US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD3121

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003121 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
CENTCOM FOR POLAD - AMB HOLZMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2025 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, KISL, IR, IZ, Women's Rights, Terrorism, Shia Islamists 
SUBJECT: SISTANI REPRESENTATIVE TAKES DIM VIEW OF U.S. 
POLICY, DENIES IMPEDING WOMEN'S RIGHTS 
 
REF: BAGHDAD 3044 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Robert S. Ford. 
Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
1.  (C/NF) SUMMARY:  TNA Constitution Committee member 
and Ayatollah Ali Sistani's aide Ahmad al-Safi 
complained about American efforts to secure Iraq and 
decried what he perceives as needless American 
suspicions of Iraqi Shia in his July 25 meeting with 
Poloff.  Al-Safi and Poloff vigorously debated 
America's effort to improve security in Iraq; al-Safi 
could not believe as powerful a nation as the U.S. 
could not secure Iraq's border.  On political issues, 
al-Safi stated that the Sunnis had already shown their 
reluctance to participate in the political process by 
boycotting the January elections.  He claimed that the 
Shia, meanwhile, were trying to compromise as much as 
possible. He also complained that the American 
Congress was fixated on the Sunnis, showing no sign 
that it understood that the Shia were in the majority. 
Al-Safi said he was concerned that the U.S. 
policymakers saw the Shia as a threat.  Western media 
made this problem worse.  He cautioned that Iraq's 
Shia would not follow the example of the Iranian 
religious state.  Poloff raised the importance of 
women's rights.  This is an issue where the U.S. was 
worried about Shia Islamist influence.  Al-Safi denied 
that the Shia were limiting women's rights; he did not 
feel he could order other women to cover their heads 
in public, he observed.  However, whether right or 
wrong, Iraqis had the right to decide the rights of 
its women, he noted.   A constitution was a very 
private thing for a nation, he remarked pointedly, and 
each country needed to do this on its own to reflect 
its own beliefs.  Safi anticipated that the 
constitution process would proceed on schedule. END 
SUMMARY. 
 
---------------------- 
A Litany of Complaints 
---------------------- 
 
2.  (C/NF) TNA Constitution Committee member and 
Ayatollah Ali Sistani's close aide Ahmad al-Safi 
discussed the security and political situation in Iraq 
with Poloff for almost two hours on July 25. After a 
few introductory comments about the importance of 
understanding one another, al-Safi immediately went on 
the offensive. He stated that the Sunnis had already 
shown their reluctance to participate in the political 
process by boycotting the January elections, while the 
Shia were trying to compromise as much as possible. He 
also complained that Congress was fixated on the 
Sunnis, showing no sign that it understood that the 
Shia were in the majority.  (Comment:  Safi was 
probably unhappy with several Codels' meetings with 
Sunni groups earlier this month.  End Comment.) 
 
--------------------------- 
Failure to Defeat Terrorism 
--------------------------- 
 
3.  (C/NF) Al-Safi went on to state that the problem 
with Iraq was not that the different groups were 
upping their political demands.  Rather, MNF-I and the 
U.S. had failed to defeat terrorists and had failed to 
listen to reliable sources of information. Al-Safi 
confided that he once asked the UK Ambassador if it 
was possible to believe that the West, with all its 
abilities and resources, was unable to stop the 
violence and had asked if it begged the question of 
whether the West was in league with the terrorists. 
Iraq is surrounded on all sides by terrorists imported 
mainly through Jordan and Syria, while countries like 
Turkey, Iran, and Kuwait were safe. He said the 
Ambassador declined to answer the question, and 
chaleged Poloff to respond. Poloff rejected the 
assertion, stating that the U.S. was devoting much of 
its energies to fighting the war on terrorism, 
particularly in Iraq. 
 
4.  (C/NF) Safi responded by asking why there were 
such difficulties monitoring Iraq's borders. Although 
the U.S. has been occupying Iraq for two years, he 
said, it has failed to stop the flood of foreign 
terrorists and appears to have stopped even trying 
accurately to identify the terrorists from the average 
citizens. This breeds fear in the different political 
groups, he claimed, and is the primary reason the 
Shia, Sunnis, and Kurds are seeking strong guarantees 
for their protection in the Constitution. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Concerns About Shia Image in the US 
------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C/NF) Al-Safi also faulted U.S. diplomats and 
politicians for meeting indiscriminately with too many 
questionable sources. When asked if he could indicate 
whom he considered to be reliable sources, he 
suggested seeking those who had a large crowd of 
followers, including him.  Al-Safi noted that the U.S. 
always behaved as though what the Shia was saying and 
what they meant were two separate things. In the end, 
he chided, this was the Americans' problem. 
 
