US embassy cable - 05RANGOON887

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GOB FINALLY ACKNOWLEDGES FORGOING ASEAN CHAIR

Identifier: 05RANGOON887
Wikileaks: View 05RANGOON887 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Rangoon
Created: 2005-08-02 07:41:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PREL BM
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

020741Z Aug 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L RANGOON 000887 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV; PACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, BM 
SUBJECT: GOB FINALLY ACKNOWLEDGES FORGOING ASEAN CHAIR 
 
REF: A. RANGOON 871 AND PREVIOUS 
 
     B. VIENTIANE 814 
 
Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1. (C) Summary: The SPDC on August 1 finally acknowledged the 
Vientiane communique of one week ago announcing that Burma 
would forgo the 2006 ASEAN Chair.  One senior GOB official 
claimed to us that the SPDC generals, if Burma hosted ASEAN, 
would have been forced to make democracy and human rights 
concessions, but "now they will do nothing."  The Deputy FM 
expressed surprise to us that the United States extended 
sanctions against Burma the day after the Chair decision, to 
us a typical sign that the SPDC does not grasp that it must 
make fundamental changes to merit any review of sanctions. 
End Summary. 
 
2. (U) It took a week, but the Burmese regime has finally 
acknowledged the July 26 joint communique in Vientiane that 
addressed the 2006 ASEAN Chair issue. 
 
3. (U) Official SPDC television broadcast on August 1 a 
synopsis of Foreign Minister Nyan Win's participation in the 
Vientiane meetings and said the FM had briefed his 
counterparts on the "progress of democratization" in Burma. 
The report, which was buried on page eleven in the GOB's 
official newspaper on August 2, stated that "in order to 
maintain the momentum of this process, and taking into 
consideration the interest of both ASEAN and Myanmar, the 
Government of the Union of Myanmar had decided to forgo its 
ASEAN Chairmanship in 2006." 
 
4. (C) Deputy FM Maung Myint, at an August 1 farewell event 
(septel), told the COM that "we did what you want (on July 
26), so why did you then extend bilateral sanctions (on July 
27)?"  The COM replied that there is no link between the 
ASEAN Chair issue and the lifting of sanctions, which are 
tied to key issues related to democratization and respect for 
human rights.  The COM added that the Chair issue was one for 
ASEAN to resolve, not the United States. 
 
5. (C) MFA DG for Political Affairs Thaung Tun, who attended 
the Vientiane meetings, told the COM and A/DCM that the 
decision to forgo the chair had been a last minute one.  He 
said that senior GOB officials had presented options to the 
SPDC, actually recommending that Burma keep the Chair, and 
the decision was "handed down" just prior to the ASEAN FM 
meeting.  Asked who made the final decision, Thaung Tun said 
"there's only one person in Burma who makes the call on 
anything, and that's the Senior General (SPDC Chairman Than 
Shwe)." 
 
6. (C) Thaung Tun said that career GOB diplomats were 
"professionally disappointed" with the decision, concluding 
that Burma would lose "prestige" by not hosting a year of 
ASEAN meetings.  "However," he added, "the international 
community miscalculated, because these guys (the SPDC 
generals) would have been forced to make concessions on 
democracy and human rights when under the spotlight; now they 
will do nothing."  He added that during the Senior Officials 
Meeting (SOM) in Vientiane, several countries, which he 
declined to identify, had asked ASEAN members to "pause" 
before pressing for a skip in the rotation, "because Burma 
might actually accept the proposal, and then what?" 
 
7. (C) Comment: DFM Maung Myint's view that there should be a 
link between the ASEAN Chair decision and U.S. sanctions does 
not surprise us.  The GOB, despite ample information and our 
frequently repeated explanations, does not grasp that 
fundamental changes in regime behavior, particularly with 
regard to its treatment of the democratic opposition, are a 
prerequisite, and indeed just a beginning, for any review of 
sanctions.  End Comment. 
Martinez 

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