US embassy cable - 02HANOI2272

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HANOI 002272 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/12 
TAGS: PREL, EAID, ETRD, MARR, VM, CVR 
SUBJECT: "WIN US OVER" 
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REF:  A. HANOI 2202 (NOTAL)  B.  HANOI 2259 
-     C. HANOI 2260          C.  HANOI 2261 
 
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR RAYMOND BURGHARDT, 
REASON: 1.5 (D) 
 
2. (C)  AMBASSADOR'S SCHEDULED SEPTEMBER 17 MEETING TO 
DISCUSS CHINA (REF A) WITH VICE FOREIGN MINISTER LE VAN 
BANG (FORMERLY AMBASSADOR TO U.S., AND NOW RESPONSIBLE 
FOR NORTHEAST ASIA) WAS UNAVOIDABLY DIVERTED INTO A 
DISCUSSION OF PRESSING BILATERAL ISSUES (REFS C-D). 
 
3.  (C)  BANG CAME PREPARED WITH SOME THOUGHTS ON THE 
US-VIETNAM BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP.  READING FROM THREE 
PAGES OF PRINTED NOTES, HE URGED THAT THE U.S. DO MORE 
TO "BUILD TRUST," OFFERING THE FOLLOWING SUGGESTIONS: 
--  MORE HIGH LEVEL MEETINGS, HOWEVER SHORT, SUCH AS 
THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S RECENT CALL ON DEPUTY SECRETARY 
ARMITAGE, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF AN UPCOMING TALK (EVEN 
TEN MINUTES) BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER 
PHAN VAN KHAI AT APEC; 
--  CONTINUE DIALOGUES ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND POLITICAL 
ISSUES, AREAS OF ONGOING DISAGREEMENTS; 
--  ESTABLISH A DISPUTE SETTLEMENT BODY IN THE CONTEXT 
OF THE BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENT (AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT 
THE EXISTING BTA-RELATED MECHANISM ALREADY PROVIDES A 
GOOD FORUM FOR THIS); 
--  AVOID LETTING CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES SUCH AS ETHNIC 
MINORITIES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM BE 
"PROMINENT" IN BILATERAL RELATIONS, BUT INSTEAD SEEK 
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WAYS TO SOLVE DISAGREEMENTS "CONSTRUCTIVELY, NOT AT THE 
EXPENSE OF THE RELATIONSHIP." 
 
4.  (C)  VFM BANG EMPHASIZED THAT "FRANKLY, YOU MUST 
HAVE A WAY TO WIN OVER VIETNAM" IN A MANNER THAT WOULD 
BE "CONDUCIVE TO US POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA."  (HE 
USED THE SAME PHRASEOLOGY IN A CONVERSATION WITH THE 
DCM AT POST'S 9/11 CEREMONY, WHERE HE ALSO SAID THAT 
VIETNAM WANTS TO BE "WITH" THE U.S.)  HE WELCOMED US 
INTEREST IN A "STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP" BETWEEN THE U.S. 
AND VIETNAM, AND REITERATED A NEED TO SOLVE SENSITIVE 
ISSUES "QUIETLY."  HE OFFERED THANKS FOR US AID 
PROGRAMS, ESPECIALLY RELATED TO LEGAL AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM, AND EXPRESSED INTEREST IN 
VIETNAM'S INCLUSION IN THE MILLENIUM CHALLENGE FUND. 
AMBASSADOR NOTED OTHER US HUMANITARIAN AID PROGRAMS AS 
WELL, AND DESCRIBED US FRUSTRATION AT DIFFICULTIES IN 
INCREASING AID IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS.  VFM BANG 
RETORTED THAT "SOMETIMES NOT TO HELP IS TO HELP." 
 
5.  (C)  VFM BANG DESCRIBED BURGEONING RELATIONS 
ELSEWHERE, POINTING TO COMMUNIST PARTY GENERAL 
SECRETARY NONG DUC MANH'S OCTOBER TRIP TO JAPAN, A 
 
SIPDIS 
"GOOD VISIT" BY DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER NGUYEN TAN DUNG 
TO SOUTH KOREA RECENTLY, "GOOD RELATIONS" WITH TAIWAN 
(NOW INCLUDING "65,000 SONS-IN-LAW"), "FRIENDLY" 
RELATIONS WITH CHINA, AND EXPANDED TIES WITHIN ASEAN 
AND IN ASEM.  HE STRESSED THAT VIETNAM ALSO "VERY MUCH 
WANTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS" WITH THE U.S. TO A "HIGHER 
LEVEL," AND ASKED FOR AMBASSADOR'S PERSONAL HELP IN 
ACHIEVING THIS.  HE URGED THAT VIETNAM AND THE U.S. 
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WORK TOGETHER TOWARD IMPROVING THE STABILITY OF THE 
WHOLE REGION, EVEN FARTHER AFIELD SUCH AS THE KOREAN 
PENINSULA AND CHINA. 
 
