will accept all of the returned 
migrants was unhelpful.  The MFA understands that the United 
States is considering how to assist those migrants who might 
be eligible under the Lautenberg Amendment on a case-by-case 
basis, and is willing to cooperate with that.  However, the 
MFA feels that we should issue a correction or clarification 
to "dispel misunderstanding" and avoid raising expectations 
in the returnee community.  (Note:  as EAP/BCLTV knows, this 
statement was not completely vetted.  Embassy will prepare 
and clear a clarification.  End Note.) 
 
-- The MFA is willing to assist with facilitating USG visits 
to the Highlands to meet with returned migrants, but 
requires that the requests for visits be channeled through 
the U.S. Embassy in Hanoi to the Consular Department of the 
MFA under the cover of a diplomatic note in order to make 
certain that "everything is done according to procedure." 
He explained that there is nothing illegal about such a 
visit and it is within the MFA's assigned responsibilities 
to assist; however, it will be necessary to follow the 
procedures very strictly to avoid any potential future 
problems in case a "sensitive situation" develops.  (Note: 
Translated from the carefully parsed diplomatese, he was 
saying that the MFA is willing to assist, but is going to 
make sure that it has all possible legal cover in case 
something goes awry and the GVN starts hunting for 
scapegoats.  It also appears to be a departure from normal 
protocol where travel by ConGen officers to the Central 
Highlands is managed through HCMC's External Relations 
Office and the provinces themselves.  End Note.) 
 
-- The GVN has decided to allow UNHCR at-will access to the 
Highlands and is committed to immediately facilitating any 
UNHCR request to visit.  UNHCR's Hanoi Chief of Mission Vu 
Anh Son's visit July 22 and UNHCR Bangkok Regional 
Representative Hasim Utkan's visit this week are evidence of 
this shift.  UNHCR Bangkok staff have been issued multiple- 
entry Vietnamese visas specifically to facilitate spur-of- 
the-moment visits. 
 
4. (SBU) Our MFA interlocutor then said he wanted to 
communicate "the true situation" but that due to the 
sensitivity of the issue, none of the following points would 
be provided (or acknowledged) officially: 
 
-- The "senior leadership" of the GVN has decided that 
granting permission for UNHCR to assign a foreign Chief of 
Mission to its office in Vietnam would send a signal that 
refugee problems in Vietnam have grown to the point where 
UNHCR requires an entire office here, which is exactly the 
opposite of the signal the GVN wants to send.  Further, they 
believe that this kind of public elevation of the status of 
UNHCR's Vietnam office would embolden "economic migrants" 
from the Central Highlands to cross the border into 
Cambodia, endangering themselves and detracting from the 
stability and development that the GVN is trying to build in 
the Highlands.  The request to assign a foreign COM is not 
going to be granted, he said.  However, it also will not be 
denied officially.  The MFA will avoid responding to UNHCR's 
formal request. 
 
-- The USG should try not to make this a "big deal" because 
the more the USG highlights the returnee problem as a human 
rights issue or a bilateral issue with the United States 
(rather than a humanitarian or multilateral issue) the more 
difficult it will become for the GVN to make what appear to 
be concessions to outside pressure.  If possible, it would 
be very good if the United States works with other concerned 
governments, such as the EU, to internationalize these 
concerns.  The MFA would accommodate requests for visits to 
the Central Highlands from other Embassies. 
 
-- The MFA believes that providing at-will access to the 
Highlands for UNHCR's existing Vietnam office as well as 
UNHCR's international staff in Bangkok, along with visits 
from the U.S. and other countries' Missions in Vietnam, 
should convince the international community of Vietnam's 
sincerity with regard to its promises that returnees will be 
well-treated.  This is not a formal proposal or offer open 
to negotiation, the MFA officer was quick to point out; it 
is simply a description of the GVN's internal understanding 
of the situation. 
 
