US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD3046

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SHIA POLITICAL INSIDER QASSIM DAOUD WORRIES ABOUT THE KURDS AND PONDERS A MODERATE IRAQI PATH FORWARD

Identifier: 05BAGHDAD3046
Wikileaks: View 05BAGHDAD3046 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Baghdad
Created: 2005-07-23 03:01:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PREL KDEM IZ Shia Islamists Sunni Arab National Assembly
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003046 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2025 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KDEM, IZ, Shia Islamists, Sunni Arab, National Assembly 
SUBJECT: SHIA POLITICAL INSIDER QASSIM DAOUD WORRIES ABOUT 
THE KURDS AND PONDERS A MODERATE IRAQI PATH FORWARD 
 
REF: BAGHDAD 2909 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Robert Ford. 
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY. Constitutional Committee member Qassim 
Daoud told NSC Senior Director for Iraq Meghan 
O'Sullivan on July 15 that he is optimistic about the 
progress of the committee and believes a draft 
constitution will be ready by July 31. Daoud felt his 
attempts to integrate Sunnis into the committee have 
been successful.  Federalism and resource distribution 
remain the major sticking points, with regional 
boundaries also contentious.  Daoud continued to 
criticize (reftel) the Kurdish role in the 
constitution drafting process and aggressive Kurdish 
moves to resolve the status of Kirkuk.  He also 
provided a pessimistic assessment of the chances of 
moderate parties and politicians in the upcoming 
elections. END SUMMARY. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
SUNNIS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITTEE 
-------------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) Meghan O'Sullivan, Special Assistant to the 
President and Senior Director for Iraq at the National 
Security Council, met with Qassim Daoud, TNA 
Constitution Committee and Institutions of the 
Regional Government Sub-Committee member, on July 15 
to discuss the drafting of Iraq's constitution.  Daoud 
began by highlighting his efforts to bring Sunnis into 
the constitutional process -- an effort he feels 
generally has been successful. Daoud said federalism 
is the major sticking point for the Sunnis in the 
constitutional drafting process. 
 
3. (C) As a group, Daoud said, the Sunnis are united 
during the sessions of the Committee, but in private, 
Sunni members approach him to complain and vigorously 
criticize their colleagues. 
 
------------------------ 
FEDERALISM AND RESOURCES 
------------------------ 
 
4. (C) With the time for drafting a constitution 
coming to a close, O'Sullivan asked Daoud to summarize 
the federalism concerns of the Committee members. 
Daoud responded that he feels that the Constitutional 
Committee has been able to neutralize Sunni extremism; 
the Kurds' "maximalist" demands pose a greater problem 
to the work of the Committee. 
 
5. (C) Daoud sees the Kurdish position as reflecting a 
willful desire to dissolve the unity of Iraq and 
cement Kurdish claims on the city of Kirkuk.  Daoud 
highlighted the Kurdish push to change the 
demographics of the city in their favor.  On several 
occasions during the meeting, Daoud stressed that the 
Kurds are pushing the limits of the TAL and must 
become less aggressive in representing their views. 
O'Sullivan responded that Kurds--and other parties-- 
view this negotiation as a time to place their maximum 
demands on the table and that, in the coming days and 
weeks, serious negotiations will need to ensue.  The 
USG, however, continues to press the Kurds not to take 
actions that would predetermine the status of the 
city.  O' Sullivan underscored the need for the 
constitution to be a "national document."  The U.S. 
Government supports TAL Article 58 as the appropriate 
venue for resolving the Kirkuk-related issues, said 
O'Sullivan.  She noted that she was heartened by an 
apparent movement in the direction of recognizing that 
the final administrative status of Kirkuk would be 
difficult to resolve in the short amount of time 
before August 15, and may best be dealt with after the 
constitutional process is complete.  This 
constitution, perhaps, may best be regarded as a 
framework document that does not seek to resolve every 
contentious political issue definitively. 
 
6. (C) Turning to Sunni federalism concerns, Daoud 
described Sunni resistance to Kurdish assertiveness 
over control of resources.  Sunni support of any 
federal arrangement is contingent on resources being 
managed by the central government, not the regions, he 
said.  While Kurds continue to insist that resources 
be divided regionally, Sunni representatives remain 
steadfast in their opposition.  O'Sullivan repeated 
U.S. support for the TAL provisions, which state that 
Iraq's resources belong to the all the people of Iraq, 
not to one specific region.  Daoud said he senses 
Kurdish willingness to compromise on this issue. 
While Daoud emphasized the importance of resource 
issues, he also pointed out the broader significance 
of Kirkuk for Sunnis and Kurds alike.  Daoud disagreed 
with O'Sullivan that difficulties over the final 
status of Kirkuk might be minimized by separating the 
resource issue from the question of the administrative 
status of the region, and he paraphrased the position 
of his Sunni interlocutors, as "Kirkuk is our city." 
It is a psychological issue for both sides. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
CONSTITUTIONAL TIMEFRAME: THE ROAD AHEAD 
---------------------------------------- 
7. (C) Daoud is confident that that his Committee will 
resolve the outstanding issues and present a draft to 
the national assembly by July 31.  When asked about 
potential roadblocks, Daoud responded that he 
considers the Shi'a in the Government -- who seem to 
be motivated by a desire to keep power they already 
hold -- a threat to the timely completion of a draft. 
However, Daoud deemed SCIRI's involvement in the 
Constitutional Committee to be positive, as was 
SCIRI's commitment to producing a document on time. 
 
