US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD3144

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003144 
 
SIPDIS 
 
REL/GBR AUS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, IZ, National Assembly, Security 
SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT ABDEL MEHDI PLEDGES COOPERATION ON 
CONSTITUTION AND SECURITY ISSUES 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Robert S. Ford. 
Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
1. (C/NF REL GBR AUS) SUMMARY.  Vice President Abdel 
Mehdi told the Ambassador during their July 25 meeting 
that, in the negotiations on the constitution, all 
sides were upping their demands, making it difficult 
to reach a final consensus.  Ambassador reiterated USG 
willingness to help a summit of political leaders to 
negotiate a final draft of the constitution.  The 
Ambassador promised to consult with the Iraqi 
leadership and with the Vice President as the two 
nations consider the gradual drawdown of Coalition 
Forces.  Abdel Mehdi suggested that a Status of Forces 
Agreement be discussed at a later date.  Ambassador 
and Abdel Mehdi agreed that continued U.S.-Iraq 
cooperation is necessary for a peaceful and prosperous 
Iraq.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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Lost In Translation 
------------------- 
 
2. (C/NF REL GBR AUS) Ambassador, accompanied by DCM 
and PolCouns met with Vice President Abdel Mehdi on 
July 25.  Abdel Mehdi began by discussing a 
translation problem with constitution ratification 
rules (the text of the referendum law uses 
"nakhibeen," which could be interpreted either as 
actual voters or as theoretical registered electors, 
vice "musawwateen," which would have clearly referred 
to actual voters).  The controversy is whether the 
Iraqi constitution must be ratified by half of all the 
Iraqis who vote in the referendum, or by half of all 
registered Iraqi voters.  Ambassador reiterated U.S. 
support for the former.  Abdel Mehdi agreed that this 
was the better choice, and said the Presidency Council 
would issue a statement clarifying this language so 
that it clearly is understood to mean half of those 
voting only. 
 
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Constitutional Negotiations 
--------------------------- 
 
3. (C/NF REL GBR AUS) Abdel Mehdi told the Ambassador 
that, in the negotiations on the constitution, all 
sides were upping their demands, making it difficult 
to reach a final consensus.  The Deputy President 
mentioned that the July 21 draft the Shia had put 
forward basically was the Shia opening line.  Abdel 
Mehdi and Ambassador agreed compromises would need to 
be reached and that all sides simply want to 
strengthen their positions by having as many 
bargaining chips as possible. 
 
4. (C/NF REL GBR AUS) Ambassador inquired about a 
possible summit involving political leaders to help 
finalize decisions on a constitution.  The dates most 
often mentioned are that the meeting in Baghdad would 
start around August 2 or 3.  Abdel Mehdi agreed this 
meeting would be very useful.  He commented that there 
is still a question about who among the Sunni Arabs to 
invite, as they have no obvious leadership. 
 
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Security Issues 
--------------- 
 
5. (C/NF REL GBR AUS) Ambassador stressed to Abdel 
Mehdi that U.S. soldiers will be in Iraq only until 
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) could "stand on their 
own."  Both Abdel Mehdi and the Ambassador agreed that 
arrangements regarding the presence of Coalition/U.S. 
forces would need to be discussed.  In response to 
Abdel Mehdi's expression of concern regarding conduct 
of Coalition forces in entering mosques, the 
Ambassador said that the U.S. military commanders have 
policies on the issue which could be reviewed. 
 
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Impact of the Sharm Al Sheikh Attacks 
-------------------------------------- 
 
6. (C/NF REL GBR AUS) Speculating on the Egyptian 
reaction to the recent terrorist attacks at Sharm al 
Sheikh, DCM gave two possible scenarios:  this attack 
could either galvanize the Mubarak and mobilize 
Egyptian action on a broad regional front to confront 
terror, including in Iraq, or Mubarak could turn 
inward and be even more resistant to building ties 
with the Iraqi government, out of concern at 
inflammation of the domestic situation post-Sharm.  It 
would be important to encourage the former course. 
Ambassador suggested the Iraqis should call the 
Egyptian President to keep lines of communication 
open.  He also suggested the Iraqis should host the 
Jordanian Prime Minister as a way of expanding Iraq's 
relations with Arab states.  By contrast, the 
Ambassador urged Iraq to maintain pressure on Syria to 
shut down terrorist training camps and police the 
Iraqi-Syrian border better.  Abdel Mehdi agreed 
readily. 
-------------------------------------- 
Armed Militias, Or Neighborhood Watch? 
-------------------------------------- 
 
7. (C/NF REL GBR AUS) Abdel Mehdi highlighted that the 
main issue worrying the Shia now is security.  He said 
the daily killing of Shia civilians could not go 
indefinitely without Shia retaliation.  They cannot 
wait several years for the ISF to come into its own, 
he added.  The Ambassador praised Shia restraint 
first.  Abdel Mehdi said the Shia civilian population 
wants a role in protecting itself.  Ambassador 
repeated U.S. opposition to militias.  Instead, the 
U.S. wants to focus on building up the ISF.  He noted 
that giving free rein to militias now might help an 
immediate security problem but lay the groundwork for 
big problems later.  Abdel Mehdi did not push hard on 
militias; he conceded that Article 91 of the TAL 
abolished militias.  He then proposed an unarmed 
"neighborhood watch" system.  He said they could serve 
as informants for the ISF and would help keep the 
streets safe. 
 
8. (U) REO Hillah, REO Basrah, REO Mosul, and REO 
Kirkuk, minimize considered. 
 
Khalilzad