US embassy cable - 05SOFIA1363

C O N F I D E N T I A L  SOFIA 001363 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, BU 
SUBJECT: BULGARIA: AS SOCIALISTS FAIL AMID POLITICAL CHAOS, 
SIMEON MOVEMENT GETS ITS CHANCE TO FORM GOVERNMENT 
 
REF: A. (A) SOFIA 1134 
 
     B. (B) SOFIA 1325 
     C. (C) SOFIA 1329 
     D. (D) SOFIA 1339 
 
Classified By: Jeffrey D. Levine for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  A hostile opposition rejected the minority 
government of Socialist PM-designate Sergei Stanishev in a 
dramatic 117 to 118 vote shortly before midnight July 27. 
The Socialists, who overplayed their hand with an elaborate 
scheme to secure votes for their proposed minority 
government, admitted defeat July 28 after a night of chaos 
that threatened a constitutional crisis.  President Georgi 
Purvanov will now ask the party of PM Simeon Saxe-Coburg, as 
the second largest parliamentary group, to form a government. 
 The escalation of tension and the dilution of power among 
seven parties, however, indicate it will be difficult for 
Simeon to form a cabinet without a substantial improvement in 
the political climate.  If this attempt fails, Bulgaria could 
face early elections.  END SUMMARY 
 
SIMEON,S CHANCES UNCERTAIN 
 
2. (C) With the failure of the Socialists to form a 
government, the mandate now passes to the former king,s 
National Movement for Simeon II (NMSS) (Ref. A).  The NMSS 
must either turn for support to the Socialists, who, 
following the dramatic developments over the past days, vow 
they will not back a NMSS cabinet, or the fragmented 
center-right.  The latter case would also require either the 
predominantly Turkish Movement for Rights and Freedom (MRF), 
or the extreme nationalist group Ataka.  MRF, the junior 
coalition partner in the incumbent government, has publicly 
ruled out backing Simeon for a second term.  A member of the 
NMSS Political Council told us they will first turn to the 
Socialists.  He believed the NMSS would not insist on Simeon 
as the Prime Minister, which might improve its chances of 
coming to agreement with the Socialists.  Stanishev, he said, 
is no longer an option. 
 
NEXT STEPS 
 
3. (SBU) There is no set deadline for the President to ask 
the second place group to form a government.  If the NMSS 
fails to propose a cabinet within seven days of being asked, 
or if the parliament fails to approve its government line-up, 
Purvanov, at his discretion, tasks one of the other 
parliamentary groups to nominate a PM.  If it comes to this 
scenario, analysts agree the chances of forming a government 
are negligible.  If the third attempt to form a government 
fails, the President appoints a caretaker government, 
dissolves parliament and schedules new elections.  New 
elections would take a minimum of two months and likely 
jeopardize the reforms needed for a 2007 EU entry.  This 
possibility is a nightmare for all parties and should 
increase their motivation to arrive at an accord. 
 
MIDNIGHT VOTE 
 
4. (U) After a tense eight-hour debate June 27 and a 24-hour 
standoff the previous day (ref C), MPs decided on a complex 
voting procedure with two separate anonymous votes ) one on 
Stanishev's PM nomination and the second on his proposal for 
a government line-up (Ref. C, D).  The Socialist leader's 
nomination as prime minister was approved by a single vote 
(120 to 119).  In a dramatic midnight twist, however, the MPs 
then rejected the government line-up proposed by Stanishev 
with 118 votes against and 117 votes in favor.  The negative 
outcome of this second vote, announced at 2:00 a.m., meant, 
according to most analysts, an overall rejection of the 
Socialist-led government.  In a last-ditch attempt at power, 
the Socialists demanded a repeat of the government vote, 
citing irregularities in the first.  After their proposal was 
rejected, and Parliament failed to achieve a quorum the 
morning of July 28, the Socialists acknowledged defeat. 
 
5. (U) The Socialists had been forced to form a minority 
government with only the MRF after month-long coalition talks 
with Simeon,s party collapsed (Ref. B).  In an address to 
parliament July 28, Stanishev blamed the opposition for its 
&irresponsibility8.  He said a stable government backed by 
this parliament was impossible without the participation of 
the BSP and MRF.  Stanishev, in a nod to possible early 
elections, laid the blame on opposition leaders and stressed 
the need for &nationally responsible behavior8 that would 
keep Bulgaria on track for accession to the EU. 
 
SCHEMES, PASSIONS AND CHAOS: THE UNDOING OF THE SOCIALISTS 
 
6. (C) The Socialist's plan to elect its minority government 
rested on back-room maneuverings to hold a secret vote. 
Rarely used in previous post-communist parliaments, they 
believed the secret ballot would allow individual MPs from 
 
 
other parties to augment their coalition's 116 MPs in the 
240-seat parliament.  BSP insiders have told us privately 
they had arranged the support of a handful of MPs from the 
center-right Bulgarian People's Union to secure the decision 
on the secret vote.  Another few MPs, from nationalist group 
Ataka, were then supposed to back the government in the 
secret vote.  The plan quickly became obvious and a number of 
 
SIPDIS 
factors, including reports that three Ataka MPs were locked 
in a room by their party colleagues to prevent them from 
backing the Socialists, brought the plan to ruin.  Passions 
escalated further when opposition MPs physically prevented 
Socialist MPs from taking the floor to request a repetition 
of the vote for the government. 
 
7. (C) COMMENT: In this charged political environment the 
final outcome is still difficult to predict.  The Socialist 
move to press their advantage late last week backfired, but 
Simeon,s party seems no better positioned.  All possible 
scenarios require the parties, which are currently 
passionately antagonistic towards each other, to set aside 
their bitterness and join in a common cause.  Despite his 
humiliation during the vote, Stanishev,s decision to return 
the mandate, at least for now, has him looking the most 
responsible.  He has already begun the political gamesmanship 
of assigning blame to Simeon in anticipation of possible 
early elections.  President Purvanov has also suffered from 
these events.  Political insiders agree that his insistence 
on the MRF,s presence in the coalition ) in order to win 
its support for his 2006 re-election campaign, contributed 
greatly to breakdown of the initial coalition talks that led 
to the Socialist's failure.