6. (C)  AMBASSADOR EXPRESSED AGREEMENT WITH THIS GOAL, 
NOTING EFFORTS TO ARRANGE HIGH LEVEL TRIPS IN BOTH 
DIRECTIONS, AND TO UTILIZE THESE MEETINGS TO RAISE THE 
LEVEL OF DISCUSSION.  VFM BANG NOTED THAT, WHILE THE 
STATE DEPARTMENT AND MFA WERE OF SIMILAR MINDS ON THIS 
GOAL, IT WAS IMPORTANT TO CONVINCE OTHER DEPARTMENTS -- 
NOTABLY THE PENTAGON AND THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL 
DEFENSE (MND) -- OF THE DESIRABILITY OF SUCH TIES.  HE 
SUGGESTED THAT THE "ENVIRONMENT WAS NOT CONDUCIVE" FOR 
FALL 2002 VISIT TO THE U.S. BY DEFENSE MINISTER TRA, 
URGING THE U.S. INSTEAD TO "BUILD UP" MILITARY-TO- 
MILITARY TIES FIRST.  AMBASSADOR RECOUNTED EXISTING 
FORMS OF MILITARY COOPERATION SUCH AS IN MEDICAL 
RESEARCH, AS WELL AS ONGOING TALKS ON FUTURE SHIP 
VISITS.  (NOTE:  THE LAST CONVERSATION BETWEEN DATT AND 
MND REGARDING MINISTER TRA'S TRIP INDICATED THAT HE WAS 
STILL HOPING TO TRAVEL TO THE U.S. IN THE LATE 
NOVEMBER/EARLY DECEMBER TIMEFRAME.  END NOTE) 
 
7.  (C)  COMMENT:  VFM BANG RETAINS A PROPRIETARY 
INTEREST IN US-VIETNAM RELATIONS, GIVEN HIS PERSONAL 
 
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                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ6873 
 
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ACTION EAP-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    AID-00   AIT-03   ACQ-00   CEA-01   CIAE-00 
      COME-00  CTME-00  DOEE-00  SRPP-00  DS-00    EB-00    EXIM-01 
      E-00     FBIE-00  VC-00    FRB-00   H-01     TEDE-00  INR-00 
      IO-00    ITC-01   L-00     VCE-00   AC-01    NSAE-00  NSCE-00 
      OES-01   OMB-01   OPIC-01  PA-00    PM-00    PRS-00   ACE-00 
      P-00     SP-00    SSO-00   STR-00   TRSE-00  USIE-00  PMB-00 
      DSCC-00  PRM-00   DRL-02   G-00     NFAT-00  SAS-00     /013W 
                  ------------------E909EB  181058Z /38 
R 181049Z SEP 02 
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7584 
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING 
AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH 
AMEMBASSY SEOUL 
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 
AIT TAIPEI 0703 
SECDEF WASHDC 
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 HANOI 002272 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV 
 
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ROLE OVER THE PAST DECADE IN SHEPHERDING THIS 
RELATIONSHIP.  HE IS LIKELY DISTURBED AT THE 
POSSIBILITY THAT US-VIETNAM TIES ARE FAILING TO KEEP 
PACE WITH THE SOMETIMES OVERWHELMING DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS 
OF NORTHEAST ASIAN STATES, AS WELL AS THE LARGER 
ECONOMIC AND ASSISTANCE ROLES JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA, AND 
TAIWAN PLAY HERE.  WE AGREE WITH HIS ASSESSMENT THAT IT 
IS IMPORTANT FOR THE USG NOT ONLY TO DO MORE 
BILATERALLY, BUT ALSO TO BE SEEN AS DOING MORE HERE. 
THIS IS A TOUGH TASK IN A COUNTRY WHERE THE MEDIA IS SO 
CONTROLLED, OFTEN INDEED BY ELEMENTS OF THE CPV AND GVN 
NOT ESPECIALLY INCLINED TO BE FAVORABLE TOWARD THE US. 
DAS DALEY'S VISIT, THE PROBABLE OCTOBER POLITICAL 
DIALOGUE, HOPEFULLY A PRESIDENTIAL PHOTO OP AT APEC 
WITH THE PM, AND THE POSSIBLE DECEMBER VISIT HERE BY 
THE MARINE CORPS COMMANDANT OFFER SOME SHORT-TERM 
BOOSTS TO THE VISIBILITY OF OUR BILATERAL TIES.  BUT, 
AS BANG ACKNOWLEDGED, PROGRESS WILL CONTINUE TO BE 
SLOWED BY LEADERSHIP ELEMENTS WHO ARE LESS ENTHUSIASTIC 
ABOUT US-VIETNAM TIES THAN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY.  SOME 
OF THESE PEOPLE -- IN THE MILITARY, PUBLIC SECURITY, 
AND PROPAGANDA FIELDS, FOR EXAMPLE -- MAY ALSO BE MORE 
RECEPTIVE TO BEIJING THAN BANG (REF A). 
BURGHARDT 
 
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