5. (SBU) Poloff pointed out that allowing a foreign Chief of 
Mission (COM) in the UNHCR office in Hanoi would have the 
exact opposite effect of what the GVN leadership feared: the 
GVN's acceptance of the office would be an indication that 
the situation had stabilized, and the presence of 
international UNHCR staff in Vietnam would improve the 
ability of UNHCR Cambodia to screen Vietnamese migrants 
objectively and identify economic migrants.  UNHCR and 
Cambodia would then be able to repatriate migrants knowing 
that their situation would be monitored in Vietnam.  This in 
turn would signal to potential migrant populations that the 
arduous trek across the border into Cambodia would not 
result in guaranteed refugee status or resettlement except 
in genuine cases of persecution, which would cut the migrant 
flow.  The MFA officer acknowledged this reasoning, and 
explained that while this interpretation had been debated 
and considered in the GVN, the decision was that the 
increased profile of UNHCR in Vietnam would create an 
incentive to migrate and send the opposite signal from what 
the GVN wants to communicate to its own citizens and the 
outside world. 
 
6. (SBU) The MFA officer then contributed his heavily- 
caveated personal opinion that the USG's emphasis on 
pressing Vietnam to authorize a foreign UNHCR COM in Vietnam 
is seen by a sizeable number of officials within the GVN as 
racist and offensive.  Vu Anh Son, the current COM at UNHCR, 
is acknowledged as a dedicated and capable UN official; the 
only criticism of him is that he is Vietnamese.  The clear 
message - that the United States does not trust a Vietnamese 
national to be an impartial and objective witness - is being 
received very badly by some. 
 
7. (SBU) The MFA officer wrapped up the conversation with a 
reiteration of the "unofficial" nature of his comments 
beyond the first three issues in paragraph three above.  The 
rest of the information (in paragraph four) was provided "on 
the basis of mutual trust and respect," he said, under the 
assumption that if the USG has a more clear understanding 
about the way the GVN is thinking about these issues, it 
will be able to tailor its own thinking and actions more 
effectively.  Acknowledging or publicizing these comments 
would not be appropriate since they fall outside of what the 
GVN has agreed to communicate formally to the USG.  The last 
point regarding leadership perceptions of the racist nature 
of the USG message, he stressed, is his own personal 
comment. 
 
8. (SBU) During an exchange of views of the Central 
Highlands with UNHCR Regional Representative Hasim Utkan 
August 1, Utkan told us that he has "full confidence" in 
Son.  He was dismayed that some have called Son's integrity 
into question because of his Vietnamese nationality.  From 
our conversations with Utkan it became apparent that he 
believed that, so long as the "refusniks" were not refouled, 
the issue of monitoring the welfare of the returnees was a 
shorter term problem that could be managed through 
complementary visits by UNHCR staff and Vietnam-accredited 
diplomats from the international community (IC). 
"Flexibility" was his mantra so long as the Tripartite MOU 
was implemented successfully.  (More on ConGen HCMC's 
conversation with Utkan and Son septel.) 
 
9. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Please comment/concur on our 
proposed next steps: 
 
-- We should consult with other Missions in Vietnam to 
enlist their support and participation in the monitoring 
effort to internationalize the issue and head off the 
opposition of those who want to cast this as a bilateral 
problem. 
 
-- We should explore alternative staffing scenarios with 
UNHCR that would allow them to accomplish their Vietnam 
goals without an international Chief of Mission: for 
example, they could use the Italian candidate they have in 
mind, but base him in Bangkok and have him make regular 
trips to the Highlands.  In reality, Bangkok-Central 
Highlands is not more onerous a trip than Hanoi-Central 
Highlands.  (Note: the MFA contact implied that the GVN 
could accept an international Chief of Mission for Vietnam 
if he were based in Bangkok, because "we do not control what 
titles UNHCR gives its staff."  End Note.) 
 
-- We should back off the "placement of UNHCR international 
staff in Vietnam" as the only solution to the international 
monitoring problem.  Regular visits by UNHCR staff based in 
Bangkok and by Son based in Hanoi supplemented with regular 
visits from Mission and IC staff members based in Vietnam 
would accomplish as much, or more, than a single UNHCR 
foreigner stationed in Hanoi, and would assuage the 
political concerns of the GVN. 
 
-- We should consider clarifying the U.S. Embassy's 
misreported and not completely vetted statement last week. 
 
MARINE