US embassy cable - 05ABUDHABI3243

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 003243 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARPI, S/CT, DS/ITA, DS/IP/NEA, 
INR/NESA 
NSC FOR JUAN ZARATE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2015 
TAGS: PTER, PINS, ASEC, EPET, MCAP, TC 
SUBJECT: UAE COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS: GOOD HARDWARE, BUT 
POOR COORDINATION 
 
REF: A. 2005 ABU DHABI 0301 
     B. IIR 6 931 0113 05 
     C. 2005 ABU DHABI 1683 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (S) Summary: The UAE, keenly aware that the threat of 
extremist violence on its soil is real, is implementing 
numerous measures in hopes of preventing terrorist attacks. 
In the past year, the UAEG has prioritized homeland security 
within its national security strategy.  However, the UAE 
lacks a coordinated, strategic approach to homeland security, 
relying instead on acquisition of technology.   Although the 
UAE established the interagency and inter-emirate National 
Counter Terrorism Committee last year, there continues to be 
relatively little coordination within and between the 
emirates on counterterrorism strategies.  No one organization 
has the clear lead on defining counterterrorism policies and 
priorities.  While the Emirate of Dubai's CT efforts are 
robust, they deal almost exclusively with activities inside 
Dubai. 
 
2. (S) Summary continued: The UAEG performs tactical, vice 
strategic, operational planning and often does not prioritize 
its national security projects.  The UAE lacks the manpower 
to fully enforce its national security plan -- such as the 
exclusion zone off the UAE coast and major offshore oil 
facilities.  Conversations between Embassy officials, Western 
oil executives, security consultants, and UAEG officials 
indicate that UAE efforts primarily entail hiring multiple 
consultants, forming multiple committees, and procuring 
multiple pieces of equipment.  End Summary. 
 
Everyone's In the CT Game, But Who Is In Charge? 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
3. (C) Although the UAE Ministry of Interior has overall 
authority over border security and critical infrastructure 
efforts, the military and State Security Directorate (SSD) 
also play a significant role in the UAE's counterterror 
efforts.  Often times the efforts of the different 
organizations are not coordinated.  There is relatively 
little coordination between Abu Dhabi and Dubai on 
counterterrorism strategies.  In Dubai, the Dubai State 
Security Organization (SSO) acts nearly autonomously on its 
cases.  The Dubai Police Department's advanced crisis 
management system, while state-of-the-art, is not 
interoperable with federal communication systems.  In an 
effort to better coordinate, the UAE has established at least 
two inter-ministerial and inter-emirate committees -- one 
dealing broadly with counterterrorism and one specifically 
dealing with critical infrastructure protection -- but even 
these committees are subject to inter-agency disputes about 
lead authority and control.  The first committee, the Counter 
Terrorism Committee, is designed to set and coordinate UAE 
counterterrorism policy, but the committee (headed by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs) focuses primarily on 
implementing the UAE's international counterterrorism 
commitments under the United Nations. 
 
4. (S) In a series of meetings with UAE military and security 
officials during the summer/autumn of 2004, senior U.S. 
officials highlighted potential threats to the UAE critical 
infrastructure and encouraged the UAE to heighten security. 
In direct response to these meetings, Abu Dhabi Crown Prince 
Mohamed bin Zayed (MbZ) formed an inter-ministerial committee 
to assess critical infrastructure vulnerability and recommend 
security enhancements.  The Ministry of Interior (MoI) is the 
lead agency, with participation by the UAE Armed Forces 
(through the Directorate of Military Intelligence and 
Security), State Security Directorate, and the Abu Dhabi 
National Oil Company (ADNOC).  Despite good intentions, this 
committee has been stymied by long lags between meetings, 
poor cooperation among members, and a lack of clear 
direction.  Organizations represented on the committee often 
move forward on their own initiatives, without coordinating 
with the other bodies (for example, at one point, the 
military and MoI had both planned to build separate national 
command centers on the same plot of land). 
 
5. (C) The UAE often gets tied down in a "study it to death" 
philosophy.  Over the past four years, multiple elements of 
the UAEG have entered into numerous contracts, MOUs, and 
informal agreements with major international defense 
contractors to conduct threat and vulnerability assessments 
and develop proposals for high-grade border security and 
critical infrastructure protection.  General Headquarters 
(the UAE's military headquarters), Directorate of Military 
Intelligence and Security, MoI, the Supreme Petroleum 
Council, and the Abu Dhabi and Dubai police departments have 
all separately contracted out projects with international 
defense and security companies to conduct assessments and 
implement border security and critical infrastructure 
programs.  These programs are not coordinated and often 
overlap. 
 
