US embassy cable - 05KINSHASA1220

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KINSHASA 001220 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MOPS, CG, UN 
SUBJECT: CURRENT MONUC OPERATIONS IN SOUTH KIVU PROVINCE 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Roger Meece.  Reason 1.4 (b/d). 
 
  1. (C) Summary:  The Ambassador and other members of the 
International Committee to Accompany the Transition (CIAT) 
toured MONUC operational areas in South Kivu and were 
extensively briefed by the Pakistani brigade July 22 - 23. 
MONUC has launched an aggressive series of operations in the 
province essentially targeting Rwandan FDLR and Rasta armed 
groups. The tactics are similar to successful &cordon and 
search8 operations previously used in Ituri District to 
disarm armed groups.  MONUC is succeeding in clearing 
previous FDLR &safe zone8 areas.  Unlike the Ituri 
militias, however, the FDLR are choosing to avoid open 
confrontation and instead withdrawing into heavily forested 
and mountainous areas further east, albeit with some apparent 
reprisal attacks against civilians.  The Rwandan rebel forces 
are showing signs of internal divisions.  Without a more 
robust corresponding FARDC or other military operation, 
however, it is not yet clear whether the MONUC operations 
will succeed in generating large-scale FDLR repatriation. 
The CIAT will press for more FARDC engagement, although the 
general FARDC operational capacity is limited.  End summary. 
 
CIAT Briefings in South Kivu 
---------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) The Ambassador and other members of the 
International Committee to Accompany the Transition 
(CIAT)visited South Kivu province July 22 - 23.  Most of the 
CIAT,s sixteen members were represented by 
Ambassadors/Charges or DCM,s; however, the Chinese Embassy 
did not participate in the trip.  The CIAT members received 
extensive briefings by the MONUC Pakistani brigade 
headquartered in Bukavu.  The Pakistani brigade, with about 
2,700 troops, assumed primary responsibility for MONUC 
military activites in South Kivu in March of this year.  The 
brigade has recently initiated a series of aggressive 
operations in South Kivu province designed to disarm armed 
groups under MONUC,s mandate to protect civilians.  The 
operations have in essence targeted Rwandan FDLR and Rasta 
groups long operating in the province, utilizing &cordon and 
search8 tactics similar to those previously successfully 
employed in Ituri District against illegal militia groups. 
 
3. (U) The terrain and population density in South Kivu 
province render operations more difficult than those in Ituri 
District.  South Kivu includes extensive highly mountainous 
zones, and in places, densely forested tracts.  Access to 
many areas is extremely difficult by road, and thus extensive 
use of helicopters, both transports and attack helicopters, 
are required for the MONUC operations.  Most of the MONUC 
helicopters in the area are either civilian-contracted 
transports or Indian aviation squadron assets based at 
Bukavu,s Kavumu airport. 
 
4. (U) The size of the area also represents a major 
challenge.  South Kivu province covers roughly 65,000 square 
kilometers, with an estimated resident population of 
approximately six million.  The initial operational area 
being targeted is itself very large, roughly 350 x 215 
kilometers, meaning the relatively limited number of troops 
available must be very selectively employed. 
 
Nature of the Target 
-------------------- 
5. (C) While it is not generally specifically articulated, in 
fact the primary target of the MONUC operations are Rwandan 
FDLR and Rasta armed groups.  The Pakistani brigade briefed 
CIAT that it believes there are approximately 3,000 - 4,000 
FDLR in South Kivu, while Rasta numbers are estimated at less 
than 100. The FDLR does collaborate at times with local Mai 
Mai groups, depending on local circumstances and 
personalities.  The Pakistanis also reported that the FDLR 
appear to have substantial new communication equipment and 
some arms.  While there is no evidence of the source of any 
new funds, some speculations center on money that may have 
been part of the negotiations related to the Rome GDRC/Sant, 
Egidio initiative. 
 
6. (C) The Rastas are a relatively new group in the region, 
and it is not clear who they are, or what they represent. The 
Rastas, however, are implicated in particularly horrific 
crimes targeting civilians, such as the recent attack which 
burned alive 47 women and children who had been forced into 
huts which were then torched.  In CIAT briefings, the 
Pakistani Brigade Commander acknowledged the prevailing view 
that the Rastas may include especially extreme Rwandan Hutu 
combatants, potentially along with fringe Mai Mai or FARDC 
deserters or other disaffected Congolese armed elements.  The 
General added, however, that it is the Pakistani Brigade view 
that the Rastas are a construct of the FDLR.  The Brigade 
Commander noted that the FDLR military leaders have 
repeatedly offered to cooperate with MONUC to attack the 
Rastas, identifying them as a rival and disruptive force. 
The Commander quickly added that any such cooperation with 
FDLR is unacceptable to MONUC in any form.  He also opined 
that reported FDLR/Rasta clashes have been faked, and that in 
fact he believes the Rastas have been set up to divert 
attention from the FDLR.  His bottom line conclusion is that 
it is &not possible to differentiate between Rasta and 
FDLR8 forces and the MONUC operations in the area are based 
on that premise. 
 
