US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD3095

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 003095 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2015 
TAGS: MCAP, PINR, PINS, MARR, PGOV, PREL, IZ, Parliament 
SUBJECT: EVALUATING MINDEF DULAME 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission David M. Satterfield for reasons 
 
 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C)Summary. After seventy five days on the job, Minister 
of Defense (MoD) Sadoun al-Dulame, one of six Sunnis 
appointed to cabinet-level positions in the Shi'a-dominated 
government, still seems committed to achieving the objectives 
he established when he became minister. Those objectives 
include defeating the insurgency as the ministry's top 
priority; rooting out corruption at the ministry; making the 
ministry a unified, professional organization, based on 
clearly-established policies and procedures; and unraveling 
the ministry's budget challenges. Since his first day in 
office, Dulame has made clear that achieving his goals will 
be very difficult. He expects to stumble and to create 
hostility, as well as to face political pressure, but vows to 
persist and succeed. Dulame has stressed that his duty as an 
Iraqi, not as a Sunni, is to build a competent and 
sustainable military force capable of protecting all Iraqis. 
He has made clear that he supports and needs the Coalition 
and seems to appreciate Coalition 
guidance. 
 
2. (C) Summary, cont. Most persons interviewed for this cable 
rate Dulame's overall performance good and a marked 
improvement over that of MoD Shalan, his predecessor. All 
agreed Dulame is a hard worker. However, some people say he 
is a micromanager; that he is too much of a thinker, and not 
enough of a doer; and that he is not using his Sunni 
affiliation to full effect. Critics who raise these concerns 
fear that Dulame's shortcomings could undermine his ability 
to build a competent Iraqi armed force capable of defeating 
the insurgents, thus allowing for the withdrawal of Coalition 
Forces. Despite his weaknesses, Dulame has demonstrated 
strengths. The USG should do all it can to support this 
important Sunni in the Iraqi government. End summary. 
 
------------------------ 
Defeating the Insurgency 
------------------------ 
 
3. (C) On his first day at work as Defense Minister, Dulame 
announced to his staff that defeating the insurgency would be 
his first priority. Since then, he has taken several steps 
that show he means what he said. Dulame understands, for 
example, that solving the many problems afflicting the people 
of al Anbar, a western province accounting for a third of 
Iraq, is key to defeating the current phase of the 
insurgency. His deployment of Iraq's operational reserve to 
al Anbar and his standing up the remaining two brigades of 
the Iraqi Army Seventh Division at al Anbar exemplify his 
commitment to fighting the 
insurgency at its core. 
 
4. (C) Despite criticism, Dulame has publicly expressed the 
ministry's continued need for and support of Coalition 
Forces, stating that the Iraqi Armed Forces would fail in 
their task without the Coalition. He meets with Coalition 
leaders regularly and listens respectfully to advice offered, 
but occasionally rejects it and then makes his own decisions. 
(Comment. According to Iraq Reconstruction Management Office 
(IRMO) advisors, Dulame has been surprised by how much advice 
he has been receiving from the Multi-National Coalition, and 
sometimes finds it overbearing. Dulame does speak English 
well, but it is difficult for him to understand American 
metaphors and slang. IRMO advisors think Dulame might be more 
engaging if his interlocutors were to speak to him directly 
using fewer American idiomatic expressions. End comment.) 
 
5. (C) On May 27, Dulame held a joint press conference with 
Shi'ite Interior Minister Baqir Jabr to announce the launch 
of Operation al Barq (Lightning), a counter-insurgency 
operation carried out in Baghdad by what the two ministers 
estimated to be 40,000 MoD and Ministry of Interior (MoI) 
personnel. Dulame stated that "unprecedented strict security 
measures" would be seen, that security cordons would make it 
"impossible for terrorists" to move freely, and that 
Operation Lightning would reverse the Iraqi army's posture 
"from the defensive to offensive."  The Coalition leadership 
was pleased with the joint pronouncement, and has requested 
more joint and individual public appearances to demonstrate 
ISF progress. Dulame has made two other press statements, 
both with the MoI, but does not appear enthusiastic about 
such events. (Comment. Some observers believe he fears a 
negative Sunni response; others think Dulame simply shuns the 
spotlight, believing that public appearances should be 
reserved for critical moments. Other reports indicate that 
Interior Minister Jabr has to be cajoled into making public 
appearances along with Dulame. Jabr has made clear in private 
that he is not a fan of Dulame and thinks he is ineffective. 
End comment.) 
 
