US embassy cable - 05COLOMBO1291

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001291 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, EAID, PGOV, CE, NO, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT SAYS GOVERNMENT WILL ABIDE BY CEASEFIRE, 
ASKS FOR LTTE TO DO SAME 
 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD FOR REASON 1.4 (D). 
 
 This cable contains an action request - see para 7. 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY: Co-chairs told President Kumaratunga 
ceasefire was under threat, that LTTE bore brunt of blame 
for ceasefire violations, but that current upsurge of 
violence in East required both sides to take steps. 
Kumaratunga said she had given orders to security forces to 
not attack LTTE, but that some elements might act anyway, 
and Karuna forces were difficult to control.  She asked 
that Co-chairs also impress on LTTE need to stop killings. 
END SUMMARY 
 
2.  (C) Ambassador and other Co-chair Chiefs of Mission (UK 
for EU, Japan, Norway) called on President Kumaratunga July 
25 to discuss ceasefire issues.  Kumaratunga was 
accompanied by Foreign Minister Kadirgamar, Foreign 
Secretary Palihakkara, and Peace Secretariat Head 
 
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Dhanapala.  Ambassador began by saying that Co-chairs had 
requested meeting because of concern about the ceasefire. 
Co-chair Senior Officials had mentioned this concern in 
their June 13 statement; Co-chairs in Colombo had repeated 
the concern in their July 19 statement. 
 
3.  (c) These statements did not imply moral equivalency 
between the Government and the LTTE.  The LTTE were 
egregious offenders and bore the brunt of the blame for 
ceasefire violations.  But in recent months there had been 
a series of killings--especially in the East--which had 
targeted people from both Government and LTTE.  That 
situation threatened the ceasefire, which was under severe 
strain.  The task now was to calm the situation down.  The 
Co-chairs believed the best way forward was for the GSL and 
the LTTE to sit together to discuss the ceasefire. 
Norwegian charge Laegried had been in Kilinocchi the 
previous week and stated that to the LTTE, which had 
rejected a meeting until the Government disarmed 
paramilitaries such as the Karuna group.  We would continue 
to press this point on the LTTE.  In the meantime, we hoped 
that the GSL would do all it could to get control over 
whoever was carrying out the killings of LTTE members. 
 
4. (C) Kumaratunga responded that the Government definitely 
"would not run with the hare and hunt with the hounds." 
She saw an opportunity of engaging the LTTE in the post- 
tsunami situation, and it would be foolish to "bump off" 
 
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LTTE members.  She had had "strong conversations" with the 
security forces and given them strict instructions.  She 
had even taken action against some people.  (Apparently a 
reference to the abrupt transfer last week of the Director 
General of Military Intelligence.)  Still, she said, there 
could be extremist elements in the armed forces who might 
be acting on their own. 
 
5.  (C) Ambassador responded that we did not think that the 
majority of these incidents were being committed by the 
armed forces, but more likely by elements of the breakaway 
Karuna faction of the LTTE.  The Karuna forces seemed to 
move about freely in the East, implying acquiescence by the 
security forces.  Kumaratunga responded that it was 
difficult to control the Karuna forces in their own home 
territory.  Nonetheless, she said, they would try to do so 
and would disarm such elements when they knew where they 
were. 
 
6.  (C) Kumaratunga continued that it would be much easier 
to take these actions if the LTTE would reciprocate.  They 
should allow elected anti-LTTE Tamil politicians to visit 
their constituencies without threat, and swear off suicide 
bomb attacks.  Ambassador said that we agreed absolutely 
that LTTE behavior was unacceptable and had to change.  The 
Co-chairs would certainly continue to press this point. 
For right now, however, we had to lower the tempo of 
violence in the East and get the ceasefire back on an even 
keel.  Kumaratunga said once again that they were committed 
to doing that. 
 
7.  (C) Returning to issue of influencing LTTE behavior, 
Kadirgamar mentioned the recent report on child recruitment 
submitted to the UN Secretary General and the Secretary 
General's recommendation that there should be a Security 
Council Resolution on the subject with sanctions on severe 
child recruitment violators.  Kadirgamar thought this would 
have a great impact on the LTTE, but there had been no 
action in the Council.  Ambassador said he did not know the 
state of play, but would ask.  ACTION REQUEST: Please 
advise state of this issue in New York. 
 
8.  (C) Comment:  The President's assurances were hedged 
with caveats about the problem of controlling low-level 
elements in the military and the problems of dealing with 
the Karuna forces.  Nonetheless, if she has given 
categorical instructions to the security forces, we expect 
they will be able to diminish significantly attacks by the 
Karuna forces.  We remain convinced that until now the 
Karuna elements have been operating with at least the 
acquiescence of the security forces, or even being used by 
the forces in a dangerous game which threatens to get out 
of hand.  At the same time she is correct that LTTE 
behavior has to change.  The Norwegians expect either 
Deputy Foreign Minister Helgesen or Special Envoy Solheim 
to visit here next week.  They will need to carry strong 
messages to the LTTE about the imperative to engage the GSL 
in talks on the ceasefire now, and the necessity to change 
their own behavior. 
LUNSTEAD