US embassy cable - 05ASUNCION935

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PARAGUAY ON OAS GENERAL ASSEMBLY CONTROL AND SECURITY GUIDELINES ON MANPADS

Identifier: 05ASUNCION935
Wikileaks: View 05ASUNCION935 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Asuncion
Created: 2005-07-25 14:25:00
Classification: SECRET//NOFORN
Tags: PARM MASS EAIR ETTC PREL PTER PA OAS
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ASUNCION 000935 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
STATE FOR WHA, PM AND NP 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR LAC/AA 
NSC FOR SUE CRONIN 
SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD DAN JOHNSON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2015 
TAGS: PARM, MASS, EAIR, ETTC, PREL, PTER, PA, OAS 
SUBJECT: PARAGUAY ON OAS GENERAL ASSEMBLY CONTROL AND 
SECURITY GUIDELINES ON MANPADS 
 
REF: A. STATE 113041 
     B. ASUNCION 00767 
     C. ASUNCION PA IIR 6 875 0030 05 AND PRECEDING 
     D. ASUNCION PA IIR 6 875 0006 05 AND PRECEDING 
     E. ASUNCION PA IIR 6 875 0033 04 
     F. 04 ASUNCION 00099 AND PRECEDING 
 
Classified By: PolOff Mark A. Stamilio, reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
1. (S/NF) Summary: Embassy has no information to suggest that 
there are MANPADs in Paraguay, within or outside of 
government control.  However, the lack of import/export 
controls on arms, corruption within the military, other 
government agencies and Paraguayan society in general, and 
known FARC activity in the region make it impossible to rule 
out the possibility that MANPADs exist in or transit through 
Paraguay.  End Summary. 
 
2. (S/NF) Paraguay has a long history as a major trafficking 
route for contraband of all sorts, including weapons, 
particularly through the tri-border area (TBA).  The FARC, 
for one, smuggles weapons and ammunition through the Southern 
Cone of South America, particularly through Paraguay, on well 
established trafficking routes.  Weapons are traded for 
Colombian cocaine in the TBA and Paraguay's northern Chaco 
region, and some weapons stolen from the Paraguayan military 
have been seized from FARC guerrillas in Colombia.  (Comment: 
If the FARC were trying to acquire MANPADs, it is conceivable 
that they would transport them through Paraguay on these 
established trafficking routes.  End Comment.) 
 
3. (S/NF) There are over 100 registered weapons and 
ammunition dealers in Paraguay, and countless smaller, 
unregistered businesses that deal in weapons and ammunition. 
Most of these businesses purport to sell their wares for 
hunting purposes, but it is widely known that a large 
percentage of them buy and sell a wide range of illegal 
weapons and ammunition.  Many of the businesses are owned by 
Chinese, Middle Easterners and Brazilians, as well as 
Paraguayans. 
 
4. (S/NF) EmbOffs are aware of several shipments of supposed 
hunting weapons and ammunition that exceeded 40 tons each. 
(Comment: It is not credible that a country with a population 
of 6.3 million and an official per capita GDP of only USD 
1,100 would import such quantities of legitimate hunting 
weapons and ammunition.  End Comment.)  Because there are no 
restrictions on the quantities of weapons and ammunition 
imported or exported from the country, such shipments are not 
inspected and clear customs with ease.  The shipping 
documents are routinely falsified, and corrupt customs 
officials facilitate entry and exit of the contraband. 
 
5. (S/NF) Once in the country, weapons and ammunition are 
typically stored at a Paraguayan Navy depot or the facilities 
of the Paraguayan military's Directorate of War Materiel 
(DIMABEL).  Corrupt military officials collect bribes in 
exchange for the protection they provide for the contraband. 
Among others, the Commander of the Paraguayan Presidential 
Escort Regiment, Colonel Heriberto Galeano Rojas, has been 
rumored to be involved in the scheme (ref C). 
 
6. (C) Other military officials have been caught trafficking 
high-caliber weapons stolen from the Paraguayan armed forces. 
 In one such case, Air Force LtCol Enrique Sarubbi Flores was 
convicted of attempting to leave a military base with a 
50-caliber machine gun in the trunk of his car while 
conducting his duties as Officer of the Day (refs D and F). 
 
7. (C) Admiral Julio Cesar Baez Acosta, who until recently 
served as the Commander of the Paraguayan Navy, has a 1986 
U.S. District Court conviction for attempting to illegally 
export ammunition from the United States on board the 
Paraguayan Navy vessel he skippered at the time (ref E). 
Baez was replaced as Commander of the Navy in June 2005 amid 
rumors that he was involved in corruption at the Navy's 
repair facility (ref B). 
 
8. (S/NF) In this environment, it impossible to rule out the 
possibility that MANPADs exist in or transit through 
Paraguay.  However, Embassy has no information to suggest 
that there are MANPADs in Paraguay, within or outside of GOP 
control. 
KEANE 

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