US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD3165

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UPDATE ON CZECH REPORT OF ATTACK ON DIPLOMATIC CONVOY

Identifier: 05BAGHDAD3165
Wikileaks: View 05BAGHDAD3165 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Baghdad
Created: 2005-07-31 20:04:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PTER PGOV PREL MOPS IZ EZ Terrorism Security
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 003165 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2015 
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PREL, MOPS, IZ, EZ, Terrorism, Security 
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON CZECH REPORT OF ATTACK ON DIPLOMATIC 
CONVOY 
 
REF: PRAGUE 1106 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission David M. Satterfield for reasons 
 
 1.4 (a), (b) and (d) 
 
 1.  (C)  Embassy, working with MNF-I and 3rd Infantry 
Division, has still been unable to ascertain whether any U.S. 
or Coalition Forces witnessed or were aware of the incident 
reported by the Czech government, reftel. MNF-I at the level 
of Deputy Chief of Staff for Political, Military, and 
Economic Affairs, has made every possible effort to determine 
what took place, but no new facts have come to light.  No 
report of any such incident was filed by U.S. forces and 
efforts to poll soldiers in the field at that time and place 
have proved negative.  In the event more details of the 
incident become available, Embassy will advise. 
 
2.  (C)  Embassy Prague and Washington may wish to explain to 
the Czechs that rules of engagement for U.S. convoys, set 
forth in Convoy Security Force Protection Measures, state 
that "Convoy commanders are responsible for the 
self-protection capability within their convoy." 
Accordingly, even if a U.S. convoy was aware of the attack, 
with no prior communication or coordination with the Czechs, 
the convoy commander would have no way to positively identify 
the status of the vehicles trailing the convoy.  Without such 
positive identification of either the trailing vehicles or 
the source of an attack, the convoy would be in no position 
to take action under the standing rules of engagement.  In 
addition, if the mission of the convoy was, for example, to 
transport VIPs, the convoy commander would potentially be 
endangering the successful completion of his own mission by 
stopping to engage in a firefight -- without knowing who he 
was defending or who he was fighting -- that would expose his 
passengers to harm. 
 
3.  (C) Embassy Prague and Washington officials should not 
hesitate to invite Czech diplomats in Baghdad to call on 
Embassy so that we can discuss with them ways to enhance 
cooperation and coordination in order to avoid such incidents 
in the future.  Moreover, Embassy plans to host a meeting 
this week with all Embassies in Baghdad (with whom the U.S. 
has diplomatic relations) to discuss security procedures and 
strategies.  We would welcome the Czechs and be more than 
willing to discuss this incident further with them at that 
time. 
Khalilzad 

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