US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD3115

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003115 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2010 
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PHUM, IZ, Elections, Security 
SUBJECT: VOTER REGISTRATION UPDATE SECURITY PLAN 
 
Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL MILITARY COUNSELOR DAVID C. LITT 
 
 FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
1.(C) SUMMARY:  The voter registration update (VRU)process 
continues to progress.  One of the greatest challenges has 
been keeping the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of 
Interior (MOI) continuously and simultaneously engaged in 
the planning.  However, both agencies were instrumental in 
categorizing the 542 District Electoral Offices (DEOs) into 
different threat-level categories.  Additionally, both were 
present at meetings where force field plans and the results 
of nation-wide communications exercises were discussed. 
The Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI) has 
selected National Air Cargo (NAC) to handle VRU material 
transport; however, NAC is extremely behind schedule 
considering VRU is set to begin August 1.  VRU start dates 
will likely vary across the country.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.(C) ENGAGEMENT OF MINISTRIES IN PLANNING:  When Elections 
Joint Working Group (EJWG) meetings commenced nearly a 
month ago, the MOD appeared to be disengaged from VRU 
planning.  However, in past weeks, MOD Joint Head Quarters 
(JHQ) has stepped up its engagement with active 
participation in weekly EJWG meetings, as well as 
attendance at a recent IECI security conference. 
Unfortunately, however, due to poor communication between 
IECI and MOD, MOD did not prepare any brief for the 
conference.  Moreover, for the past two weekly meetings, 
MOI Director of Elections Security, Major General (MG) 
Aydin, was called away on other matters, an unfortunate 
development during such a crucial time. Since he left no 
deputy with decision-making authority in his stead, limited 
progress was made during the meetings he missed. 
Fortunately, the registration security plan was drafted 
before MG Aydin left and remains unchanged.  Additionally, 
this plan is very similar to the one used during the 
January elections. 
 
3.(C) EXTERNAL REGISTRATION SITE SECURITY:  542 DEOs have 
been established for the purposes of conducting voter 
registration update.  Most of the DEOs are located in 
government buildings and will derive their immediate 
security from Iraqi Police (IP).  Threat levels are divided 
into three categories: critical, more critical and most 
critical as assessed by Iraqi ground commanders and Multi- 
National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I).  The assessed threat levels 
determine how each DEO will be protected throughout August. 
Currently, for example, Al Anbar and Baghdad ratings equate 
to most critical, meaning their protection involves the use 
of three concentric security circles where IP form the 
circle closest to the DEOs, Iraqi Army (IA) the middle 
circle and IA plus Coalition Forces (CF) the outermost 
ring.  The outer layer is designed to be transparent to 
most Iraqis.  Originally, election planning was designed to 
decrease the MNF-I presence and put an "Iraqi face" on all 
aspects of the elections process.  In a recent military 
order, however, Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) stated 
it would augment Iraqi efforts in both the inner and middle 
rings of security as needed.  Nevertheless, the plan 
remains to have CF's presence as visibly limited as 
possible. 
 
4.(C) INTERNAL REGISTRATION SITE SECURITY:  Internally, the 
DEOs will be staffed with 10-12 IECI employees during hours 
of operation, which are 0800-1700 Monday through Thursday. 
These hours will enable the registration of 250 people per 
day per site.  Between one and four million people across 
the country are expected to participate in the VRU. 
Previous EJWG meetings have suggested IECI workers may 
search registrants with metal-detecting wands and chemical 
explosive detecting pads.  IECI plans to provide phone 
numbers on its web site to enable registrants to call in to 
determine whether they need to visit VRU sites.  This 
phone-in customer service initiative will also provide an 
additional security measure, since many people can avoid 
visiting potentially dangerous VRU sites unnecessarily. 
 
5.(C) WHEN WILL SECURITY BE IN PLACE?  DEO Registration 
security is scheduled to be in place throughout the country 
by July 27 to accommodate an August 1 launch.  Forces will 
be in position on this start date even if VRU is delayed to 
impart a sense of personal security and confidence in the 
VRU process to the Iraqi people. 
 
6.(C) REGISTRATION COMMUNICATIONS:  MNF-I has conducted 
several communications exercises over the past month with 
the National Joint Operations Center (NJOC), the JHQ at 
MOD, the MOI National Control Center, Provincial Joint 
Coordination Centers and the Joint Coordination Centers 
throughout Iraq.  These exercises are designed to expedite 
threat and incident reporting to the Iraqi C2 centers and 
MNF-I.  In an actual emergency, NJOC will directly inform 
the Prime Minister of incidents.  MNF-I conducts frequent 
communications exercises; however, progress with secure and 
non-secure voice and data communications has been lacking, 
requiring more practice and coordination. 
 
7.(C) VRU MATERIAL TRANSPORT AND SECURITY:  IECI selected 
NAC to transport, collect and protect completed VRU 
materials, however NAC has not officially signed a contract 
and is way behind schedule.  At this writing, VRU materials 
have been delayed in Sharjah (UAE), and are re-scheduled to 
arrive in Iraq July 28.  IECI says VRU materials traveled 
from Austria to Sharjah and will enter Iraq via the 
Baghdad, Irbil and Basra Regional Airports.  Materials will 
then be transported from these airports via contracted 
security to warehouses guarded by Federal Building 
Security.  Per GEO request, IECI will transport VRU 
materials to the DEOs via taxicabs, pick-up trucks and 
personal vehicles as they feel this method will attract 
less attention than convoys and allow them to "fly under 
the radar."  The amount of time needed to distribute VRU 
materials throughout the country is said to vary anywhere 
from three days to three weeks.  Thus, the EJWG feels 
registration will likely occur August 7 vice August 1. 
However, even if VRU is delayed, IECI has no plans to 
extend the VRU beyond August 31. 
 
8.(C) OTHER SECURITY CONCERNS:  After one EJWG adjourned, 
one member raised a concern that insurgents may attempt to 
masquerade as ISF wearing ISF uniforms, as recent reports 
have indicated.  Another concern involved the bona fide of 
media personnel covering the registration process. 
Although these concerns are relevant, EJWG members believe 
the current security plan addresses these concerns 
adequately. 
Khalilzad