US embassy cable - 05BOGOTA6914

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SCENESETTER FOR UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS R. NICHOLAS BURNS

Identifier: 05BOGOTA6914
Wikileaks: View 05BOGOTA6914 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Bogota
Created: 2005-07-25 14:42:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PTER SNAR PREL PGOV PHUM CO
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BOGOTA 006914 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2015 
TAGS: PTER, SNAR, PREL, PGOV, PHUM, CO 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL 
AFFAIRS R. NICHOLAS BURNS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
------------ 
Introduction 
------------ 
 
1. (C) President Uribe and the Embassy welcome the visit of 
Undersecretary for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns with 
enthusiasm.  Current hot topics include: 
 
--U.S. support in out years 
 
--Demobilization and reinsertion of almost 6,000 paramilitary 
terrorists and several thousand more expected 
 
--Human rights 
 
--Growing concern about Venezuela 
 
--Military progress and Plan Patriota 
 
--Record-breaking drug eradication and seizures 
 
--Status of U.S. hostages 
 
--Free Trade Agreement negotiations 
 
--Judicial reform 
 
--Presidential re-election 
 
------------ 
U.S. Support 
------------ 
 
2. (C) Colombia faces a four front war -- narcos, FARC, ELN, 
paramilitaries -- and a growing concern about Venezuela.  It 
is fighting each of the fronts with a slightly different mix 
of political, military, and police measures, all of which are 
expensive and at times controversial.  The GOC will be 
looking for private and public reaffirmation of sustained 
U.S. support, including financial support.  Requested U.S. 
assistance tops $556 million in FY06, plus a number of other 
agency operating accounts, continuing the steady decline from 
about $602 million in FY03.  The Colombian security forces 
face serious helicopter shortages for counter-drug and 
counter-terrorism operations and struggle to afford 
maintenance, pilot training, and other support.  President 
Uribe and newly appointed Defense Minister Camilo Ospina may 
ask for additional Blackhawk helicopters and increased 
intelligence sharing to help the military kill or capture a 
high value target. 
 
------------------------------ 
Demobilization and Reinsertion 
------------------------------ 
 
3. (C) The GOC has requested U.S. aid for the demobilization 
and reinsertion process for the paramilitaries, especially 
for securing the areas formerly dominated by the 
paramilitaries.  Although DOJ recently determined that 
certain USAID assistance programs for demobilization and 
reinsertion would not be in violation of the Patriot Act, we 
are still consulting with Congress.  In the meantime, the GOC 
program reflects the lack of U.S. input. 
 
4. (C) Since 2003, nearly 6,000 paramilitaries (AUC) have 
demobilized collectively and another 7,000 from all illegal 
armed groups have deserted.  The GOC is confident that the 
remaining 10,000 paramilitaries will demobilize by the end of 
2005.  But they have no place to go.  The program is 
under-funded and the OAS verification chief has issued an 
international call for help.  Although the Netherlands, 
Sweden, and Ireland are providing modest bilateral 
assistance, the EU refuses to help, partly at the behest of 
NGOs, who have criticized the recently passed demobilization 
law for being soft on paramilitaries.  The controversial 
"Justice and Peace" law passed Congress on June 22 and was 
signed by the President on July 22.  It calls for five to 
eight years in jail, no benefits for intentionally concealed 
crimes, and guarantees reparations to victims.  Although not 
perfect, if implemented correctly, it will dismantle the AUC, 
provide for peace with justice, safeguard extradition, and 
create mechanisms for demobilization and reinsertion of 
ex-terrorists.  The U.S. has urged the GOC to begin 
implementation immediately, especially in a few exemplary 
cases, to demonstrate commitment to holding the 
paramilitaries accountable for their crimes.  Your visit is 
another opportunity to reiterate the point. 
 
5. (C) In a related peace process, the ELN rejected Mexican 
facilitation on April 18, ostensibly over the GOM's vote 
against Cuba at the UN Commission on Human Rights.  We 
believe that the FARC influenced the ELN to end the talks and 
that the ELN will engage in "forum shopping" to find a more 
pliable facilitator.  In early July, a Colombian Senator 
claimed that former Spanish President Felipe Gonzalez had 
offered to be mediator, but the Governments of Colombia or 
Spain have not confirmed this.  The FARC has steadily refused 
peace talks or an acceptable humanitarian prisoner exchange. 
A French mission, with GOC knowledge, recently met with a 
FARC senior commander to secure the release of FARC hostages, 
including dual French-Colombian citizen and former 
presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt. 
 
------------ 
Human Rights 
------------ 
 
6. (C) The Uribe Administration continues to make progress in 
human rights, but needs to do more to ensure accountability, 
strengthen the military justice system, break military ties 
to paramilitary groups, and end corruption.  Human Rights 
certification is pending.  Your visit will be an opportunity 
to review human rights issues with GOC officials and press 
for the strongest possible case for certification. 
Misunderstandings over the Justice and Peace demobilization 
law and continued attention to the February 2005 massacre in 
San Jose de Apartado have complicated the climate for 
certification on the Hill.  In addition to recent positive 
steps on the Cajamarca and Arauca cases, the GOC recently 
issued a useful statement on the Santo Domingo case.  You 
should press for further GOC action, including convoking a 
meeting with NGOs here in Colombia to explain the justice and 
peace law, and publicizing a chronology of GOC actions and a 
statement of intentions regarding San Jose de Apartado. 
 
