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| Identifier: | 05BAGHDAD3046 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05BAGHDAD3046 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Baghdad |
| Created: | 2005-07-23 03:01:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PGOV PREL KDEM IZ Shia Islamists Sunni Arab National Assembly |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003046 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2025 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KDEM, IZ, Shia Islamists, Sunni Arab, National Assembly SUBJECT: SHIA POLITICAL INSIDER QASSIM DAOUD WORRIES ABOUT THE KURDS AND PONDERS A MODERATE IRAQI PATH FORWARD REF: BAGHDAD 2909 Classified By: Political Counselor Robert Ford. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 1. (C) SUMMARY. Constitutional Committee member Qassim Daoud told NSC Senior Director for Iraq Meghan O'Sullivan on July 15 that he is optimistic about the progress of the committee and believes a draft constitution will be ready by July 31. Daoud felt his attempts to integrate Sunnis into the committee have been successful. Federalism and resource distribution remain the major sticking points, with regional boundaries also contentious. Daoud continued to criticize (reftel) the Kurdish role in the constitution drafting process and aggressive Kurdish moves to resolve the status of Kirkuk. He also provided a pessimistic assessment of the chances of moderate parties and politicians in the upcoming elections. END SUMMARY. -------------------------------------- SUNNIS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITTEE -------------------------------------- 2. (C) Meghan O'Sullivan, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Iraq at the National Security Council, met with Qassim Daoud, TNA Constitution Committee and Institutions of the Regional Government Sub-Committee member, on July 15 to discuss the drafting of Iraq's constitution. Daoud began by highlighting his efforts to bring Sunnis into the constitutional process -- an effort he feels generally has been successful. Daoud said federalism is the major sticking point for the Sunnis in the constitutional drafting process. 3. (C) As a group, Daoud said, the Sunnis are united during the sessions of the Committee, but in private, Sunni members approach him to complain and vigorously criticize their colleagues. ------------------------ FEDERALISM AND RESOURCES ------------------------ 4. (C) With the time for drafting a constitution coming to a close, O'Sullivan asked Daoud to summarize the federalism concerns of the Committee members. Daoud responded that he feels that the Constitutional Committee has been able to neutralize Sunni extremism; the Kurds' "maximalist" demands pose a greater problem to the work of the Committee. 5. (C) Daoud sees the Kurdish position as reflecting a willful desire to dissolve the unity of Iraq and cement Kurdish claims on the city of Kirkuk. Daoud highlighted the Kurdish push to change the demographics of the city in their favor. On several occasions during the meeting, Daoud stressed that the Kurds are pushing the limits of the TAL and must become less aggressive in representing their views. O'Sullivan responded that Kurds--and other parties-- view this negotiation as a time to place their maximum demands on the table and that, in the coming days and weeks, serious negotiations will need to ensue. The USG, however, continues to press the Kurds not to take actions that would predetermine the status of the city. O' Sullivan underscored the need for the constitution to be a "national document." The U.S. Government supports TAL Article 58 as the appropriate venue for resolving the Kirkuk-related issues, said O'Sullivan. She noted that she was heartened by an apparent movement in the direction of recognizing that the final administrative status of Kirkuk would be difficult to resolve in the short amount of time before August 15, and may best be dealt with after the constitutional process is complete. This constitution, perhaps, may best be regarded as a framework document that does not seek to resolve every contentious political issue definitively. 6. (C) Turning to Sunni federalism concerns, Daoud described Sunni resistance to Kurdish assertiveness over control of resources. Sunni support of any federal arrangement is contingent on resources being managed by the central government, not the regions, he said. While Kurds continue to insist that resources be divided regionally, Sunni representatives remain steadfast in their opposition. O'Sullivan repeated U.S. support for the TAL provisions, which state that Iraq's resources belong to the all the people of Iraq, not to one specific region. Daoud said he senses Kurdish willingness to compromise on this issue. While Daoud emphasized the importance of resource issues, he also pointed out the broader significance of Kirkuk for Sunnis and Kurds alike. Daoud disagreed with O'Sullivan that difficulties over the final status of Kirkuk might be minimized by separating the resource issue from the question of the administrative status of