Border Security - It's All About Technology 
------------------------------------------- 
 
6. (S) Since 9/11, the UAE has transformed the military and 
internal security agencies to focus more concretely on border 
security with an eye toward blocking extremists' entry into 
the country.  In a February meeting with Homeland Security 
Advisor Fran Townsend, MbZ described the UAE's border control 
challenges and admitted that the UAE's land and sea borders 
were still porous and vulnerable (ref A).  From border 
security measures such as iris scanners at 17 ports of entry, 
a 525 mile long "security wall" along the border with Oman 
and Saudi Arabia, and listening and observation posts 
equipped with video, infrared and sound technology along the 
land borders, the UAEG is spending significant amounts of 
money on border security initiatives.  The UAE's push for 
domestic development of an armed unmanned aerial vehicle 
(UAV) is also an effort to further enhance its border 
security (ref B).  The problem with the UAEG's hardware 
profile, however, is that the government often procures the 
equipment before designing an operational plan fully.  This, 
coupled with the UAEG tendency to buy equipment piecemeal, 
from different international companies, often leads to 
non-interoperable systems. 
 
7. (S) The UAEG often launches a project with an 
international partner and then expands the project itself, 
without further contracts.  For example, the government 
contracted Raytheon to assist with the border security 
project along a discreet length of the Saudi Arabia-UAE 
border, and then planned to complete the border security 
fence along the Omani-UAE border independently.  According to 
Lunday, "They wanted to take what we had done and just 
carbon-copy it along the rest of the border.  They didn't 
understand that different terrain has different needs." 
 
8. (S) Although most of the illegal aliens who enter the UAE 
via its porous land and sea borders are seeking to enter the 
UAE for economic purposes, the UAEG is aware that its borders 
could be exploited by terrorists and terrorist facilitators. 
The UAE has continued to reshape its Land Forces by 
transferring 5,000 soldiers to the Frontier Corps responsible 
for border security, but these units have remained part of 
the UAE Armed Forces -- rather than being transferred to the 
Ministry of Interior as previously announced.  Minister of 
Interior Sheikh Saif bin Zayed Al Nahyan (a member of the Abu 
Dhabi ruling family) resisted the transfer of the Frontier 
Corps to the MoI, preferring instead to leave the border 
security function to the UAE Armed Forces.  The Frontier 
Corps is responsible for investigating any illegal border 
crossings, and local newspapers frequently report the arrest 
of "infiltrators" by the Frontier Corps. The coastline of the 
UAE is patrolled by the UAE Coast Guard, which plans to use 
as many as 200 small patrol craft in the future to conduct a 
picket line interdiction operation 12 miles outside the coast 
and around the exclusion zones to investigate any 
unregistered dhows or ships entering the patrol zone. 
Despite these patrol craft, the UAE sea border is often used 
by illegal aliens who enter the country through the Gulf of 
Oman and attempt to walk across to the emirates of Sharjah or 
Ajman. 
 
Critical Infrastructure 
----------------------- 
 
9. (C) Although the UAE has taken steps to try to limit the 
vulnerability of its critical infrastructure, the consensus 
of oil industry executives and even UAEG officials is that 
UAE facilities are still at risk.  The Ministry of Interior, 
which is responsible for security at power, water, and 
onshore oil facilities, formed a unit to examine critical 
infrastructure protection.  This small team (which received 
training from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security) has 
focused primarily on designing security features for new 
government buildings in Abu Dhabi.  Much of the UAEG's 
existing infrastructure remains lightly guarded and lacks 
significant resources to protect against a concerted attack. 
 
10. (S) The key onshore infrastructure includes oil fields 
and facilities, power plants, and water desalination plants. 
UAEG officials have reiterated to USG interlocutors that they 
feel the power and desalination plants are the most 
vulnerable to attack, since only a few sites provide all 
water and electricity usage in the Emirates.  Since 2001, the 
UAE has significantly increased security procedures at oil, 
power, and water facilities -- requiring badges and 
background checks for all visitors and personnel.  BP Middle 
East and Pakistan President Michael Daly (protect) pointed 
out earlier this year that the UAEG does not take a strategic 
approach to critical infrastructure protection, attempting to 
cover every contingency rather than focusing on vulnerable 
chokepoints (ref C).  For example, ADNOC's onshore security 
plans thus far consist of grandiose schemes such as fencing 
off all of the vast oil fields and pipelines and installing 
closed circuit TV along every mile of buried pipeline. 
According to the President of ExxonMobil al-Khaleej, Frank 
Kemnetz (protect), ADNOC officials recognize that this plan 
will not in fact really decrease the vulnerability of 
critical oil and gas facilities, but since plans have been 
announced to build fences and install video monitoring 
everywhere, it would be "embarrassing" to completely change 
strategies.  Kemnetz assessed that ADNOC will fence certain 
parts of the pipelines (even though an attack on one would 
not impact the UAE's ability to produce or export oil), and 
will develop more robust plans to better protect other 
chokepoints, such as export terminals. 
 
