US embassy cable - 05ANKARA4296

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 004296 
 
SIPDIS 
 
EMBASSIES BAKU AND TBILISI PLEASE PASS DAS BRYZA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, TU, CY, EUN, EU Accession 
SUBJECT: TURKEY-EU: STEP BY STEP TOWARD TURKISH SIGNING OF 
THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE ANKARA AGREEMENT 
 
 
(U) Classified by CDA Nancy McEldowney; reasons: E.O. 12958 
1.4 (b,d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: The UK Embassy hopes UK lobbying will have 
steered the Turkish government to sign the additional 
protocol to the Ankara Agreement shortly after the July 27 
Blair-Erdogan meeting in London.  At the same time, the UK 
has been pressing Turkish authorities to issue Turkey's 
expected reaffirmation of non-recognition of the Republic of 
Cyprus in a way which will not throw commencement of Turkey's 
harmonization process off the October 3 start date.  Turkish 
MFA EU general directorate assures us the text will 
faithfully reflect UK recommendations.  However, enough 
elements remain uncertain that the UK is taking nothing for 
granted.  End summary. 
 
2. (C) UK Embassy polchief affirmed to us July 26 that her 
government hopes the Turkish government will sign the 
additional protocol to the Ankara Agreement shortly after the 
July 27 Blair-Erdogan meeting in London. 
 
3. (C) The UK aims to use the July 27 meeting to gain clarity 
on how Turkey proposes to reaffirm its non-recognition of the 
Republic of Cyprus and to dissuade Erdogan from any language 
that some in the EU could consider too harsh, especially any 
language that would interpret the additional protocol as 
giving Turkey the right to deny entry to its ports and 
airfields for Cypriot vessels.  The UK has been advising the 
Turkish authorities, both in the MFA and at the political 
level (FM Gul), that it is not proper for Turkey to comment 
in its declaration on how it intends to implement the 
additional protocol; if Turkey intends to interpret the 
protocol in any restrictive manner, it should make its 
intentions known subsequently through the EU Commission's 
legal mechanisms. 
 
4. (C) A complicating element is Erdogan's attitude, polchief 
added.  There is some concern in London that Erdogan, who, 
despite continual travel, has not visited any EU country 
since the December 2004 EU summit, is not focused on the 
delicacy of the issue or even on Turkey's EU candidacy in 
general.  Erdogan has indicated that he intends to use his 
meeting with Blair to talk about "more important" issues such 
as Iraq, terrorism, and anti-Muslim sentiment.  UK Ambassador 
told Charge July 25 that he was waiting to see whether Gul 
would arrange for him to fly with the PM to London in order 
to be able to brief Erdogan on the need for prudence. 
 
5. (C) If a satisfactory signing appears to be in the offing, 
the procedure would be for the UK permrep to the EU, on 
behalf of the EU, to sign a copy of the additional protocol 
and present it to the Turkish permrep in Brussels.  The 
Turkish permrep would then sign and return the protocol, 
along with a Turkish declaration that its signature does not 
constitute recognition of the Republic of Cyprus. 
 
6. (C) UK polchief acknowledged that the UK will be taking a 
risk in signing the additional protocol before it knows the 
content of the Turkish non-recognition declaration.  However, 
this is the deal the UK has worked out with Turkey, and in 
any event it might be better not to be presented beforehand 
with a Turkish text which could put the UK in an awkward 
position.  In any event, the Cypriots are pressing for a 
COREPER meeting immediately after the signing to issue a 
counter-declaration, but the UK has deflected this pressure, 
polchief said.  Instead, depending on the tone and content of 
the Turkish declaration, the UK may issue a statement 
reaffirming that the Republic of Cyprus is an EU member state 
and the only internationally-recognized authority on the 
island.  The UK would then suggest a COREPER meeting for 
sometime in mid-August. 
 
7. (C) Turkish MFA EU general directorate DDG Turkmen averred 
to us late July 26 that the Turkish non-recognition statement 
takes into account the UK recommendations and should be 
reasonable enough in tone to satisfy both Turkish legal 
exigencies and EU opinion.  In outlining the text to us, 
another excellent contact of ours also asserted that the 
Turkish statement will be concise and leave room enough for 
both Turkish public opinion and the EU to live with it. 
MCELDOWNEY