the region, and he paraphrased the position of his Sunni interlocutors, as "Kirkuk is our city." It is a psychological issue for both sides. ---------------------------------------- CONSTITUTIONAL TIMEFRAME: THE ROAD AHEAD ---------------------------------------- 7. (C) Daoud is confident that that his Committee will resolve the outstanding issues and present a draft to the national assembly by July 31. When asked about potential roadblocks, Daoud responded that he considers the Shi'a in the Government -- who seem to be motivated by a desire to keep power they already hold -- a threat to the timely completion of a draft. However, Daoud deemed SCIRI's involvement in the Constitutional Committee to be positive, as was SCIRI's commitment to producing a document on time. 8. (C) O'Sullivan inquired about the possibility of changes to the draft constitution during the period between its submission to the TNA and the constitutional referendum scheduled for October 15. Daoud said he expects the constitution to remain 'as is' during the interim period, as the work of his Committee has been transparent and accessible. His efforts -- and the efforts of the TNA -- will focus on gaining approval for the constitution in the form approved by the TNA. O'Sullivan and Daoud agreed on the importance of public outreach during the interim period leading up to the referendum. 9. (C) Daoud also addressed Ayatollah Sistani's insistence that the Shi'a provinces in the South be merged into one (Shi'a) entity. According to Daoud, Sistani argues that dividing the South into multiple regions will "encourage interference from neighbors." Daoud told Sistani that interference from neighbors (Iran) already exists, regardless of he umbr of regions. In the end, Daoud predicted, the South will be divided into two or three regions. O'Sullivan and Daoud both agreed on the symbolic importance of this issue, and the potential negative effects of creating a monolithic Shi'a entity in the South. --------------------------------------------- ------- THE POLITICAL OUTLOOK: TOUGH TIMES FOR MODERATES AND THE END OF ALLAWI --------------------------------------------- ------- 10. (C) Daoud analyzed the current political situation in Iraq and the challenges ahead. Despite the abundance of polarizing issues that face Iraq, the political process is, in his opinion, irreversible. However, this political process will continue to polarize the country. Sunnis, in Daoud's opinion, will eventually develop parties similar to those of the Shi'a. Daoud agreed that the development of Sunni leadership is critical. 11. (C) Daoud also predicted a decline in the influence of the "liberal national strain" in Iraqi politics. He pointed to violence against and assassination of Shi'a politicians as contributing to the polarization of Iraqi politics. Daoud also opined that the Sunnis see the (Coalition and Iraqi) military offensive against terrorists as "revenge of the Shi'a on the Sunni." The violence and polarization has nearly eliminated the space for truly national parties, according to Daoud. 12. (C) Daoud said he sees his role as one of building coalitions with "Islamists that we can deal with." He pointed to SCIRI as a key player and praised its constructive role in settling last year's Najaf crisis. Daoud explained the focus on SCIRI by saying that SCIRI would prefer to work with moderate groups because it "does not like to be alone." He intimated that he would likely leave Allawi's coalition to join the better funded and organized SCIRI in the next election. (COMMENT: The interest of Daoud -- a moderate, non-sectarian leader -- in shifting his political allegiance to SCIRI is an indication of the real weakness of national, cross-sectarian parties in the current political spectrum.) 13. (C) Daoud also touched briefly on Sistani's insistence that there be multiple electoral districts for the upcoming December elections. Daoud insisted that it is unreasonable to expect the electoral commission to implement multiple districts in place of the current single national electoral district before December. 14. (C) Turning to the role of former PM Allawi, Daoud pointed to his reluctance to engage moderate Islamists as one reason for his decline. He also mentioned his unwillingness to compromise, lack of flexibility, and alleged focus on high-level meetings and phone calls as other contributing factors. Daoud predicted Allawi would fare very poorly in December's election. Daoud contrasted Allawi's high-handed approach with his own, noting how he has sought to be a constructive player at every level, despite being in the opposition. 15 (C) Daoud closed by mentioning his ongoing concern over the unhelpful role of Syria and Iran in Iraq's internal affairs. He disclosed that he had been officially invited to Teheran. He also agreed that, although normal bilateral relations with Iran are desirable, Iraq must remain wary of its neighbor. 16. (U) This cable has been cleared by NSC Senior Director O'Sullivan. 17. (U) REOs Hillah, Basrah, Kirkuk, and Mosul minimize considered. Satterfield
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