US embassy cable - 05CAIRO5757

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 005757 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2015 
TAGS: KISL, PTER, KPAO, EG 
SUBJECT: SPEAKING WITH MUSLIM LEADERS ABOUT TERRORIST ACTS 
 
REF: A. STATE 121757 
 
     B. CAIRO 4877 
 
Classified by Charge Stuart E. Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and 
(d). 
 
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Summary 
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1. (C) Embassy Cairo warmly welcomes the Department's 
initiative outlined in ref A.  The Embassy has a strong 
record of engagement and contacts with influential Islamic 
leaders in Egypt but agrees more can and should be done.  Key 
leaders like Sheikh Tantawi are generally allies in the 
struggle against extremism, but are constrained both by 
poorly executed media relations and a tendency to follow 
perceived public opinion rather than staking out a more 
affirmative role in shaping it.  The repugnant July 23 terror 
attack in Sharm el-Sheikh, which claimed far more Egyptian 
victims than foreign, has repulsed the Egyptian public and 
constitutes a potential opportunity to make progress in the 
war of ideas against violent Islamist extremism.  The Embassy 
will continue and step up its engagement of key Islamic 
institutions and influential leaders.  However, some 
Egyptians, particularly youth, have already tuned out the 
Islamic establishment.  Reaching this audience and 
influencing their thinking constitutes the greatest 
challenge.  End summary. 
 
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Embassy Outreach 
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2. (C) The Embassy has a strong record of engagement and 
cultivation of contacts in Egypt's Islamic community.  Sheikh 
Tantawi, who as Imam of Al-Azhar, is the senior spiritual 
leader of Egypt's Sunni Muslim majority, has been a regular 
and faithful interlocutor of past U.S. Ambassadors and 
visiting senior USG officials.  The Embassy also maintains 
strong working level contacts at Al-Azhar, the thousand 
year-old institution which remains one of the most 
influential centers of thought in Sunni Islam.  We also have 
regular contact with Egypt's Supreme Islamic Council, the 
office of the Mufti of the Republic, and the Ministry of 
Islamic Endowments (Awqaf).  We have engaged in a number of 
activities with these contacts, ranging from representational 
events, to paying office calls on key Islamic leaders, to 
inviting clerics to celebrate Ramadan with Muslim communities 
in the U.S., and facilitating visas for them. 
 
3. (C) A May 2005 lunch in honor of the outgoing Charge 
hosted by Dr. Ali Samman, a senior advisor to Sheikh Tantawi, 
typified ongoing Embassy efforts to convey our message on the 
need for credible and moderate Islamic voices to rise in 
challenge to the rhetoric employed by extremist clerics. 
Lunch guests, including several members of the Supreme 
Islamic Council and Sheikh Tantawi's principal deputy did not 
disagree, but objected to western tendencies to blur the 
distinction between extremists and the peaceful majority of 
Muslims.  Acknowledging that more education and outreach 
about Islam in the U.S. and other countries would be useful, 
the Charge and emboffs stressed the U.S. view that the 
ideological front lines were here in Egypt and other Muslim 
countries, where extremist clerics were finding receptive 
audiences among too many Muslim youth.  Emboffs have had many 
similar conversations with Muslim thinkers and writers, at 
various levels and in different fora. 
 
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Constraining Factors 
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4. (C) The Embassy closely monitors statements by influential 
Islamic leaders in Egypt that have potential implications for 
U.S. policy, and reports regularly.  Statements by key 
leaders like Sheikh Tantawi and Mufti Ali Gom'a, who we 
generally view as allies in the ideological struggle against 
violent religious extremism, are not always entirely helpful. 
 Even when carefully parsed, their remarks are often 
distorted by the biased and unprofessional members of Egypt's 
press corps.  Two problems govern this phenomenon, one 
procedural and one political. 
 
5. (C) On the procedural level, public statements by Sheikh 
Tantawi, the Mufti, and others, printed on letter head and 
issued by press officers are rare.  Key statements on timely 
issues, reported in the Egyptian media, usually originate 
from off-the-cuff remarks to the press, often lurking outside 
their office doors.  Al-Azhar rarely makes its own 
transcripts or recordings of such remarks.  We have often 
been told by Tantawi's staff that remarks he has made, 
appearing to condone acts of terror in Iraq or Palestine, are 
misquotes or distortions of the Sheikh's actual words, yet 
Al-Azhar rarely, if ever, publicly challenges or disclaims 
them. 
 