---------------------------------- 
The Sunni Effect on the Insurgency 
---------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) Post has hopes that Dulame will show himself to be a 
key Sunni leader capable of influencing other Sunnis to leave 
the 
insurgency and engage in the political process. Dulame meets 
regularly with local Sunni leaders, including imams and 
sheikhs who come often to the Ministry to discuss security 
concerns. According to IRMO advisors, the local Sunni 
leaders' primary requests generally revolve around the 
release of detainees and permission to establish local 
militias. Dulame 
perforce explains that the Iraqi judicial system must handle 
the former, and that the ITG and the TAL outlaw the latter. 
Informal interviews with a cross-section of Baghdad's 
citizens suggest that many respect Dulame, and believe 
security has improved in Baghdad since his arrival. They 
largely attribute this progress to the Iraqi army, not the 
Iraqi police. (Comment. This conclusion may simply reflect 
the Iraqis traditional positive view of the military, not a 
real comparison of security force effectiveness. End comment.) 
 
7. (C) Coalition leaders believe Dulame could do more to 
reach out to the Sunni populace, and could be a more 
influential spokesman. In early June, LTG Robin Brims 
(British Deputy Commanding General of Multinational 
Force-Iraq), British Ambassador Patey, and DCM Satterfield 
had asked Dulame to go to Tal Afar to state publicly that 
Operation Veterans Forward was directed against terrorists, 
not Sunnis. In late June, LTG Brims repeated the request. 
Dulame demurred both times, saying only that he would "think 
about it". IRMO personnel averred that Dulame was not against 
the idea, but wanted to wait until after his travels to 
Brussels and Iran to make a public appearance and statement. 
Dulame went to Tal Afar with MNF-I's General Casey on July 18 
to meet the troops and assess the progress; there was no 
public statement. 
 
8. (C) Dulame does not appear interested in playing Iraqi 
politics. He seems determined to make decisions based on what 
he believes is best for the nation, not for a particular 
group or specific individual. He has avoided the appearance 
of being a tool of the Shi'a, balancing this by not leaning 
too far in the direction of his Sunni constituency. There 
does not appear to have been special privileges given to 
Sunnis in MoD or in the military during Dulame's tenure. But 
Dulame's individualism does not always play well with other 
Iraqi leaders, however. The Interior Minister Jabr has made 
clear that he does not believe Dulame is a team player. Prime 
Minister Jafari seemed taken aback when Dulame went to Iran 
on his own accord recently, even after Dulame had gotten word 
that he could have gone to Iran with the PM. Dulame's trip to 
Iran, his statement of apologies for the Iraq-Iran war, and 
his continued emphasis that "I am Iraqi, not a Sunni" has 
irritated several influential Sunni leaders and citizens. 
(Comment. 
 While not showing partisanship is good in many ways, some 
persons fear that Dulame may be increasingly isolating 
himself in ways that will ultimately affect his ability to 
lead the MoD. End comment.) 
 
------------------- 
Fighting Corruption 
------------------- 
 
9. (C) The MoD seems rife with corruption, a problem that may 
have intensified under the last administration. While it is a 
tremendous challenge to "clean house", Dulame has already 
made headway. He was behind the dismissal of the MoD Director 
General (DG) for Acquisition, Logistics, and Infrastructure. 
After the dismissed DG's personal secretary was found 
attempting to break into the former DG's sealed office trying 
to steal files, the secretary was also fired. The former DG 
is under investigation by the Iraqi Government for 
corruption. Although the charge against him involves the 
purchase of uniforms, he is also suspected of having signed 
many bad contracts, including a deal with Poland for 48 MI8 
helicopters and 30 Sokol helicopters (estimated value, $400 
million). (Comment.  Although the Iraqi Air Force needs 
helicopters, the number ordered exceeds requirements, and the 
type of helicopters was not approved by the MoD. Dulame may 
have unsuccessfully requested the Polish Ambassador's help to 
cancel or reneg 
otiate the contract. End comment.) 
 
10. (C) Part of Dulame's strategy against corruption is a 
policy that he personally review and sign all contracts below 
$3.0 million, regardless of how small. (The Prime Minister 
approves all contracts over $3.0 million.)  Some people 
believe the review is necessary, given the risk of 
corruption, the current contracting problems, and the 
uncertainty surrounding the MoD budget. Others believe that 
such "micromanagement" will further strain the troubled 
operations in the field and intensify the lack of trust 
within the ministry. IRMO advisors claim that stacks of 
contracts stood waiting for signature or funding even before 
this requirement took effect. 
 