11. (S) Industry executives have noted many times that the 
offshore infrastructure is more vulnerable to an attack than 
the onshore, since there are large numbers of offshore 
facilities that need protection.  The major offshore sites 
are patrolled by the UAE Coast Guard and Armed Forces who 
enforce an exclusion zone and prohibit unauthorized boats to 
get near offshore facilities.  However, the UAE lacks the 
manpower resources to patrol their vast offshore sites and 
enforce these zones. 
 
12. (S) The UAE also lacks a deep understanding of the 
capabilities and tactics of potential attackers.  In 
developing an offshore oil field protection scheme, Raytheon 
requested a detailed map of the Das Island oil facilities 
(the major offshore integrated refinery and holding tanks). 
The UAEG refused, saying it was highly classified.  Raytheon 
simply pulled a commercial satellite image of the facility - 
and the senior UAEG officials were shocked that such 
information was publicly, and easily, available.  Although 
many UAE sites, such as Das Island, are large-scale, 
integrated complexes, and would be difficult for terrorists 
to take completely off-line using conventional weapons, an 
attack on a single liquid natural gas (LNG) plant or oil 
refinery would likely damage world confidence, thus causing 
energy prices to spike. 
 
Hotel and Tourist Destinations - Who's Watching? 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
13. (C) In Abu Dhabi, the security presence at major hotels 
is more likely effective at countering crime vice deterring 
or preventing acts of terrorism.  Hotel security and police 
officials are not yet completely focused on the need for a 
different strategy.  Hotel security officials monitor closed 
circuit video television (CCVT) systems, and the Abu Dhabi 
Police Department's Criminal Investigative Division (CID) 
reports that plain-clothed officers patrol hotel lobbies and 
clubs at night.  But the discreet nature of security measures 
in both Abu Dhabi and Dubai does not serve as a significant, 
visible counterterror deterrent.  Even after this week's 
attacks in Sharm Al Sheikh, hotel officials continue to 
prefer to rely on surveillance technology, rather than 
implement more overt security measures -- such as metal 
detectors and bollards at the front entrances -- out of 
concern of offending their guests. 
14. (C) In Dubai, where authorities are aware that even one 
attack could wreak havoc on their ambitious future plans and 
strong desire to maintain the city's reputation as a 
world-class terrorism and business hub, the "anything goes" 
atmosphere is in some ways deceptive.  The State Security 
Organization (SSO) endeavors to keep close tabs on third 
country nationals whose sympathies are known to lie with 
extremist groups.  Still, Dubai is replete with soft targets, 
and there exists among residents and security personnel a 
worrisome complacency. 
 
Internal Defense, Crisis Management - In Case of the Worst 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
15. (S) In meetings this year with senior U.S. officials, 
MbZ's growing concern about internal security has become 
apparent.  Expressing his concerns that the Saudi Government 
might one day collapse and be taken over by extremists, MbZ 
worries that the UAE may one day need to defend itself 
against an influx of extremists.  MbZ recently told 
Ambassador and Washington visitors that he wants the 250 UAE 
Special Forces soldiers fighting with Coalition Forces in 
Afghanistan to become more "battle-hardened" in the event of 
an "internal security" crisis.  In a similar vein, the UAE 
military is seeking multi million dollar training programs 
from U.S. companies like Blackwater USA for its Special 
Forces units.  Although UAE leaders are making efforts to 
prepare for contingencies, Raytheon executive Bob Lunday told 
Econoff, "the UAE military is the only element of the UAE 
that is even remotely able to respond to a sustained attack 
or large incident, but their capabilities are frightening 
(poor) and I fear the response will be disastrous." 
 
16. (S) Lack of a centralized command and control system and 
non-interoperable UAE communication systems further impede 
the UAE's ability to respond effectively to a crisis. 
Currently, the communications systems used by the police and 
the Ministry of Interior cannot interface with military 
communications, making joint response nearly impossible. 
Local industry executives assess that Dubai's crisis 
management system is effective, but it needs to expand to the 
national level.  The UAEG is aware of the coordination 
problem, and intends to establish a National Crisis 
Management Center and an Emergency Response Center to 
coordinate nationwide military, police, and emergency service 
responses.  The UAE Ministry of Presidential Affairs 
contracted a feasibility study with Raytheon Corp. to design 
a strategy for developing and operating the centers, and the 
study is due to be completed in August.  However, the lead 
for the project is unclear, having rotated between the 
Ministry for Presidential Affairs and the Ministry of 
Interior.  The UAE military has halted its plans to build a 
separate National Military Command Center, pending 
instructions from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and 
Interior. 
 
Comment 
-------- 
 
17. (S) Although UAE ruling family members are committed to 
enhancing the UAE's counterterrorism profile, the 
working-level coordination and communication remains weak. 
MbZ, as President Khalifa's National Security Advisor, and 
his brothers Interior Minister Saif and SSD Director Hazza, 
have a significant task ahead of them to prioritize the most 
important national security vulnerabilities and take concrete 
steps to address them. End Comment. 
SISON