8. (C) O'Sullivan inquired about the possibility of 
changes to the draft constitution during the period 
between its submission to the TNA and the 
constitutional referendum scheduled for October 15. 
Daoud said he expects the constitution to remain 'as 
is' during the interim period, as the work of his 
Committee has been transparent and accessible.  His 
efforts -- and the efforts of the TNA -- will focus on 
gaining approval for the constitution in the form 
approved by the TNA.  O'Sullivan and Daoud agreed on 
the importance of public outreach during the interim 
period leading up to the referendum. 
 
9. (C) Daoud also addressed Ayatollah Sistani's 
insistence that the Shi'a provinces in the South be 
merged into one (Shi'a) entity. According to Daoud, 
Sistani argues that dividing the South into multiple 
regions will "encourage interference from neighbors." 
Daoud told Sistani that interference from neighbors 
(Iran) already exists, regardless of he umbr of 
regions.  In the end, Daoud predicted, the South will 
be divided into two or three regions.  O'Sullivan and 
Daoud both agreed on the symbolic importance of this 
issue, and the potential negative effects of creating 
a monolithic Shi'a entity in the South. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
THE POLITICAL OUTLOOK: TOUGH TIMES FOR MODERATES AND 
THE END OF ALLAWI 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
10. (C) Daoud analyzed the current political situation 
in Iraq and the challenges ahead.  Despite the 
abundance of polarizing issues that face Iraq, the 
political process is, in his opinion, irreversible. 
However, this political process will continue to 
polarize the country.  Sunnis, in Daoud's opinion, 
will eventually develop parties similar to those of 
the Shi'a.  Daoud agreed that the development of Sunni 
leadership is critical. 
 
11. (C) Daoud also predicted a decline in the 
influence of the "liberal national strain" in Iraqi 
politics.  He pointed to violence against and 
assassination of Shi'a politicians as contributing to 
the polarization of Iraqi politics.  Daoud also opined 
that the Sunnis see the (Coalition and Iraqi) military 
offensive against terrorists as "revenge of the Shi'a 
on the Sunni."  The violence and polarization has 
nearly eliminated the space for truly national 
parties, according to Daoud. 
 
12. (C) Daoud said he sees his role as one of building 
coalitions with "Islamists that we can deal with."  He 
pointed to SCIRI as a key player and praised its 
constructive role in settling last year's Najaf 
crisis. Daoud explained the focus on SCIRI by saying 
that SCIRI would prefer to work with moderate groups 
because it "does not like to be alone." He intimated 
that he would likely leave Allawi's coalition to join 
the better funded and organized SCIRI in the next 
election.  (COMMENT: The interest of Daoud -- a 
moderate, non-sectarian leader -- in shifting his 
political allegiance to SCIRI is an indication of the 
real weakness of national, cross-sectarian parties in 
the current political spectrum.) 
 
13. (C) Daoud also touched briefly on Sistani's 
insistence that there be multiple electoral districts 
for the upcoming December elections.  Daoud insisted 
that it is unreasonable to expect the electoral 
commission to implement multiple districts in place of 
the current single national electoral district before 
December. 
 
14. (C) Turning to the role of former PM Allawi, Daoud 
pointed to his reluctance to engage moderate Islamists 
as one reason for his decline.  He also mentioned his 
unwillingness to compromise, lack of flexibility, and 
alleged focus on high-level meetings and phone calls 
as other contributing factors.  Daoud predicted Allawi 
would fare very poorly in December's election.  Daoud 
contrasted Allawi's high-handed approach with his own, 
noting how he has sought to be a constructive player 
at every level, despite being in the opposition. 
 
15 (C) Daoud closed by mentioning his ongoing concern 
over the unhelpful role of Syria and Iran in Iraq's 
internal affairs.  He disclosed that he had been 
officially invited to Teheran. He also agreed that, 
although normal bilateral relations with Iran are 
desirable, Iraq must remain wary of its neighbor. 
 
16. (U) This cable has been cleared by NSC Senior 
Director O'Sullivan. 
 
17. (U) REOs Hillah, Basrah, Kirkuk, and Mosul 
minimize considered. 
 
 
Satterfield 

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