US embassy cable - 05ANKARA4364

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 004364 
 
SIPDIS 
 
BAKU PLEASE PASS TO EUR DAS BRYZA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, MOPS, TU, IZ, SY, Iraq 
SUBJECT: CHARGE DISCUSSES IRAQ WITH SENIOR MFA OFFICIALS, 
DELIVERS STRONG MESSAGE ON SYRIA 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 4187 
     B. ANKARA 3844 
     C. ANKARA 4186 
     D. ANKARA 4260 
 
Classified By: CDA Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: GOT Special Envoy for Iraq Koruturk told 
Charge July 25 that Turkey hopes the Sunni Arabs will return 
soon to constitutional negotiations.  He rebutted Kurdish 
criticism of Turkish outreach efforts, expressed concern that 
the Kurds may be agitating for Turkish troops to leave 
northern Iraq, and reported that Shia and Sunni leaders in 
Talafar had reached an agreement to end sectarian violence. 
Koruturk expressed frustration over increased PKK activity in 
Turkey, but agreed that the issue must not divide Turkey and 
the U.S. and that Turkey would act to preserve and strengthen 
stability in Iraq.  Charge delivered a strong warning on a 
possible visit by Syrian President Asad to Turkey.  End 
summary. 
 
2. (C) GOT Special Envoy for Iraq Osman Koruturk called in 
Charge July 25 to discuss Iraq and Syria; he was joined by 
his deputy, Ethem Tokdemir, and Deputy Director General for 
the Middle East Safak Gokturk.  Koruturk began by thanking us 
for providing good meetings during his July 5-6 visit to 
Washington (ref a).  Koruturk repeated the importance of 
Sunni participation in the constitutional process (ref b), 
and hoped that the Sunni representatives on the 
constitutional committee would soon return to the table. 
Koruturk reported that his Iraqi Sunni Arab contacts have 
told him that a full investigation of the assassination of 
the two Sunni committee members would reassure them; he added 
that some Sunnis believe the Kurds are behind the murders 
(over the Kirkuk issue). 
 
Criticism of Turkish Outreach Efforts 
------------------------------------- 
 
3. (C) Koruturk sought to deflect apparent Kurdish criticism 
of the constitutional seminar the Turks held July 12-13.  He 
said the Iraqi Kurdish press had accused the Turks of holding 
a secret meeting without KDP and PUK representatives to 
pressure the other communities in Iraq to hold firm on Kirkuk 
and the PKK issue.  Koruturk asserted that the participants 
did not discuss Kirkuk and that the Iraqi 
co-organizer--Ghassan al-Atiyyah of the Iraqi Fund for 
Democracy and Development--had chosen the Iraqi participants 
with an eye toward reconciliation.  (NOTE: The PUK 
representative to Turkey had complained about the Kurds' 
apparent exclusion from the seminar to PolMilOff.  END NOTE.) 
 
Kurds Pressing for Turkish Troops to Leave? 
------------------------------------------- 
 
4. (C) Koruturk expressed concern that the Kurds are seeking 
to press Turkish military units in northern Iraq to leave. 
His information (Kurdish press articles calling for the 
Turkish forces to leave, a petition drive, and meetings 
between KDP leader Masoud Barzani's brother, Nihat, and PKK 
front parties) echoed what TGS had provided to us July 19 
(ref c), but Koruturk was either unaware of or did not 
mention TGS's further claims to us that the PKK was planning 
to attack Turkish positions in Iraq. 
 
PKK Frustrations 
---------------- 
 
5. (C) Charge cited recent public statements by Turkish 
officials, including FonMin Gul and PM Erdogan, on the issue 
of "hot pursuit" of PKK terrorists over the border into Iraq, 
and noted that a press debate on this sensitive issue was 
exceptionally unhelpful.  She emphasized that both sides must 
work together to educate the Turkish public on what the U.S. 
has done and is doing to fight the PKK, and that we should 
not fight out issues such as hot pursuit in the press. 
Koruturk responded that D/CHOD GEN Basbug had in fact 
attempted to cool down the rhetoric in Turkey by 
acknowledging that CF have orders to arrest PKK leaders in 
Iraq (refs c and d), but asked why USG spokesmen had denied 
this. 
 
