US embassy cable - 05THEHAGUE2064

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NETHERLANDS: DUTCH THINKING ON ISAF III; FUTURE OF DUTCH NAVY, JSF

Identifier: 05THEHAGUE2064
Wikileaks: View 05THEHAGUE2064 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy The Hague
Created: 2005-07-27 08:12:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: MARR MOPS NL PGOV PREL NATO
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 002064 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2015 
TAGS: MARR, MOPS, NL, PGOV, PREL, NATO 
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: DUTCH THINKING ON ISAF III; FUTURE OF 
DUTCH NAVY, JSF 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Clifford M. Sobel for reasons 1.4 (b,d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: Ambassador, DATT and ODC Chief met with Dutch 
CHOD Gen. Dick Berlijn on July 19.  Gen. Berlijn reviewed 
Dutch thinking on participation in ISAF III, including a PRT 
consisting initially of 1000 personnel (later to be expanded 
to 1200) deployed most likely to Uruzgan province.  Later 
discussions on July 26 with the Acting Director of Operations 
at the Dutch MFA confirmed this preliminary plan.  The Dutch 
will host the Canadians and British on August 17-18 to 
follow-up on the force generation conference.  Berlijn noted 
that a compromise in Parliament prevented plans for an 
1800-man deployment, as the main opposition party wanted 
personnel available for a potential African mission.  Berlijn 
also talked about the possibility of U.S. support -- either 
through proximity to Dutch forces or embedded U.S. 
intelligence personnel -- as potentially helping convince 
Dutch Minister of Defense Henk Kamp and others in the Dutch 
government to deploy to Uruzgan. 
 
2. (C) Cont. Summary: Gen. Berlijn reviewed changes occurring 
in the Dutch Navy.  Quoting Minister Kamp, Berlijn described 
the Dutch Navy as "demoralized and adrift".  Berlijn 
explained that they need to become expeditionary, relying 
less on their frigates and more on coastal patrol vessels and 
landing platform ships to support land battles.  He outlined 
the possibility of selling six "M" frigates -- two to Belgium 
and four to Chile  -- proceeds from which could potentially 
be used to purchase coastal patrol vessels, landing platform 
dock ships, Tactical Tomahawk, helicopters, and other assets. 
 
 
3. (C) Cont. Summary: Berlijn also stated that he was 
interested in finding a way to prioritize the Joint Strike 
Fighter (JSF) program within the Dutch government.  He hoped 
to develop a plan to pursue the purchase of an initial, 
"acceptably safe" number of 50-60 JSFs in 2006, in order to 
"depoliticize" the issue prior to the May 2007 elections. By 
depoliticizing the issue through this initial purchase, 
Berlijn suggested that the Dutch could keep options open 
regarding the total eventual purchase of 80 or more JSFs. 
End Summary. 
 
-------------- 
ISAF Stage III 
-------------- 
 
4. (C) Gen. Berlijn initially briefed on Dutch plans to 
participate in ISAF Stage III.  These plans are still by and 
large under discussion within the Dutch government; Dutch FM 
Bot has been negotiating with Parliament over ISAF III for 
several weeks.  MajGen Cobelens, MOD Director of Operations, 
drafted the preliminary plan presented to NATO during the 
July 25 force generation conference.  According to the Acting 
Director of Operations at the Dutch MFA on July 26, this 
preliminary plan calls for Dutch partnership with the 
Canadians and Brits at the Forward Support Base (FSB) in 
Kandahar beginning in April 2006.  The deployment will last 
for eighteen months; command responsibility for the FSB will 
be on a six-month rotation with the Canadians taking the 
first watch.  The Dutch will assume command of the FSB in 
November 2006. 
 
5. (C) According to the Acting Director of Operations at the 
Dutch MFA, the preliminary Dutch plan proposed a Dutch 
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Uruzgan province. 
The Dutch plan to initially deploy 1000 personnel, ramping up 
to 1200 personnel by the time they assume charge of the 
Kandahar FSB in November 2006.  The 1200-person deployment 
will also include approximately 4 Chinooks, 4-6 Apaches, and 
the 4 F-16s currently stationed in Kabul.  The Dutch MOD will 
host Canada and the UK on August 17-18 to follow-up on ISAF 
Stage III proposal details. (Note: A read-out from USNATO 
suggests that the United States may be invited to attend the 
meeting as well; according to the Dutch MFA, only the Brits 
and Canadians have thus far been invited.  Post will seek 
more information on possible U.S. attendance.  End note.) 
 
6. (C)  Gen. Berlijn explained that he was limited to a PRT 
consisting of 1000 personnel due to restrictions set by 
Parliament.  Berlijn initially wanted 1800 personnel, but the 
Labor Party (PvdA) demanded that some personnel also be 
available for possible operations in Africa (NFI).  A 
compromise within Parliament led to the 1000-person 
restriction to accommodate the Labor Party.  (Note: Dutch 
governments prefer to make military deployment decisions 
backed by a parliamentary super-majority, usually to include 
the main opposition party.  End note.)  While the number of 
personnel in the PRT will eventually increase to 1200, the 
Acting Director of Operations at the Dutch MFA explained that 
this number is a "maximum" number set by Parliament that 
cannot be exceeded, and will also include air technicians and 
support for their deployed helicopters and F-16s.  Actually, 
the Dutch initial plan calls for a fully operational PRT of 
1568 men; due to the 1200 restriction set by Parliament, the 
Dutch were actively encouraging the Australians to partner 
with them in the PRT. 
 
