US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD3133

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 003133 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/29/2025 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KDEM, IZ, Sunni Arab, Shia Islamists, National Assembly 
SUBJECT: SUNNI ARABS MAKE A COUNTER-OFFER ON FEDERALISM AS 
SHIA SHOW AMBIVALENCE 
 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Robert Ford. 
Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
 1.  (C) SUMMARY: Sunni Arab negotiators have put 
forward a detailed response to the draft constitution 
that marks their first substantive engagement on the 
issue of federalism.  Iraqi Islamic Party leader Ayad 
al-Samara'i told us July 27 that he supports a federal 
system that maintains the status quo in Kurdistan and 
puts off regional entity formation elsewhere.  There 
could be a one-year moratorium on creating regional 
entities or such mergers could move forward 
immediately but be subject to approval from a special 
commission, the National Assembly, and a national 
referendum.  Meanwhile independent Shia 
parliamentarian Qasim Daoud also entertained the idea 
of a four-year delay on entity formation as a possible 
compromise so long as planning and regional 
constitution drafting could begin immediately.  Both 
men were still vague on the authorities that regional 
entities would enjoy. Samara'i was otherwise fairly 
upbeat on the draft constitution text.  An open 
Islamist, Samara'i supported the Sharia restrictions 
as written but said he would have no problem amending 
them to avoid any indication that Islam was being 
imposed on Iraqis.  We pushed hard for Samara'i to 
think through the issues carefully with an eye to the 
hopes of his fellow negotiators and the international 
community.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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The Sunni Counter-Offer 
----------------------- 
 
2.  (C) Sunni Arab Constitution Committee member Ayad 
al-Samara'i, a member of the Iraqi Islamic Party, 
presented us the substance of the Sunni Arab reaction 
to the constitution draft released over the weekend. 
He went through the following key points: 
 
- KEPING IRAQ'S NAME SIMPLE: Samara'i objected to 
using the words "federal" or "Islamic" in naming Iraq. 
He said both terms were unnecessary and carried 
certain bad connotations for some.  Instead he argued 
for "The Iraqi Republic," a slight variation on the 
Saddam-era name "The Republic of Iraq." 
 
-- BAN BA'ATH PRACTICE, NOT THOUGHT: Samara'i said he 
opposed the current language in Article 11 banning the 
Ba'ath Party because it bans "thought" rather than 
action.  It is only practical to ban action, he 
argued, and allowing a government to ban thought, even 
in the form of the Ba'ath, is to open the door to 
oppression.  Samara'i added that he believed the 
Ba'ath Party ought to be legalized because he felt it 
would be more easily controlled if out in the open. 
Current laws have not weakened it; they have only 
forced it underground and made it harder to combat. 
 
-- ENSURING NO FORCE ON ISLAM LANGUAGE: Himself an 
Islamist, Samara'i had few objections to the Islamist 
tone of the draft document, except for language that 
seemed to promote Shiism, like references to the 
marja'iya and "Persian" minority.  We warned Samara'i 
that declaring Islam "the principal source of law" and 
putting a Sharia restriction on women's rights would 
send an intolerant message to non-Muslims, secular 
Muslims, and the world community.  Samara'i said he 
would support amending the draft to ensure that 
women's rights are equal and Islam is not forced on 
anybody.  He cautioned however that Iraqi society 
itself is very largely Muslim and references to Islam 
in the text appeal to most Iraqis regardless of 
Western worries. 
 
-- NAMING FEDERALISM: Samara'i argued for shifting all 
references to federalism to the word unionism, a 
synonym in Arabic without the term federalism's 
complications.  Instead of saying "federaliyya," the 
document would reference "itihadiyya." 
 
-- BANNING SECESSION EXPLICITLY:  Samara'i said he 
considered draft language in Article 8 affirming 
Iraq's unity to be too weak.  He had suggested, at 
Kurdish protest, adding a reference that refers to the 
sanctity of Iraq's "international and UN-recognized 
borders."  He also argued for a clause banning 
"secession under any circumstances."  (Comment: Kurds 
have argued that he has made the constitution sound 
more like a forced march than a national compact, he 
said. End Comment) 
 
-- KEEPING THE KURDISTAN STATUS QUO: Samara'i said he 
considered Kurdish semi-autonomy to be a "fact," not a 
negotiating point.  He proposed allowing Kurds to 
maintain most of their current authorities. 
 
-- KEEPING THE THREE-PROVINCE LIMIT: Samara'i and 
other Sunni negotiators have strongly advocated 
limiting future mergers to three provinces at most. 
Allowing the formation of larger entities would create 
conditions too favorable and tempting to secession, he 
claimed. 
 
-- ENSURING EQUALITY BETWEEN GOVERNORATES AND REGIONAL 
ENTITIES: Samara'i said he would push for the 
constitution to delineate the authorities of regional 
entities and the central government without actually 
drawing the borders.  He would then push for regional 
entities and governorates in Iraq to have the same 
authorities.  If regional entities have authorities 
that single governorates do not possess, he said, then 
there will be a natural incentive for governorates to 
merge to gain power.  Samara'i does not protest 
mergers, but he does object to building a system that 
actual incentivizes them. 
 
-- REGIONAL AUTHORITIES: Samara'i said he thought 
police force control should be further decentralized. 
He believed some federally controlled forces should 
also be in place, however.  He opposed the idea of 
allowing regions to have a veto on the entry of the 
armed forces into their borders.  Such forces would 
need to transit the country regularly for training, he 
said.  It would also be too great a limit on the 
sovereignty of the national government. 
 