Pushing the PKO Envelope 
------------------------ 
 
7. (SBU) MONUC is continuing to press the limits of 
traditional PKO activity with the South Kivu operations. 
Citing their Chapter 7 authority and the MONUC mandate to 
protect civilians, tactics similar to those already utilized 
in Ituri District are being utilized.  Targeted areas are 
declared to be arms-free, for example, with MONUC forces 
deployed to surround the area.  Search operations, including 
door-to-door searches of villages in the area are then 
conducted to disarm any individuals or forces who refuse to 
surrender their weapons.  Camps utilized by FDLR or Rastas 
are destroyed. 
 
8. (C) Given the size of the target areas and difficult 
terrain, sizeable forces and relatively complex operations 
are utilized.  In addition to the Pakistani Brigade, two 
companies of MONUC South Africa troops have been utilized, as 
well as Guatemalan Special Forces units, Indian aviation 
assets (including attack helicopters), and at times Uruguayan 
riverine units.  Operational movements have been conducted by 
vehicle where possible, often coordinated with 
helicopter-borne forces.  Operation Iron Fist, for example, 
launched July 7, involved roughly 1,000 troops and 141 
vehicles, and transport and attack helicopters.  In another 
example, Operation Thurnderstorm, launched July 20 involved 
1,200 troops and combined air, riverine, and ground 
operations.  In the latter operation, the MONUC forces 
believed they identified and destroyed two camps that had 
served as FDLR battalion headquarters. 
 
Incorporating FARDC Forces 
-------------------------- 
 
9. (C) Lacking newly integrated FARDC forces which have yet 
to be deployed to the area, and given the extremely limited 
capabilities of the FARDC forces already in place, the 
Pakistani MONUC force has also taken an aggressive posture to 
incorporate a FARDC component into its operations.  While 
there is no MONUC mandate to train FARDC forces, the 
Pakistani brigade chose the best FARDC forces they could 
identify and brought them together.  Kinshasa MONUC 
headquarters carefully refers to the subsequent Pakistani 
efforts regarding these troops as &mentoring.8  The 
Pakistani Brigade Commander was less restrained, openly 
describing the six to eight week training program the 
Pakistanis have provided to a total of 2,500 Congolese 
troops.  At least a thousand of these have thus far been 
deployed with the Pakistani troops in the ongoing operations, 
and plans are to utilize the remaining 1,500 as soon as 
possible.  While not specified in the CIAT briefings, it 
appears the Pakistanis are also pushing the envelope of their 
mandate to provide at least partial logistics support to the 
FARDC troops as well.  The FARDC troops being utilized are 
drawn from various former belligerent factions, although they 
have not formally been through the military integration 
process. 
 
10. (SBU) During a helicopter tour of the operational area, 
the CIAT delegation stopped in a field location near Nindja, 
where a number of the Pakistani and FARDC troops were 
gathered.  The FARDC troops appeared relatively well equipped 
with uniforms, boots, and weapons.  Officers with whom the 
Ambassador and other CIAT members spoke appeared to take 
pride in their role and activities, a quality not always seen 
with FARDC units. 
 
Results To-Date 
--------------- 
 
11. (C) The MONUC briefing and field observations confirmed 
that FDLR and Rasta elements are being removed from areas 
long considered essentially safe zones for them.  FDLR camps 
are indeed being burned, and the CIAT witnessed camps being 
burned, as well as evidence of previously destroyed camps. 
In a number of areas, local civilian populations are 
returning to their villages, relatively free of fear for the 
first time in years of attack from the Rwandan Hutu extremist 
forces.  MONUC reports hundreds of huts in many camps have 
been destroyed, and perhaps more significantly, the Pakistani 
forces believe they are beginning to shake the prior 
confidence of the FDLR forces.  As the Brigade Commander put 
it, the &so-called myth8 of the FDLR is being broken, with 
FDLR removed from long-standing stronghold areas.  The 
Brigade Commander also briefed that sparse medical supplies 
and other evidence seen in former FDLR camps indicate acute 
logistical and medical support problems that are presumably 
adversely affecting FDLR morale. 
 
12. (C) Unlike the Ituri militias, however, the FDLR forces 
are choosing not to engage the MONUC forces directly. FDLR 
forces are instead opting  to withdraw further to the east, 
and many are now concentrated in a highly inaccessible 
densely forested mountainous area around and east of Mount 
Besi.  These tactics at least for now are preserving basic 
FDLR unit integrity, with the attendant possibility of 
returns to their previous positions.  No significant pick-up 
in repatriation activity to Rwanda is yet recorded.  There 
have as well been several reprisal raids reported against 
civilians, likely carried out by Rasta elements, possibly 
with FDLR concurrence.  A new attack resulting in a reported 
13 deaths, for example, was reported in the area the day 
before the CIAT,s arrival. 
 