7. (C) According to Berlijn, the Dutch had not yet agreed 
internally (as of July 19) on the location of the PRT.  While 
the Dutch preliminary plan proposed during the force 
generation conference calls for a PRT deployment in Uruzgan, 
the subject is still open for debate.  Berlijn and other 
members of the military staff were strongly recommending that 
the Dutch troops be deployed to Uruzgan province in central 
Afghanistan, where they could, in his view, make a real 
difference in a challenging environment.  Others in the 
government, however, wanted the Dutch to deploy to the safer 
province of Nimruz near the Iranian border.  Berlijn 
discussed the possibility of U.S. support -- either through 
proximity to Dutch forces or embedding U.S. intelligence 
within Dutch forces -- as potentially helping convince his 
minister and others in the Dutch government that they can and 
should deploy to Uruzgan. 
 
-------------------- 
Future of Dutch Navy 
-------------------- 
 
8. (C) Following a question on the status of potential 
Tactical Tomahawk acquisition, Gen. Berlijn provided an 
extended background explanation on changes occurring in the 
Dutch Navy.  According to Berlijn, Dutch Minister of Defense 
Kamp recently described the Dutch Navy as "demoralized and 
adrift".  Kamp felt that the Navy relied too heavily upon 
their frigates.  The Navy needed to reorient and "focus on 
tasks", becoming "expeditionary and more coastal". 
 
9. (C) After studying the issue, Berlijn stated that the 
Dutch need to sell some of their frigates and buy more 
coastal patrol vessels (CPVs) and landing platform dock (LPD) 
ships.  Berlijn cautioned that convincing Dutch admirals to 
sell their frigates would be very difficult -- "Getting the 
Admirals to give up their frigates is like getting a fighter 
pilot to give up his fighter" (Note: Berlijn is a fighter 
pilot.).  Berlijn stated that he wants the Navy to support 
land battle and theater ballistic missile defense (TBMD).  He 
expressed firm support for a Dutch submarine capability, 
noting that "the Dutch are in the submarine business".  In 
that respect, he needed to put an end to the current debate 
on submarines within the Dutch government.  Berlijn also 
noted that they are looking at a study to improve its oiler 
ship, including its capacity to incorporate more helicopters 
in order to support Dutch troops in the field or for use 
during amphibious deployments. 
 
10. (C) Berlijn then discussed the possibility of selling six 
"M" frigates, which he described as "very sensitive" as the 
Dutch are in competition with the Brits in this regard.  He 
stated that the Belgians are interested in purchasing two 
frigates; the Chileans have expressed interest in buying the 
other four.  (Note: In a conversation with Dutch FM Bot on 
July 21, Bot told ambassador that he was not in favor of 
selling the frigates, but would not/not disagree with Kamp in 
Cabinet.  Bot noted, however, that there was resistance in 
the Dutch Navy regarding the sale of the frigates.  End 
note.)  Berlijn further explained that if the Dutch sold 
these frigates, proceeds could potentially be used to 
purchase coastal patrol vessels, landing platform dock ships, 
Tactical Tomahawk, helicopters, and other assets. 
 
-------------------- 
Joint Strike Fighter 
-------------------- 
 
11. (C) Berlijn then turned discussion to the Joint Strike 
Fighter (JSF), and noted that he was looking for ways to 
prioritize JSF in the Dutch government.  He wished to 
"depoliticize" the issue prior to the May 2007 elections by 
working to get a commitment from the Dutch government in 2006 
for the purchase of an initial, "acceptably safe" number of 
50-60 JSFs.  By depoliticizing the issue with this initial 
purchase, he suggested that options remained open to 
eventually buy over 80 JSFs in total.  He commented that 
"even the leftists agree that this is the best fighter we 
could acquire".  Berlijn acknowledged that if the Dutch want 
to keep their aerospace industry alive, they must be actively 
involved with both JSF and the Airbus 380. 
 
------------------------------- 
Tactical Tomahawks; UAV Project 
------------------------------- 
 
12. (C) Berlijn noted that the Dutch are still committed to 
the acquisition of Tactical Tomahawks, but it needed to occur 
sequentially following the development and construction of 
coastal patrol vessels.  (Note: Selling the six "M" frigates 
and replacing them with newly-built corvettes -- thus 
providing work for the Dutch ship-building industry -- may 
yield sufficient parliamentary support for acquisition of 
Tactical Tomahawk, which could be employed on the Dutch 
Navy's new Aegis-equivalent LCF frigates.  End note.) 
Berlijn briefly addressed the Dutch unmanned aerial vehicle 
(UAV) project in partnership with the French.  According the 
Berlijn, the partnership helps diffuse tensions within the 
Dutch government regarding the perception that the Dutch only 
buy military equipment from the United States.  Berlijn 
explained, however, that the program has stalled as the 
French have taken a "90 degree turn".  The French Defense 
Minister is scheduled to visit the Netherlands in September; 
the UAV project will be on the agenda for discussion. 
 
SOBEL 

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