6.  (C/NF) Al-Safi suddenly shifted gears and asked 
how Embassy Baghdad was informing Washington about the 
realities in Iraq. He was concerned that U.S. 
policymakers saw the Shia as a threat, and asked why 
this was the case. When told that the primary concern 
was the emphasis on an Islamic state, he replied sadly 
that he remembered what Western media were 
broadcasting during the Iranian revolution. He claimed 
to know that President Carter had asked the CIA to do 
a study on the Shia, which poisoned U.S. perceptions 
toward the Shia by linking them to the Iranian 
prototype. 
 
7.  (C/NF) The Iranian example was not broadly 
applicable, he continued. He cautioned that the West 
had to learn to distinguish not only between the Sunni 
and the Shia, but also between Iraqi Shia and those of 
other countries. For example, Ayatollah Sistani was 
working to push democracy in Iraq while holding the 
state together, al-Safi said. In response to Poloff, 
al-Safi also admitted that the Shia themselves were 
responsible for creating some of the negative 
impressions but he adamantly claimed the Western media 
were mostly to blame. 
 
8.  (C/NF) Al-Safi went on to state that it was wrong 
to judge people on their beliefs. Indians, even 
educated ones, believe that a cow is divine and that 
even a cow's urine should be held sacred. We do not 
have the right to correct people on their beliefs, he 
stated. He indicated that some people outside Baghdad 
were more extremist in their beliefs, but he said he 
was not going to try and change what Qy believed. 
Poloff countered, stating that it was in these areas 
that the moderate moral leadership of Sistani and al- 
Safi were needed, especially to combat the negative 
image of Islamists in the media. 
 
-------------- 
Women's Rights 
-------------- 
 
9.  (C/NF) Poloff pressed Safi on human rights, 
pointing to concerns many Iraqi women have about the 
constitution being drafted.  Safi claimed that, while 
he personally believed a woman should be covered in 
public, he had no right to impose his belief on 
others. (Comment:  It was unclear, however, whether he 
meant he could not impose this on other countries, or 
other women in Iraq.  End Comment.)  Again, he blamed 
the media for the negative images of Shia clerics 
abroad on this issue. Iraqis are writing the 
constitution, he said, and whether it is right or 
wrong, Iraqis had the right to decide the rights of 
its women.  Poloff emphasized the importance of 
ensuring the rights and freedoms of all Iraqi women 
and reminded al-Safi it would be too late to pressure 
the drafters on the constitution after they had 
completed it. 
 
-------------------- 
On the Constitution 
-------------------- 
10.  (C/NF) Finally, al-Safi briefly spoke on the 
progress with the constitution. He confirmed that the 
process would continue on schedule and added that a 
constitution was a very private thing. Each country 
needed to do this on its own, he said pointedly, to 
reflect its own beliefs. 
 
11.  (C/NF) He claimed that part of the problem was 
that the Sunnis appointed to the Constitution 
Committee did not represent the Sunni population. When 
asked why he accepted them in that case, he said it 
was not the Shia's right to decide who would 
participate from the Sunni group. It just meant that 
the Sunnis would have some form of participation, and 
while the Shia rejected some of the names, the Shia 
had no choice but to accept the majority of them in 
the interests of adhering to the timeline. If the 
Sunnis themselves were not satisfied with their 
representation, they could ask for replacements -- as 
long as it does not hold up the drafting process. 
 
12.  (C/NF) The meeting ended with al-Safi explaining 
why he did not meet with U.S. officials. He countered 
the claim that he was reluctant to meet with Poloff 
because she was a woman, saying instead that, as a 
matter of principle, he refused to meet with 
representatives of what he termed an "occupying 
force." He did not, however, reject his Chief of 
Staff's offer to set up meeting with Shia leaders in 
Karbala for Poloff and did not reject hints for 
further meetings.  When asked if this meant we had his 
approval, he laughed in assent. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
13.  (C/NF) While al-Safi had only promised a 30- 
minute meeting, it ran to two hours and he appeared to 
become more comfortable and frank with his comments as 
the session progressed. Although he spoke mainly in 
Arabic, he did use some English phrases and several 
times corrected the interpreter. He ignored three 
summons to join a Constitution Committee meeting and 
joked that this meeting was more important since the 
report would be going straight to Washington within 
the hour. This was only the second time that al-Safi 
had met with Embassy staff; the first meeting was with 
PolCouns on May 24, during which al-Safi had rejected 
any overtures for more meetings.  His unhappiness and 
suspicions about American efforts on security, and his 
worries about Western perceptions of the Shia are 
illuminating in what they suggest about the viewpoints 
of the higher-level Shia religious leadership.  END 
COMMENT. 
 
14.  (U) REO HILLA, REO BASRA, REO MOSUL, and REO 
KIRKUK, minimize considered. 
 
 
Khalilzad