13. (C) Whether as a result of the GDRC/Sant, Egidio Rome 
initiative, new MONUC operations, other factors, or more 
likely some combination of these, there are signs of new 
internal divisions within the FDLR.  Open clashes were 
recently reported between rival FDLR units, the first such 
reported case of internal fighting.  Scattered reports and 
intelligence suggest significant divisions among FDLR forces, 
presumably centered on future options and the possibility of 
returns to Rwanda. 
 
The Missing Element - Non-MONUC Military Force 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
14. (C) As was clear to the CIAT delegation, and as was 
briefed by the Pakistani Brigade, the missing piece to 
achieve operational success in South Kivu is a military force 
that can complement and go beyond the MONUC PKO operations. 
Ideally FARDC forces, for example, should be deployed to 
ensure continuing secure conditions in areas cleared of FDLR. 
 Moreover, FARDC (or conceivably African Union) forces could 
in principle conduct more aggressive forcible disarmament and 
repatriation operations that would go beyond the MONUC 
authorized mandate.  FARDC forces in the province, however, 
are hobbled by inadequate training, equipment, and support. 
 
15. (C) The Pakistani Brigade Commander also identified other 
problems.  There are clear major internal splits that weaken 
government authority and control, with various FARDC brigade 
commanders, for example, in essence operating as autonomous 
commanders unresponsive to central authority orders.  The 
former 10th Military District Commander, General Mabe, had 
experienced increasing difficulty in maintaining control over 
ex-Mai Mai troops in particular, and these constitute the 
largest single component of FARDC troops in the province. 
Mabe has since been removed from the 10th District command, 
as has his former deputy, but replacements have not yet 
arrived.  The Pakistani General pointedly noted that no 
regular military force would remove both the commander and 
deputy with no replacements in sight, but that is exactly the 
current FARDC situation in the area.  Civilian GDRC 
leadership is also split, with no Governor currently in South 
Kivu, and civilian authority divided between RCD-Goma and 
&Civil Society8 Vice Governors. 
 
Future Actions 
------------------ 
 
16. (C) The Pakistani Brigade outlined further operations 
including one focused on Idjwi Island in Lake Kivu.  The 
MONUC forces made it very clear that they intend to maintain 
the stepped-up operational posture.  With only a limited 
number of troops available, however, it was also clear that 
MONUC will in fact be unable to maintain a significant 
military presence in any of the operational areas of the 
province while carrying on these operations. 
 
17. (C) CIAT members are resolved to increase pressure on the 
Kinshasa government to address urgently various issues that 
are impeding FARDC operations.  This includes deployment of 
the Kitona integrated brigade to the Kivus to be available 
for operations.  Transport of the brigade and its equipment 
from western DRC to the east has been delayed, apparently due 
to a lack of transport capacity.  General support issues, 
including regular payment of salaries, ongoing provision of 
food supplies, and other logistics support also represent 
major continuing concerns.  A Security Sector Mixed 
Commission meeting scheduled for July 27 will represent the 
next institutional opportunity to press home formally these 
issues; the CIAT is also seeking a meeting soon with the 
Espace Presidentiel (the President and four Vice Presidents) 
primarily to discuss security sector issues.  It is clear 
that an increased capable military force to complement MONUC 
is needed in South Kivu to add military pressure to the 
FDLR/Rasta, and provide ongoing security in areas being 
cleared. 
 
Comment: Setting Peacekeeping Precedents-With Full Support 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
18. (C) Comment: The MONUC operations in South Kivu go far 
beyond traditional PKO operations, and are probably 
generating some angst among DPKO staff.  A more traditional 
and passive stance, however, had pretty much reached the 
limits of what could be accomplished.  It has become clear 
that less aggressive posture was not capable of bringing 
security to the region.  From all accounts, the Pakistanis 
who are spearheading this effort on the ground are doing a 
superb job.  They enjoy the full support of CIAT members, the 
Kinshasa Transition government, and to all appearances the 
large majority of civilians in the affected areas, civilian 
casualties notwithstanding.   Indeed, the Pakistanis are 
doing an excellent job all around with extensive community 
outreach and related &hearts and minds8 efforts that is 
changing successfully the heretofore negative image of MONUC 
in the province.  Other aspects of the South Kivu situation 
will be covered septels.  It is not clear, however, if all 
this will be enough in at least the short run to incite the 
large-scale FDLR repatriation which just about everyone now 
in the province and Kinshasa wants.  While we can hope that 
newly developed internal FDLR rifts may produce some 
beneficial results, additional military force is needed 
beyond MONUC.  At this point, the FARDC represents  the only 
such force on the horizon, but it will be a continuing 
struggle to develop further its capacity.  The Europeans, 
Angolans, and South Africans are devoting substantial 
resources to this effort, in addition to the unofficial MONUC 
mentoring/training activities.  We will continue to press 
strongly for the kind of central government actions needed as 
well.  End comment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MEECE