US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD3086

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003086 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2025 
TAGS: PGOV, KDEM, IZ, Sunni Arab, National Assembly 
SUBJECT: CONSTITUTIONAL DRAFTING:  SUNNIS BACK ON BOARD, 
BUT NOT ON SAME PAGE 
 
REF: BAGHDAD 3018 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Robert S. Ford. 
Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary.  Sunni members of the Constitutional 
Drafting Committee have said their group will return 
to negotiations on July 26.  Internal divisions in the 
Sunni Arab group of 15 are growing.  The National 
Dialogue Council spokesman wants a UN role in the 
investigation of slain colleagues, while Iraqi Islamic 
Party officials pour over constitutional drafts and 
engage in coalition building efforts with former Prime 
Minister Allawi.  National Dialogue appears to have 
better relations with Masoud Barzani and reports SRSG 
Qazi will hold a meeting to bring Kurds, Sunni and 
"some Shia" together to cut a deal.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (C) Constitutional Drafting Committee member and 
Spokesman for the hard-line National Dialogue Council, 
Dr. Saleh Mutlak appeared temporarily satisfied with a 
statement from Transitional National Assembly (TNA) 
Speaker Hajim al Hassani regarding the investigation 
of the deaths of fellow drafters.  Mutlak did not 
fully commit to returning to negotiations on the 
constitution until the group of drafters met and 
endorsed the statement.  While he suggested there was 
a 99.9 percent chance his group would approve and vote 
to return to the process, all needed the opportunity 
to discuss and make their voices heard.  Initially, 
Mutlak said the Sunni drafters would not hold this 
meeting until July 26, and afterward GO to the TNA for 
a 12 PM meeting.  When pressed by PolOff and UK 
Embassy personnel, Mutlak agreed to hold the meeting 
the afternoon of July 25 so as not to lose more time 
in resuming their critical work. 
 
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Breaking of an Impasse: 
Progress on the International Investigation 
------------------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) Mutlak provided a copy of the Hassani 
statement that indicated, as ordered by the Council of 
Ministers, an independent judicial investigation into 
the assassinations.  The letter reserved the right of 
the investigators to draw upon "international 
assistance."  Mutlak wants UN involvement -- at 
minimum a statement -- to demonstrate the seriousness 
of producing results in the search for Mujbil Shaykh 
al Issa and Dhamim Hussein Aleiwi al Obeidi's killers. 
The statement also condemned the attack upon "the 
forces absent from the election" as an act of 
terrorism that was "targeting the constitutional 
process" in Iraq. 
 
----------------- 
Bridging the Gaps 
----------------- 
 
4.  (C) Mutlak said he received a call from Masoud 
Barzani on July 24 urging him to attend a meeting 
organized by United Nations Special Representative of 
the Secretary General Ashraf Qazi.  The meeting will 
include Kurdish and "some Shia" negotiators.  Mutlak 
claimed he was contacted by Muqtada al-Sadr 
supporters, who expressed their opposition to language 
in the constitution allowing the creation of a 
southern regional government.  (A top UN political 
aide here told us July 25 that SRSG Qazi would host a 
meeting of Sunni Arabs and Kurds but mainly as a way 
of breaking the ice and helping the negotiators 
establish better informal, serious communication.) 
Mutlak, amid dozens of phone calls, briefly told 
Poloff July 25 that federalism could only be feasible 
after two to four years, changing tack slightly to say 
the debate on federalism should be postponed for four 
years. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
IIP Role: More Focused, More Pragmatic? 
--------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) The Iraqi Islamic Party's Ayad Samarra'i told 
Poloff July 25 that the Sunni negotiators would be 
back at the table at 12 PM on July 26.  He said they 
had continued to work -- even through the suspension - 
- on analyzing the draft and composing counter- 
proposals.  He had heard little about the proposed 
'constitutional summit,' and mentioned nothing about 
the Qazi gathering.  Samarra'i said IIP leadership met 
with former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi on July 24 to 
discuss forming a common front.  (Comment:  Allawi 
separately confirmed this to us July 25.  End 
Comment.)  The IIP, according to Samarra'i, would be 
better served by running on its own ticket but is open 
to forming a coalition government with Allawi after 
December's elections.  The key to future cooperation, 
he said, is agreement now on a mutually acceptable 
program.  He also dismissed forming an alliance with 
Vice President Ghazi al-Yawar, noting Yawar had lost 
(through inaction) what little political base he had 
commanded in the January 30 elections. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Kirkuk Requires a Long-term Solution 
------------------------------------ 
 
6.  (C) Sammara'i, who was raised in Kirkuk until 
middle school age, reiterated his opposition to a 
(allegedly Kurdish imposed) push for hasty resolution 
of the Kirkuk issue.  He argued for the formation of a 
multi-ethnic administrative body but he would not 
specify whether at the municipal or provincial level. 
In a lowered tone, Samarra'i observed while Talabani 
appears closer to the thinking of Sunni Arabs in terms 
of delaying a final resolution (see ref, for example). 
However, what Talabani tells them does not correspond 
with what Kurds on the constitutional drafting 
committee are saying.  Sammara'i said that Allawi 
supported the IIP's approach to promoting multi-ethnic 
governance for the troubled city.  He suggested slates 
comprising three Kurds, three Turkmen, three Arabs and 
one Christian should compete in an election.  In the 
meantime, Kirkuk must be granted "special status" as a 
mixed city. 
 
7.  (C) Comment.  Strains in the cohesion of the Sunni 
drafters are again growing.  As of a week ago, nearly 
all interloctutors were speaking with one voice.  At 
present, Mutlak is consumed with the issue of the 
investigation into the assassination of his fellow 
National Dialogue members and, to a lesser extent, 
badges for the two new additions to the Committee, as 
well as the four experts.  Mutlak said he had received 
a copy of the constitution but had left it in the room 
where he had been meeting with Speaker Hassani.  In 
stark contrast to Samarra'i, he avoids any in-depth 
discussion of the provisions of the draft.  Instead, 
he is focusing on the public perception of the Sunni 
role.  Samarra'i exhibits little -- if any -- concern 
about the investigation and has been working 
diligently, if independently from the other Sunni 
Arabs, on Islamic Party adjustments to the draft.  If 
a Sunni Arab common agenda exists, they need develop 
and explain it promptly.  We are not sure such a 
common agenda exists, and we also are not sure that 
National Dialog people like Salah Mutlak ultimately 
want to find it and negotiate it with the other 
constitution drafters.  End Comment. 
 
8.  (U) REO HILLA, REO BASRA, REO MOSUL, and REO 
KIRKUK, minimize considered. 
 
 
Khalilzad