US embassy cable - 05RANGOON861

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

GOB OFFICIAL: FREEDOM FOR ASSK "INEVITABLE"

Identifier: 05RANGOON861
Wikileaks: View 05RANGOON861 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Rangoon
Created: 2005-07-25 06:55:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PHUM PREL BM ASSK
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L RANGOON 000861 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV; PACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PREL, BM, ASSK 
SUBJECT: GOB OFFICIAL: FREEDOM FOR ASSK "INEVITABLE" 
 
REF: A. RANGOON 860 
     B. RANGOON 814 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  A senior MFA official told Emboffs it is 
"inevitable" that the SPDC generals will release ASSK in 
order to include her in the national reconciliation process 
and achieve a durable solution to the country's political 
crisis.  However, while the official's observations are 
logical, we continue to assess that the illogical SPDC is 
unlikely to release ASSK or other senior opposition leaders 
anytime soon.  End Summary 
 
2. (C) During a July 22 courtesy call on Denzil Abel, the 
MFA's Director for International Organizations (ref A), A/DCM 
and P/E officer pressed for the release of political 
opposition leaders Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK), U Tin Oo, and 
Hkun Htun Oo--observing that their prolonged detention would 
continue to hamper progress on a host of bilateral and 
multilateral issues of importance to the GOB. 
 
3. (C) Abel, clearly uncomfortable at having to respond to 
issues involving ASSK, offered that in order to achieve a 
durable solution to Burma's political crisis it is inevitable 
that "they" (SPDC generals) will have to make the national 
conciliation process "an inclusive one"--predicting that at 
some undefined point ASSK would be released and consulted. 
 
4. (C) We also noted that recent releases of political 
prisoners (ref B) were a step in the right direction, but 
that Burma needed to release all political prisoners, 
including ASSK, in order to achieve progress in engaging such 
institutions as the UNGA, the UNCHR, the ILO, and ASEAN. 
Abel acknowledged this point and said that (the SPDC) "can't 
continue to operate in a vacuum" without the country's 
political opposition. 
 
5. (C) Comment: Abel's comments are noteworthy given the 
rarity that GOB officials will address with us the current 
detention of ASSK and other high-profile democracy leaders. 
However, he and his senior MFA colleagues, including the 
Foreign Minister, are not decision makers and have little 
influence with the SPDC regime.  His conclusion that the 
generals will have to deal eventually with ASSK is a logical 
one.  However, we continue to assess that, despite external 
pressure, the interminably illogical SPDC believes there is 
no significant incentive in releasing ASSK--and no particular 
disincentive in keeping her detained.  End Comment. 
Martinez 

Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04