-- KEEPING KIRKUK SEPARATE:  Samara'i said he would 
only support TAL Article 58 if Article 53 remains in 
place.  (TAL Article 53 bans Kirkuk from joining with 
any other provinces to form a regional entity.)  He 
said he believed that a special status for Kirkuk, 
like that for Baghdad, was most appropriate.  He said 
he could only envision a referendum in the province if 
only 1957 residents and their descendants were allowed 
to vote.  After 1957, too many political changes were 
introduced to the area, he said.  Furthermore, he said 
that Chamchamal residents, now part of Suleimaniyya, 
would not be allowed to participate in the referendum 
even though their city fell within the boundaries of 
Kirkuk province in 1954.  To allow them back into the 
province simply to vote when they have successfully 
integrated with Kurdistan would be to deliberately 
prejudice the vote.  (Note: The TAL anticipates the 
completion of a new, fair and transparent census of 
Kirkuk among other disputed territories. End note) 
 
-------------------------------- 
Two Views on Delaying Federalism 
-------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) Samara'i and Shia Arab Constitution Committee 
negotiator Qasim Daoud both put forward visions on 
postponing full federalism in separate conversations 
with us July 27.  Samara'i offered three possible ways 
to delay entity formation.  Samara'i said he felt it 
was premature to allow entities to form outside 
Kurdistan immediately following ratification or the 
next elections. He proposed three paths to a final 
federal map: 
 
-- OPTION A, 4-YEAR DELAY: No regional entities 
outside Kurdistan may be formed for one four-year 
election cycle.  Samara'i said this would allow time 
"for a calm and full discussion." 
 
-- OPTION B, LETTING A COMMISSION DECIDE: Samara'i 
said he thought the wisest option would be for the 
next National Assembly to form a commission to study 
the issue of federalism, Iraq's resources and 
geography, and propose a map that lays out an 
appropriate structure.  He envisioned a national 
referendum to approve the commission's plan.  This 
option would be quicker than the 4 year delay he said. 
 
-- OPTION C, SEVERAL LAYERS OF APPROVAL: Samara'i said 
alternatively this commission could be formed as a 
binding arbitrator on federalism proposals. For 
example, if Basra sought to merge into a regional 
entity, the commission would review the proposal and 
hear out concerns from those affected. For example, 
the Sunni community in Basra, now a strong 30 percent 
minority, would find its voice significantly diluted 
if Basra were to join with other neighboring Shia 
provinces.  The commission would be able to study this 
concern and set conditions ensuring that the future 
structure and constitution of the province has 
adequate safeguards for minority rights.  Samara'i 
acknowledged that the commission would also have the 
right to conclude that the circumstances were simply 
not right for merger and regional entity formation in 
that area in any form.  Following a positive judgment, 
however, he said the amended proposal would go to the 
National Assembly for vote and to the country at large 
for referendum.  Samara'i was specific, contrary to 
the TAL, in envisioning a national referendum on any 
regional entity proposal.  The TAL would merely 
require a referendum of the people in those provinces 
directly involved in the merger. 
 
4.  (C) Qasem Daoud, meeting with Poloff and Roman 
Martinez, advisor to the Ambassador on constitutional 
issues, acknowledged that even the Shia Arab delegates 
are ambivalent on federalism.  He said Da'wa and 
Sadr's faction are significantly less enthusiastic 
about federalism, and are divided as to whether 
Southern Iraq should be divided into one or more 
regions at all. 
 
5.  (C) Daoud said that requiring a "Transitional 
Period" before new federal regions could formally take 
shape might be an acceptable compromise.  The 
constitution would recognize the status quo in 
Kurdistan while allowing - in principle - the 
formation of new regions from other provinces 
elsewhere in Iraq.  Provinces could begin discussions 
and planning on new regions immediately, and could 
take tangible steps to draft regional constitutions 
and create the administrative infrastructure needed to 
assume additional authorities as a region.  No new 
regions would actually be created, however, until 
after the completion of the first election cycle in 
four years.  Daoud explained that this approach would 
meet the Shi'a demand for parity with Kurdistan while 
assuaging Sunni fears about the immediate dissolution 
of Iraq. 
 
6.  (C) Daoud emphasized, however, that the U.S. would 
need to play a strong role in urging Iraqis - and 
particularly Sunni Arabs - to agree to the formula. He 
also made clear that new regions would need to have 
the same range of authorities exercised by the Kurdish 
Regional Government (including control over the police 
forces), and may also need to be given a share of the 
natural resources located within the region. 
 
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COMMENT 
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7.  (C) The federalism discussion is turning more 
practical and detailed, which itself is cause for 
minor celebration.  The Sunnis are saying the word; 
itself progress, and the proposals listed above were 
put forwarded in a written paper.  These negotiators, 
Daoud included, have still not come head to head with 
the issue of regional authorities.  Divided opinion 
among Shia Arab representatives may lead to an 
unlikely Fadila-Da'wa-Sunni Arab alliance aimed at 
pushing a full federalist vision off for the time 
being.  This possibility has already frustrated some 
participants to the talks who have a bolder federalist 
imagination.  Independent Shia negotiator Ali Dabagh 
left the room and passed Poloff grumbling that the 
constitution would "say the word" federalism, but 
nothing more. 
 
8.  (C) We are pushing the sides to continue to delve 
deeper and are making clear that any moves that 
threaten Iraq's unity or pull resource ownership out 
of the hands of the federal government are steps too 
far.  That mantra, plus our presence on the sidelines 
as each side emerges from the room, is adding an 
urgency and realism to a discussion that seems to be 
picking up steam. 
 
9.  (U) REO HILLA, REO BASRA, REO MOSUL, and REO 
KIRKUK, minimize considered. 
 
Khalilzad