7. (C) The vast majority of human rights crimes are 
attributable to the illegal armed groups; e.g., in the second 
week of April 300 FARC attacked an Indian village, killing a 
number of civilians and local police.  The government has a 
difficult but active dialogue with NGOs, the United Nations, 
and foreign governments.  Human rights training is mandatory 
for all members of the military and police.  The Embassy vets 
all units that receive U.S. assistance, in accordance with 
the Leahy Amendment.  In 2004, homicides fell by 16 percent, 
kidnappings by 42 percent, and forced displacements by 37 
percent. 
 
--------- 
Venezuela 
--------- 
 
8. (C) Colombia remains concerned about Venezuela's arms 
build-up, and is tempted to divert needed resources away from 
counter-drug and counter-terror priorities.  You should 
encourage regional counter-terror and counter-drug 
cooperation, a major theme of March's summit among Presidents 
Chavez, Lula, Zapatero, and Uribe.  Colombia has proposed a 
closer bilateral defense relationship as a partial solution 
to what they perceive as Venezuela's threat. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Military Progress and Plan Patriota 
----------------------------------- 
 
9. (C) Plan Patriota: The military's multi-phased campaign 
plan to re-take areas dominated by the FARC is entering its 
third year and focused on traditional FARC strongholds in 
southeastern Colombia.  The FARC are being pressured 
militarily and financially, but the logistical strain of 
keeping 15,500 troops in the dense, hostile jungle, hundreds 
of miles from their supply bases, is a huge challenge.  The 
priority for DOD funding is to provide assistance for forces 
involved in Plan Patriota.  President Uribe has continually 
pressured the military to kill or capture a senior FARC 
member.  Upon being named Defense Minister on July 8, Camilo 
Ospina sought Embassy advice on how to best go after high 
value targets and make the most of U.S. assistance.  Ospina 
has served as Uribe's legal adviser and been a solid Embassy 
contact. 
10. (C) FARC violence in the first seven months of 2005, 
although tactically aggressive, remained localized and below 
2004 levels.  The FARC attacked indigenous towns, a meeting 
of rural councilman, electrical towers and rural highways in 
addition to military and police outposts.  The attacks were 
partially directed at military targets and to divert 
resources from Plan Patriota, but civilians were also 
indiscriminately killed.  On June 26, for instance, a 
contingent of 250-300 FARC members attacked an army outpost, 
killing 21 and wounding another 11. 
----------------------------- 
Drug Eradication/Interdiction 
----------------------------- 
11. (C) Cooperation with Colombia remains excellent, 
complicated at times by the competition for scarce 
helicopters between the counter-terror and counter-drug 
priorities.  Eradication and interdiction are at record 
levels.  Over 92,000 hectares of coca and 1,000 hectares of 
opium poppy have been sprayed since the beginning of the year 
and 8,000 hectares of coca and poppy were manually 
eradicated.  In 2004, over 136,000 hectares of coca and 3,000 
hectares of poppy were sprayed, and almost 200 metric tons of 
cocaine and cocaine base were seized inside Colombia.  Ground 
fire against spray planes is below 2003 levels but remains 
problematic. 
 
------------- 
U.S. Hostages 
------------- 
 
12. (C) The three U.S. contractors captured by the FARC in 
February 2003 are now the longest U.S. terror captives in the 
world.  Their safe release continues to be one of our top 
priorities.  The Colombians are providing full assistance. 
They have assured us that our hostages will be included in 
any humanitarian exchange and have done their best to avoid 
military operations that might unnecessarily jeopardize the 
hostages. 
 
---------------------------- 
Free Trade Agreement/Economy 
---------------------------- 
 
13. (U) Tremendous gains in security have helped the 
Colombian economy.  In 2004, Colombia's gross domestic 
product (GDP) increased by 4.1 percent to nearly USD 90.8 
billion. Colombian exports grew 26 percent in 200 to USD 16 
billion.  Exports to the U.S. grew by USD 1 billion.  The 
Colombian Congress recently passed a pension reform package 
that will improve the long-term sustainability of the 
country's retirement system.  Although the International 
Monetary Fund has recommended that Colombia revamp its tax 
system, fiscal reform was not addressed during this session 
of Congress.  Unemployment remains high at 12 percent, but 
the rate has been declining since the beginning of the Uribe 
administration. 
 
14. (U) The tenth round of negotiations toward a free trade 
agreement with Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru took place in 
Ecuador in March.  The talks are progressing slowly, with 
agricultural issues representing the biggest stumbling block. 
 As the Colombian political season approaches, negotiators 
are concerned that significant delays in completing the 
agreement this year could put the FTA on hold until late 
2006, at the earliest. 
 
--------------- 
Judicial Reform 
--------------- 
 
15. (C) The U.S.-backed switch to an oral trial system has 
been successful.  The Colombian military justice system, 
however, is unreformed, giving rise to justified accusations 
of impunity in selected cases.  In March, the military 
submitted a "shock" reform package to Congress as the first 
step towards streamlining military justice.  You should press 
for more rapid, effective progress with newly installed 
Minister of Defense Ospina. 
 
----------------------- 
Presidential Reelection 
----------------------- 
 
16. (C) Congressional elections will take place next March; 
presidential elections next May.  The Constitutional Court 
will rule on the possibility of presidential re-election in 
September; the outcome is uncertain.  Positioning relating to 
the elections is dominating and confusing politics.  If Uribe 
can run, he will win.  He is above 65 percent approval in 
polls.  We expect that, if it is not Uribe, all candidates 
will take a leaf from his book by trying to combine security 
with social issues.  If he cannot run, Uribe will play an 
important role in anointing his successor. 
WOOD 

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