US embassy cable - 05RANGOON871

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000871 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV; PACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, BM 
SUBJECT: SPDC SILENT ON ASEAN CHAIR ANNOUNCEMENT 
 
REF: A. RANGOON 825 AND PREVIOUS 
 
     B. VIENTIANE 814 
     C. BANGKOK 4784 
 
Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  The announcement in Vientiane that Burma 
would relinquish its rotation to the ASEAN chair apparently 
came as a complete surprise to many GOB officials and 
diplomats in Rangoon.  Official state media has thus far 
ignored the development entirely and GOB officials refuse to 
comment.  Despite quiet satisfaction among many observers 
that the regime has been denied further legitimacy, few 
expect ASEAN to now confront Burma in any meaningful way and 
thus conclude that the SPDC has simply gained more time to 
maintain the status quo.  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) Burma's military regime, as anticipated, held its 
cards close on the ASEAN chair issue until the July 26 joint 
communique in Vientiane.  Prior to issuance of the 
communique, press reports indicated that senior GOB officials 
in Vientiane were predictably ambiguous, leaving many in 
Rangoon to conclude that the issue would remain unresolved 
for months to come. 
 
3. (SBU) However, the announcement that FM Nyan Win had 
informed the ASEAN ministers that Burma would relinquish its 
rotation to the ASEAN chair in 2006 apparently came as a 
significant surprise to many GOB officials and diplomats in 
Rangoon.  Ref C indicated that the Thai believe the Burmese 
decision rested with Than Shwe and was not made until the 
last minute; such a scenario is highly probable (ref A). 
 
4. (C) As the news broke from Vientiane on July 26, we 
contacted a variety of GOB officials and offices, including 
at the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Information, and 
they all expressed genuine surprise about the development and 
said they knew absolutely nothing about the apparent GOB 
decision.  As of COB July 27, official state television and 
press has ignored the development entirely and GOB officials 
refuse to make any comment. 
 
5. (C) Our next opportunity to seek reliable clarification 
from the GOB would have been an MFA-hosted departure dinner 
for the COM scheduled for the evening of June 27.  However, 
following the Vientiane announcement, the MFA canceled the 
dinner, citing "other obligations." 
 
6. (C) ASEAN diplomats in Rangoon only learned about the 
development from our inquiries for reactions.  The Malaysian 
Ambassador said "this decision means that the Lady (ASSK) 
will now be detained for a very long time."  The Thai 
Ambassador, caught off guard by the announcement, declined to 
speculate if the visit to Burma on July 25 of his Deputy 
Prime Minister had tipped the GOB balance.  Of note, the 
Philippines Ambassador was also unaware of the development, 
and said that, given domestic politics in Manila, her country 
would "have to look strong and indicate our willingness to be 
the next ASEAN chair, but we're concerned that Burma will 
resent it." 
 
7. (C) NLD leaders, having reiterated their view to the COM 
on July 25 that Burma should be denied the chair, told 
Emboffs on July 27 that they were pleased about the outcome. 
However, they concluded the decision is clearly a strategy on 
the part of the SPDC to avoid splitting ASEAN and losing the 
non-interference relationship the regime enjoys with its 
neighbors.  The NLD plans to issue a statement o/a July 27 or 
28, noting that the regime took a pass on the chair in favor 
of "national reconciliation" and demanding a meaningful 
dialogue.  NLD Chairman U Aung Shwe also told us that FM Nyan 
Win's apparent snub in Vientiane of UN Special Envoy Razali 
was a clear sign of the regime's utter disregard for the UN 
process and the rest of the international community. 
 
8. (C) Comment:  Despite quiet satisfaction among many 
observers in Rangoon that the regime has been denied the 
"honor" of hosting ASEAN, and the further legitimacy that 
such a role could have bestowed on the SPDC, there is also 
much trepidation.  Few expect ASEAN to confront Burma in any 
meaningful way over democracy and human rights issues, 
leaving many in Rangoon to conclude that the regime has again 
succeeded in doing what it does so well: simply buy more time 
to maintain the status quo.  End Comment. 
Martinez