6. (C) DDG Gokturk noted that Iraqi officials seem to have 
ceded control of the border to Kurdish authorities; these 
same authorities, he asserted, are themselves cooperating 
with the PKK.  Koruturk added that the GOT is particularly 
frustrated by the knowledge that it is capable of taking 
military action against the PKK in northern Iraq, but is 
constrained by its respect for Iraqi sovereignty since the 
fall of Saddam and the presence of a legitimate government in 
Baghdad.  Charge urged that the PKK issue not be allowed to 
divide us, and that Turkey not react by taking "rash steps." 
This is a delicate time for Iraq, and we do not need a 
"conflagration" involving Turkish troops in northern Iraq. 
Koruturk answered that he is working for precisely the same 
ends. 
 
A Peace Deal in Talafar? 
------------------------ 
 
7. (C) Koruturk asserted that Sunni and Shia leaders in the 
northwest Ninewah city of Talafar had reached an agreement to 
cease sectarian violence and also not to support the 
insurgency there.  He noted that a group of leaders from both 
sides had presented their plan to DPM Chalabi in Baghdad. 
Koruturk recalled that Turkey had been working to bring many 
of the same leaders to Ankara to meet FonMin Gul in an effort 
to stop the fighting, but "perhaps this will not be necessary 
now."  He believed some Sunnis in Talafar were supporting the 
insurgents to gain their assistance against the Shia. 
Koruturk urged that any potential CF action in Talafar not 
turn into a "Fallujah-type" operation; this would inflame 
Turkish public opinion. 
 
Syria: No Firm Answer on an Asad Visit 
-------------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) Koruturk and Gokturk noted the recent visit of Syrian 
Deputy FonMin al-Muallim to Turkey, and provided a condensed 
readout of his meetings here (more in ref d).  Koruturk 
rehearsed his argument that the U.S. should follow Turkey's 
policy of "persistent dialogue" with Syria with an eye toward 
achieving measurable results, such as a renewed 
U.S.-Iraq-Syria border agreement.  Gokturk reported that it 
is not yet decided whether Syrian President Asad will visit 
Turkey. 
 
9. (C) Charge warned that Syria is seeking to manipulate 
Turkey by exploiting high-level contacts such as Turkish 
President Sezer's April 13-14 visit to Damascus and the 
prospective Asad visit here.  The regime uses Turkey to show 
cracks in the international consensus that Syria must stop 
interfering in Lebanon, must stop supporting Palestinian 
rejectionists and terrorists, and must stop providing aid and 
comfort to terrorists who operate in Iraq.  It is not only 
the administration that is concerned about Ankara's course 
here: Many friends of Turkey in Congress, in various lobbies, 
in the press, and in other countries are dismayed by the 
prospect of Asad's visit to Turkey.  Charge added that the 
U.S. has so far sought to deal with this matter privately and 
not in the press.  Nor did the U.S. object when the Syrian 
Interior Minister visited Istanbul to attend the recent Iraq 
neighbors' meeting.  But, she argued, the Syrians will use 
high-level, bilateral ties with Turkey as a wedge against the 
will of the international community. 
 
Comment: Why Are We Here? 
------------------------- 
 
10. (C) Koruturk had few specifics on his mind other than 
fairly weak press reports about Kurdish pressure to get 
Turkish troops out of Iraq, urging us to keep the Sunni Arabs 
involved in the constitutional process, and points we've 
heard repeatedly on Syria.  We are a bit mystified as to why 
he called this meeting.  Charge was nonetheless able to use 
the opportunity to directly go after Turkey's threadbare 
Syria policy.  End comment. 
 
11. (U) Iraq REOs minimize considered. 
MCELDOWNEY