US embassy cable - 02ABUJA2712

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 002712 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
LONDON FOR GURNEY 
PARIS FOR NEARY 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2012 
TAGS: PGOV, SOCI, KDEM, NI 
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: FORMER HEAD OF STATE BUHARI--PRESIDENTIAL 
CANDIDATE OR NORTHERN POLITICAL SPOILER? 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER. REASONS 1.5 (B) AND 
(D). 
 
 
1. (C) Summary: Disaffection with President Obasanjo has 
placed three words into the lexicon of Northern politicians: 
"Northern Consensus Candidate." One of the bruited names is 
Mohammadu Buhari, former military Head of State from 1983 to 
1985. Known as an honest, highly disciplined, hard-working, 
anti-corruption crusader, Buhari's declared intention to seek 
the ANPP presidential nomination has been well received at 
grassroots levels in the North. This grassroots popularity 
has not gone unnoticed; however, Buhari lacks a key 
ingredient for success--elite backing to complement his 
significant grassroots appeal. On September 6, national media 
reported that Buhari wrote all former Heads of State, seeking 
their advice and support.  The purpose of the Buhari letter 
was not entirely clear, but appears an attempt to elicit 
elite support. 
 
 
2.(C) Summary Continued. By throwing his hat into the ring, 
Buhari has added a new dimension to the presidential race and 
has already caused strategy adjustments in other political 
camps.  Although Buhari's Northern popular appeal is 
significant, he may not play well in the South and Christian 
Middle Belt because he is perceived as an Islamic 
fundamentalist.  This perception, combined with his lack of 
elite patronage could stop Buhari from becoming a major, 
national contender and might relegate him to the role of 
spoiler, a regional favorite son. End Summary. 
 
 
 
 
3. (C) Like President Obasanjo before the 1999 election, 
General Buhari's political experience is limited to that of 
military Head of State.  Buhari came to power as a result of 
a 1983 New Year's Eve coup against the democratically elected 
Shehu Shagari.  The eviction of Shagari came as a welcome 
relief as did Buhari's promise to root out corruption. That 
relief, however, was short-lived as Nigerians watched 
despairingly as the Buhari regime's promises to revive the 
economy and wipe out rampant corruption withered during 20 
months of heavy-handed, largely ineffective rule. 
 
 
4.(C) In May 1984, Buhari ordered the brutal expulsion of 
700,000 illegal immigrants from neighboring African states, 
jailed hundreds of political opponents and muzzled a once 
aggressive press. His loyalty to the military also came into 
question as he dismissed 30,000 soldiers as a cost-cutting 
measure.  Buhari also soured Nigeria's relations with 
Britain, when he was accused of masterminding a clumsy and 
unsuccessful attempt in July 1984 to kidnap President 
Shagari's brother-in-law, former Transport Minister Umaru 
Dikko. Moreover, Buhari undermined traditional rulers 
throughout Nigeria, slashing their benefits and questioning 
their authority.  Still, many of these moves resonated well 
with the common man.  Now, economic hard times and the 
perception of avaricious politicians have caused many people 
in the North to remember Buhari's efforts nostalgically and 
see him as the man of the moment who can extirpate the 
corrupt, machiavellian elitism that still characterizes 
Nigerian politics. 
 
 
5.(C) Despite accusations of heavy-handedness, supporters 
praise Buhari's former prosecution of corrupt public 
officials, governors, Ministers and others.  Buhari 
supporters also contend he performed well as chairman of the 
now defunct Petroleum Trust Fund (PTF).  In fact, the PTF did 
accelerate road construction, and subsidized agricultural 
equipment and pharmaceuticals. Schools and water works were 
also rehabilitated; some claim that the PTF performed better 
than most Ministries.  However, detractors claim the PTF did 
disproportionately more for the Northwest than any other 
region, and that the South, in particular, was practically 
ignored. 
 
 
6. (C) As if he had not alienated enough people during his 
previous tenure as Head of State, Buhari continues to trod on 
sensitive toes in his current quest for the presidency. Due 
to indelicate public statements, he has been accused 
religious bigotry.  Last year, Buhari reportedly encouraged 
Muslims to vote only for a Muslim President. These reports 
caused a swift reaction in all sectors of Nigerian society, 
particularly from the Christian clergy.  Buhari has been 
accused of "playing the religion card" and stirring up 
tensions.  Buhari compounded his political gaffe by waiting 
two months before issuing a clarifying statement.  According 
to Buhari, his call was not for exclusive voting along 
religious lines, rather an appeal to conscience. 
 
 
7. (C) Buhari's current attempts to gain support from the 
Southeast have also been unrefined.  After calling on the 
Southeast to unite with the North, Buhari stoked ire in the 
eastern region by tutoring Igbo politicians not to follow the 
path set by previous generations of Igbo politicians he 
described as mercenaries to the highest bidder.  (Comment: 
While there may be a grain of truth in his remarks, it was 
grossly impolitic and politically naive for Buhari, as a 
visiting Northerner and supplicant for votes, to abuse and 
embarrass his Igbo hosts. This episode demonstrates Buhari's 
penchant for divisiveness in Nigerian politics, at the very 
moment when Nigeria needs a leader to unify the nation. End 
Comment.) 
 
