US embassy cable - 05SANJOSE1730

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SAN JOSE 001730 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPT FOR WHA GIOVANNI SNIDLE, PM AND NP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2015 
TAGS: EAIR, ETTC, PARM, PGOV, PREL 
SUBJECT: COSTA RICA: MANPADS INVENTORY AND TRAFFICKING 
CONTROLS 
 
REF: SECSTATE 113041 
 
Classified By: CDA Fred Kaplan for reasons 1.4 (a, b, c & d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: Having experienced no major military 
conflicts, and since abolishing the national army in 1949, 
the GOCR has never bought, sold or otherwise had possession 
of MANPADS or similarly sophisticated missile delivery 
systems.  While Costa Rica does represent a transit point on 
the illicit arms route from Nicaragua to Colombia, import 
controls along its border with Nicaragua seem to have limited 
the feasibility of transporting anything other than light 
weapons.  Despite numerous illicit weapons seizures made 
possible though close cooperation with USG agencies, no 
MANPADS or similar weapons have ever been found transiting 
Costa Rica.  Arms import and export controls are stringent, 
and corruption investigations are generally effective.  End 
Summary. 
 
2. (C) Costa Rica abolished its military in 1949.  While 
still maintaining a robust and well-equipped police force, 
Costa Rica's arms imports and use are generally limited to 
small arms.  To the best of our knowledge, Costa Rica has 
never purchased or received MANPADS units.  However, due to 
its long, easily accessible coastlines along both the Pacific 
and Atlantic oceans, as well as its porous border with 
Panama, Costa Rica has long been a transit point for illicit 
arms trade, principally between Nicaragua and Colombia.  The 
most common transfer involves shipment of arms from 
Nicaragua, which generally consist of surplus weapons from 
Nicaragua's civil war, in exchange for drugs from Colombia. 
Most weapons are ultimately destined for use by the FARC. 
Costa Rica's transit control scheme, while generally good, 
has several vulnerabilities, particularly along its southern 
border with Panama, and within its coastal waters.  USG 
cooperation with Costa Rican public security agencies has 
helped to improve interdiction efforts, with high-profile 
narcotics and weapons seizures in the past year.  While it is 
impossible to rule out transit of illicit MANPADS and other 
portable missile systems through Costa Rica, it is 
improbable, given that none of these weapons have been found 
in at least the last five years, despite frequent discovery 
and seizure of illicit small arms like AK-47s. 
 
4. (C) Confiscated and intercepted arms are stored at the 
central armory in San Jose, where inventory and maintenance 
are generally regarded as effective.  The weakest point in 
the control chain is the human element.  Post recently 
learned that Costa Rica's Armaments Director, until his 
suspension one of our principal contacts within the Ministry 
of Security, is under investigation for his potential 
involvement in facilitating illicit arms shipments.  The 
official has been returned to active duty status, but with 
unrelated responsibilities.  Post has not been informed of 
any specific charges pending, nor of the scope of the alleged 
trafficking, but has no reason to believe that trafficking 
MANPADS is suspected. 
 
Arms Import/Export Controls 
--------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Costa Rican law includes very strict import and export 
controls, banning all military-grade weapons outright except 
for official use.  However, consistent enforcement of these 
controls appears to be increasingly difficult for law 
enforcement officials.  Furthermore, these officials lack 
intelligence on the potential scope of the black market for 
arms in Costa Rica.  Wealthy Costa Ricans have little 
difficulty acquiring large quantities of legal weaponry, 
although they pay a premium.  Our Blue Lantern Defense Trade 
Control checks tend to confirm that registered arms dealers 
comply with Costa Rican law and U.S. end-use requirements for 
importing small arms.  However, in a relatively new trend, 
many of the violent crimes committed in Costa Rica involve 
cheap, unregistered weapons that are disposed of upon use. 
That these weapons are entering Costa Rica illegally in large 
enough numbers to be cheap implies that the current import 
controls for non-military weapons and routine traffic 
checkpoints fail to deter weapons smugglers when there is a 
domestic market to be serviced.  Since the vast majority of 
assault rifles seized in Costa Rica are destined for 
Colombia, it would appear that, to date, there is little 
domestic demand for weapons outside of small arms. 
 
6. (S/NF) Country Team Survey: 
 
--DEA reports that to the best of our knowledge, despite 
numerous weapons seizures each year, Costa Rican officials 
have not encountered MANPADS or other sophisticated arms. 
Primary currency in arms-for-drugs deals between Nicaragua 
and Colombia, and which comprise nearly all local arms 
seizures are AK-47 and similar assault rifles. 
 
DEA reports that land-based entry to Costa Rica is well 
controlled along the northern border with Nicaragua, but 
porous and easily breached along Costa Rica's southern border 
with Panama.  Owing to the weakness of exit controls in the 
south, Panamanian officials in the past have found weapons 
entering from Costa Rica.  All post's information indicates 
that these finds have consisted exclusively of assault 
rifles; there is no indication that MANPADS or other portable 
rocket systems are transiting Costa Rica by land. 
 
--RSO reports having no information on availability of 
MANPADS in Costa Rica.  There have been unconfirmed rumors of 
rocket-propelled grenades (RPG's) for sale on the black 
market, but these rumors have always been subsequently proven 
false. 
--The Office of the Defense Representative (ODR), whose 
officers routinely visit Costa Rica's central armory, 
including confiscated weapons holdings, report that they have 
never encountered MANPADS among Costa Rica's inventory. 
 
--Local RCMA office has no knowledge of any MANPADS within 
Costa Rica's public or private sectors, nor any information 
on any prior shipments or purchases of similar weapons. 
KAPLAN