11. (C) Dulame's actions, while well intentioned, have not 
always improved the situation.  Vendors have walked off the 
job while others have threatened legal action. During the 
third week in July, after being unpaid by the MoD for three 
months, a local caterer ceased delivery of food to the Iraqi 
Army's Second Brigade, which was recently assigned 
responsibility for securing northeastern Baghdad. Another 
vendor to whom MoD is in arrears suspended its trash and 
sanitation service to the Iraqi Army's Muthana base a few 
kilometers west of the International Zone. The MoD's 
persistent failure to meet contractual obligations, 
especially for logistics and life support, will adversely 
impact unit readiness and erode ISF support for the 
government. Likewise, Coalition-provided replacement funding 
for life support adversely affects the MOD and MNSTC-I plan 
to field the Iraqi Security Forces. (Minister Dulame affirms 
that one of his highest priorities is care for soldiers, 
which includes life support. He has given orders 
 to pay the bills; orders that have not been fully 
implemented.) 
 
------------------------------------ 
Establishing a Professional Ministry 
------------------------------------ 
 
12. (C) Dulame's agenda includes establishing a professional, 
unified ministry with established and well-documented 
processes and procedures.  According to the IRMO-MoD chief 
advisor, Dulame's first impression of the ministry was 
"chaotic". Noting the poor work ethic in 
time of crisis, he quickly charged each director general with 
getting his staff to work by 0800 every day. (Since many 
staff members sleep at the MoD as a safety precaution, this 
order has been "implemented."). The Minister also charged 
each DG with briefing him on his role, policies, plans, and 
challenges. Some of the information will be used to develop 
action plans within three months. 
 
13. (C) Through many of his actions, Dulame is sending a 
strong message about the need for a positive work ethic. 
Persons willing to work hard will be heartened by this, but 
he may fail to attract even these followers if he continues 
to micromanage and show little trust in his staff. (Comment. 
A sign of the minister's lack of confidence in his staff was 
his recent designation of General Babakir (Commander of the 
Iraqi Armed Forces) to serve as Secretary General 
(traditionally a civilian position) while the incumbent takes 
leave. While this action reflected Dulame's trust in at least 
one senior military leader, it also made evident his distrust 
of many of his civilian subordinates. End comment.) 
 
14. (C) Establishing a professional work force sometimes 
entails also getting rid of dead wood. Dulame has initiated a 
comprehensive review of the payroll. Although perhaps only 
symbolically significant, he has terminated the salaries of 
28 personal advisors who were hired by the former minister. 
While on the books as employees, they could not be located 
during work hours. 
 
15. (C) To reduce the potential for more bad decisions, 
Dulame has restructured the three bodies responsible for 
identifying and approving acquisition requirements. 
Previously, about two-thirds of the requirements council were 
senior civil servants, while the others were mid-level 
military officers. The military-civilian ratio has been 
roughly reversed and all council members are now of 
equivalent rank. Dulame also named himself chairperson of the 
approval body. Dulame took into consideration ethnicity and 
religion. (Comment. The real issue is not the civil-military 
or ethnic mix; it is acquisition transparency. It can best be 
assured 
by marginal changes to the various committees, not by making 
every acquisition decision one the Minister must make. End 
comment.)  Dulame also approved a proposal to send an Iraqi 
delegation to various countries in an attempt to renegotiate 
contracts let under the previous administration. The value of 
these contracts approximates $1.2 billion. 
 
---------- 
MoD Budget 
---------- 
 
16. (C) Dulame is trying to get a fix on the ministry's 
budget. He inherited the 2005 budget, which was initially 
$1.3 billion. Perhaps because the ministry's officials are 
not sure about the budget figures, they have not been 
forthcoming about what is left in the budget for 2005. The 
current budget must fund at least salaries.  The ministry is 
also being asked to assume gradual responsibility for life 
support (food, water, waste removal, etc.) in 2005. In the 
near future, the Iraqi government will have to assume all 
operations and maintenance costs, and later, acquisition, 
construction and all other costs. Many observers believe that 
the current budget cannot sustain the existing force 
structure and doubt that MoD will be granted the necessary 
funds in the next few years to cover essential costs. 
 
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Outlook 
------- 
 
17. (C) Despite the many challenges facing Dulame, the 
outlook at MOD is much better than it was during the previous 
minister's tenure. Dulame's anti-corruption measures may slow 
down bureaucratic processes, but the measures may eventually 
help develop a trusted core of bureaucrats who will share his 
vision and help him build the professional and honest 
ministry he desires and Iraq needs. He may not always be able 
to produce the desired results, but Dulame can be trusted to 
follow through when he gives his word. His emphasis on making 
his "own" 
decisions and "being an Iraqi not a Sunni" is positive, even 
if not without consequence. Some critics believe his 
individualism is isolating him from other key Iraqi leaders 
and the Iraqi citizenry. Despite his possible shortfalls, 
Dulame has demonstrated strengths; the USG should do 
everything possible to support this important Sunni 
representative of 
the Iraqi government. 
Khalilzad