US embassy cable - 05KINSHASA1229

C O N F I D E N T I A L KINSHASA 001229 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KDEM, CG 
SUBJECT: SOME LUBERIZI INTEGRATION CENTER PROGRESS 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Roger Meece.  Reason 1.4 (b/d). 
 
1. (U) Ambassadors/Charges composing the International 
Committee to Accompany  the Transition (CIAT) stopped at the 
Luberizi military integration camp while on a visit to South 
Kivu Province July 22.  The Luberizi camp is located very 
near the Burundi border, at the site of a prior, now largely 
destroyed, military training center.  It was established as 
an integration center in recent months associated with the 
various "emergency plans" established to further DRC,s 
military integration, but lacked even the most basic 
facilities to conduct training or other operations. 
 
2. (SBU) The July 22 visit was encouraging, with visible 
progress at the camp.   The European Union (EU) has committed 
funds in support of Luberizi camp improvements, but that 
money has not yet arrived through the delivery pipeline. 
Nonetheless, construction was underway of simple wooden 
barracks and other facilities, following a master plan for 
camp development that had already been defined.  More 
significantly, CIAT members found over 3,000 troops assembled 
at the center, the majority of whom had opted for 
integration, and a smaller number choosing to be demobilized. 
 MONUC Pakistani officials as well as GDRC officers at the 
camp affirmed to the CIAT that all the troops at the camp 
were receiving regular food rations and pay, albeit at the 
meager $10/month level in effect for FARDC troops.  All of 
this was coming out of the government budget.  All troops 
destined for integration were equipped with fairly 
recently-issued uniforms and boots; most still retained 
weapons.  Soldiers opting for demobilization wore civilian 
clothes. 
 
3. (C) The ranking FARDC officer, a Colonel, briefed CIAT 
members that the assembled troops included nearly 1,000 
"ex-government" forces, about the same number of ex-RCD-Goma 
troops, slightly more than 1,000 ex-MLC troops, about 410 
ex-Mai Mai combatants, and roughly 40 "Ex-Masunzu" soldiers. 
(Note: The latter refers to South Kivu Banyamulenge soldiers 
who served under the command of General Masunzu.  End Note). 
The camp had originally received 123 "ex-Masunzu" troops, but 
83 of these had deserted, presumably returning to the 
Banyamulenge home area in South Kivu.  Roughly 125 of the 
original Mai Mai contingent had also deserted.  Of all 
remaining troops, however, only 2 had deserted, both of these 
ex-RCD-Goma soldiers.  Most of the soldiers at the center 
were accompanied by their families.   None of the training 
had been started for the troops to be integrated, and would 
not pending completion of some further facilities. 
 
4. (C) The FARDC Colonel also reported the specific arms 
inventory of the camp, which included over 2,200 AK-47,s, 
four 60 mm mortars, and 7 RPG,s, the latter weapons having 
only a few rounds each of ammunition.  Upon questioning by 
CIAT members, MONUC officers present confirmed that MONUC 
will soon be taking possession of all weapons and ammunition 
as a part of the agreed-upon integration procedures. 
Officials from CONADER, the GDRC agency in charge of DDR 
programs, affirmed that a DDR center has been established, 
about 14 kms. away, and that those soldiers to be demobilized 
would be transferred there after being disarmed.  The German 
NGO, GTZ, has already been designated to oversee operations 
at the DDR camp. 
 
5. (C) Comment:  The Luberizi camp illustrated both 
difficulties and progress characteristic of the current 
integration and DDR programs.  The camp had been established 
in haste with no adequate facilities.  In theory, separation 
of the soldiers to be demobilized is to be done before troops 
arrive at the integration center, the opposite of what is 
occurring at Luberizi.  Nonetheless, GDRC-supplied uniforms, 
food, and pay are arriving at the camp, construction is 
(belatedly) underway of facilities, and the mix of troops in 
the camp is a good representation of former belligerent 
armies.  All are living in close proximity with no evident 
tension nor reported incidents.  The relatively high 
desertion rate of former Mai Mai and Banyamulenge troops is 
not surprising, and can be expected as the integration and 
DDR processes move forward.  In general, however, pending the 
start of training, the Luberizi camp is showing signs of how 
the larger integration program should develop.  End comment. 
MEECE