US embassy cable - 02KATHMANDU1797

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NEPAL: MAOIST STRIKE GENERALLY OBSERVED IN KATHMANDU VALLEY

Identifier: 02KATHMANDU1797
Wikileaks: View 02KATHMANDU1797 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Kathmandu
Created: 2002-09-16 12:13:00
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Tags: PTER ASEC PGOV NP Maoist Insurgency
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001797 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS AND DS/OP/NEA 
LONDON FOR POL - RIEDEL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER, ASEC, PGOV, NP, Maoist Insurgency 
SUBJECT: NEPAL:  MAOIST STRIKE GENERALLY OBSERVED IN 
KATHMANDU VALLEY 
 
REF: KATHMANDU 1693 AND PREVIOUS 
 
--------------------------- 
SHOPS CLOSED; VEHICLES IDLE 
---------------------------- 
 
1.  (U) The general strike, or "bandh," called by Maoist 
insurgents nationwide for September 16 appeared to have been 
generally observed in the Kathmandu metropolitan area.  Only 
about five percent of the shops along main thoroughfares in 
the city opened (although some along less-traveled side 
streets defied the ban), and few private vehicles--with the 
exception of a rare motorcycle or two--were observed plying 
the streets.  Even government vehicles, which had made a 
point of traveling the roads during the five-day strike in 
April, this time seemed few and far between.  Foot traffic, 
however, was heavy, and many Kathmanduites appeared to spend 
the day sitting in front of their shuttered homes and shops, 
chatting.  Sources in the adjoining cities of Patan and 
Bhaktapur reported a similar drop in traffic.  A quick 
telephone survey of five districts in different parts of the 
country revealed that while some shops in district 
headquarters had opened, private vehicles--including 
long-distance buses--were not operating. 
 
------------- 
GENERAL CALM; 
SOME BOMBS 
------------- 
 
2.  (U)  The streets of Kathmandu and adjoining cities were 
generally reported calm throughout the day.  Early in the 
morning two bombs exploded in neighboring Bhaktapur, but no 
casualties were reported.  Security personnel defused another 
would-be early-morning bomb near the entrance to a boys' 
school in adjoining Lalitpur.  One suspect was apprehended 
after attempting to place a bomb near a popular Kathmandu 
hotel at 6:00 a.m. September 16.  A mid-day report over 
Nepali radio that authorities had apprehended a suicide 
bomber proved to be fictitious. 
 
3.  (U) The preceding day bombs were found at five different 
locations across Kathmandu.  Two of the bombs exploded, one 
less than a kilometer from the British Embassy.  (The 
suspected target was a dairy corporation building; no 
injuries were reported.)  Another explosive, placed near a 
police post, injured five when it detonated. 
 
-------- 
COMMENT 
-------- 
 
4.  (SBU) That the September 16 strike seems to have been 
better observed, at least in the Kathmandu Valley, by a 
greater portion of the general public than previous bandhs 
over the past year may be attributed to several factors. 
First, the two weeks preceding the bandh witnessed 
intensified Maoist activity, particularly in the form of 
scattered improvised explosive devices, within Kathmandu 
proper (Reftel).  Second, the insurgents' surprise attacks on 
a police post and a district headquarters in different parts 
of the country, in which more than 100 members of the 
security forces were killed, undoubtedly scared people lulled 
into a false sense of security by the monsoon moratorium on 
hostilities.  Third, the Maoists recently have stepped up 
violent activities against civilian targets--usually 
local-level political figures in rural areas--in an effort to 
discourage participation in upcoming national elections. 
Finally--and perhaps most decisive--was the Government of 
Nepal (GON) approach to the bandh this time.  Before the 
April bandh, the GON launched a public relations offensive 
against the strike, pledging openly to provide security to 
any business that opened and encouraging private vehicles to 
defy the bandh by running government-plated vehicles up and 
down the streets.  This time, however, the GON made a 
conscious decision to adopt a low-profile reaction in order 
to deny the insurgents any additional publicity for their 
effort.  But absent any clear signal from the GON, this time 
many business owners apparently decided not to take a chance 
and remained closed.  We expect the Maoists to tout the high 
observance of the bandh as a victory. 
MALINOWSKI 

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