6. (C) On the political level, an apparent fear of straying 
too far from public opinion also seems to constrain the 
rhetoric of Egypt's important and influential moderate 
Islamic leaders.  Conventional wisdom in Egypt holds that 
Tantawi, in particular, is viewed as too close and obedient 
to the GOE, which after all appointed him, a view Tantawi and 
other "establishment" clerics are no doubt aware.  The Sheikh 
often stresses that his jurisdiction is limited to spiritual 
rather than political affairs, and has used this argument to 
avoid overly specific public pronouncements on issues such as 
Iraq and Palestine, preferring to stick to a gray area where 
"resistance to occupation" is legitimate, and even a sacred 
duty, while killing civilians and innocents of any 
nationality is forbidden.  Such positions, which try to 
satisfy both sides, usually end up pleasing neither. 
 
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From the Ashes...Opportunity 
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7. (C) The repugnant July 23 terrorist attack in Sharm 
el-Sheikh, for which responsibility remains obscure, carried 
the signature of a typical "martyrdom" operation conducted by 
violent Islamist radicals.  While some Egyptian reactionaries 
have predictably accused "Mossad or the CIA" of 
responsibility, the more widely held view on the Egyptian 
street is that Islamist radicals, homegrown or imported, are 
indeed the most likely culprits.  In the days since the 
attack, Egypt has witnessed a media offensive, unprecedented 
at least in recent years, against Islamist/terrorist 
ideologies. 
 
8. (C) Major Egyptian and regional papers have carried 
numerous commentaries assailing the attack, its perpetrators, 
and any ideological justification for it.  An interesting 
trend is the number of commentaries penned by long-time 
adversaries of the Muslim Brotherhood (the MB - which 
condemned the Sharm attacks).  Longtime MB antagonists, like 
leftist opposition leader Rif'at Said, have slammed the MB 
for paying lip service to condemning terror while fomenting 
the angry and intolerant attitudes which ultimately evolve 
into terrorist ideology. 
 
9. (C) In Egypt's Islamic establishment, Sheikh Tantawi and 
Mufti Gom'a issued sharp condemnations of the Sharm attacks 
within hours of their occurrence.  Tantawi called the attack 
the "work of the devil...an ugly and cowardly act..."  Major 
Egyptian dailies also reported on July 26 that Dr. Hamdy 
Zaqzouq, the Minister of Awqaf, had approved, apparently in 
reaction to the Sharm attacks, a new public education 
campaign that clarifies the concepts of martyrdom and 
"jihad," underscores the forbidden nature of terrorism, and 
stresses tolerant interpretations of Islam. 
 
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Looking Ahead 
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10. (C) The Embassy, in discussions with Islamic contacts, 
and more broadly with Egyptian interlocutors across various 
fields, is seizing on the Sharm attack as a wake up call for 
Egyptians of all persuasions to unite in the ideological 
battle against violent perversions of Islamic theology.  The 
Embassy will also seek out near term opportunities for 
meetings with key figures like the Sheikh of Al-Azhar, the 
Mufti, and the Minister of Awqaf to press for further and 
more explicit condemnations of outrages like the Sharm 
attack, as well as the illegitimate "martyrdom" operations 
taking such a catastrophic toll in Iraq, as well as the 
destructive role radical Islamist violence has played in 
undermining Israeli-Palestinian peace efforts. 
 
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Comment 
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11. (C) Getting moderately inclined Islamic leaders like 
Tantawi, the Mufti, and the Minister of Awqaf, and key 
members of the institutions they represent, to issue more 
decisive and regular statements distancing mainstream Islam 
from radical, violent ideologies has built-in challenges, as 
discussed paras 4-6.  The effort is nonetheless well worth 
it, these figures occupy bully pulpits and are virtually 
guaranteed to make headlines, or get airtime, whenever they 
open their mouths.  At the same time another, greater 
challenge looms.  Many in Egypt, particularly youth who might 
be the most susceptible to extremist teachings, have already 
tuned out Egypt's Islamic establishment.  They regard many 
senior clerics as out of touch, or even "agents of the U.S. 
Zionist conspiracy."  Winning over this category of people 
will require a more sustained and thoughtfully designed 
effort implemented over the coming years. 
 
 
Visit Embassy Cairo's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/cairo 
 
You can also access this site through the 
State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. 
 
JONES