 
8. (C) Buhari also stirred controversy last August when he 
appeared as the special guest of honor at the first yearly 
National Convention of the Supreme Council for Shari'a in 
Nigeria (SCSN). There, he urged Muslims to establish Shari'a 
in all 36 states, concluding the Islamic legal code had 
restored sanity in the states where it had been enacted. 
 
 
9.(C) The effect of Buhari's most recent attempt at 
politicking by writing to former Heads of State is likely to 
fall flat as well. Enumerating the problems and shortcomings 
of the current government, Buhari explained that the need for 
quality national leadership compelled his entrance into 
politics.  He wrote the former leaders out of respect, he 
claimed, and sought their assistance and advice. 
 
 
 
 
10. (C) One of those former Heads of State was Ibrahim 
Babangida.  A major factor determining Buhari's fate will be 
his relationship with Babangida (IBB).  Taking over from 
Buhari in a bloodless coup in 1985, Babangida, declared in 
his first address Buhari was "too rigid and uncompromising." 
Eventually Buhari was jailed by IBB, and not even allowed to 
attend his mother's funeral.  Although the press runs 
frequent speculation about a Babangida-Buhari reconciliation 
and a possible anti-Obasanjo alliance, the chemistry between 
the two is volatile; most insiders believe they are eternal 
enemies.  More importantly, IBB probably is more wary of 
Buhari than of any other potential candidate. Babangida would 
much rather see Obasanjo return than deal with Buhari in the 
driver's seat. IBB rightly senses that he likely would be one 
of the first victims of Buhari's vindictive wrath should 
Buhari capture Aso Rock. Even Buhari's own words--"I forgive 
him, but I can never forget,"--indicate that IBB has reason 
to fear a Buhari Presidency.  Consequently, IBB is probably 
working actively to scuttle Buhari's chance of winning the 
ANPP nomination; the stark truth for Buhari is that Babangida 
is equally adept at being a "kingbreaker" as he is a 
kingmaker.  A Buhari presidency is Babangida's worst 
nightmare and IBB will do anything he can to stop it. 
 
 
 
 
11. (U)  Buhari's run for President has altered Nigeria's 
political landscape.  Recent power struggles to control the 
ANPP's National Executive Committee have been partially 
attributed to political jockeying by Buhari's foes. The ANPP 
has unsuccessfully attempted to hold its convention on two 
separate occasions; it was postponed until later this year 
after being halted by a court injunction.  The source of the 
injunction was never determined, but many speculated that the 
PDP and the incumbent ANPP leadership conspired to prevent 
the election of a pro-Buhari leadership.  Others contend that 
IBB was the one who scuttled the convention,  with an 
unrelenting intent to stop Buhari.  A device being used to 
undermine Buhari is to zone the ANPP National Chairmanship to 
the Northwest; under the party guidelines, the Presidential 
candidate and the National Chairman cannot hail from the same 
geopolitical zone. 
 
 
12. (C) Despite (or because of) this opposition, Buhari seeks 
to build a credible political machine.  Many key advisors are 
recycled from his earlier incarnation and have participated 
in numerous coups during Nigeria's troubled history.  Some 
remained through the IBB years, although to hear them talk, 
they never approved of Buhari's removal.  Members of the 
group are largely northern Muslims, but some retired military 
personnel from other regions are also reportedly on board. 
One backer, explaining the organization's strategy to Poloff, 
acknowledged that some of Buhari's earlier statements had 
been misinterpreted and that the group realizes that enormous 
effort will be required to overcome the skepticism of 
Christians and southerners.  Still Buhari was extremely 
popular with the common man in the North, which accounted for 
fifty percent of Nigeria's voting population.  He speculated 
that Buhari's inner circle would soon select a point man from 
among his Christian supporters and that the group was ready 
to embark on a sustained effort to ensure Buhari's nomination 
by the ANPP. 
 
 
 
 
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COMMENT 
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13. (C) All in all, Buhari represents an ideologically vague 
but psychologically resonant viewpoint in the North.  He is 
the pennant for a religiously conservative, yet politically 
anti-establishment Northern populism.  It is these adjectival 
qualities that strongly endear him to those who fit into this 
category but also alienate him from the many Nigerians who do 
not. 
 
 
14. (C) At the moment, Buhari is the most prominent figure in 
the ANPP; however, this does not mean he will win the prize. 
Buhari has many powerful enemies with more money and back 
room clout than he does.  Consequently his fight to win the 
ANPP nomination is an uphill one. 
 
 
15. (C)Buhari also has to find a way to traverse the great 
regional and religious divides that separate him from his 
Southern and Christian compatriots.  If he emerges as the 
ANPP candidate, region and religion will be cardinal, and 
hugely divisive campaign issues.  Southerners and Christians 
will oppose him relentlessly.  Moreover, Buhari is unlikely 
to be able to unite the North due to his history with 
Babangida and other political elites in the Northern 
establishment. 
 
 
16 (C) Given the cleavages inherent in a Buhari campaign, 
Obasanjo probably sees Buhari as someone he would like to run 
against.  Buhari could only be assured of taking those areas 
in the North that Obasanjo will lose in any event.  Buhari 
would push more and larger chunks of the Christian Middle 
Belt, moderate Muslim, and Southern vote into Obasanjo's camp 
than any other conceivable candidate. 
 
 
 
 
ANDREWS