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| Identifier: | 05QUITO1734 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05QUITO1734 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Quito |
| Created: | 2005-07-22 19:56:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | ECON EFIN PGOV PREL EC Economy |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 QUITO 001734 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/2015 TAGS: ECON, EFIN, PGOV, PREL, EC, Economy SUBJECT: MORE FINANCIAL PRESSURE ON ECUADOR Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Kevin Herbert Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d) 1. (C) Summary. Opting for the path of least resistance, President Palacio issued a partial veto of the bill to refund social security (IESS) reserve funds, but proposed to refund the reserve funds anyway. The major immediate difference between the congressional bill and the Palacio proposal is that under his proposal the reserves will be refunded over six months versus the 0-90 days proposed in the bill. His attempt to please everyone (business, and even Minister of Economy Correa, were urging a veto) places additional pressure on Ecuador,s already strained financing needs. Palacio has succeeded in temporarily averting strong public protests, but only by postponing more and greater (especially financing) pressures in the future. End summary. Is Everybody Happy? ------------------- 2. (SBU) President Alfredo Palacio, in a nationally televised address to the nation the night of July 21, announced he was partially vetoing the congressional bill to refund social security (IESS) reserve funds to contributors. While in the strictest sense it is a partial veto, Palacio actually proposed to do exactly what the bill called for, refund IESS reserve funds to contributors. The major difference between the congressional bill and Palacio,s proposal is that, under the latter, reserve withdrawals would be phased in over a relatively longer 3-6 months instead 0-90 days in the original bill. Congress has 30 days to override the veto with 67 out of 100 votes; otherwise, Palacio,s version becomes law. Palacio called for an extraordinary session of congress (which is in recess) to convene next week. 3. (C) Retirees, union members and others had threatened to take to the streets if Palacio vetoed the bill. Seventy-five of the 100 congressional deputies voted in favor of the bill. Business leaders and others, including Minister of Economy Rafael Correa, who understood more of what was at stake for the country, had urged Palacio to veto the bill. In press reports July 22, Correa was still calling for a full veto of the bill. Palacio, perhaps fearing the same fate of his predecessor Lucio Gutierrez who was ousted last April 20, elected to try to satisfy everyone, providing both a veto (partial) and the return of the reserves. 4. (C) To further distract both the Congress and the public, Palacio threw in several additional proposals. Among them are economic and political reforms, including proposed national referendum issues (septel). More Financial Pressures and Causes for Concern --------------------------------------------- -- 5. (U) Instead of allowing contributors to immediately (within 90 days) withdraw their IESS reserve funds, Palacio proposes to make the funds available to contributors in 3 phases. In the first phase, contributors with $1000 or less in reserves can withdraw their funds within 90 days of September 1. Those contributors with $1000-1500 would be able to make withdrawals in December and January. Those contributors with over $1500 in social security reserve funds would have to wait until February 2006 to withdraw the funds. Palacio claimed that the first phase alone would cover 91% of those eligible to withdraw funds from the reserve system. 6. (U) Currently, the reserve fund holds $734 million, $384 million of which is invested in government debt. Thus, under the congressional or Palacio scenario, because both allow the complete withdrawal of reserves, the GOE could lose up to $384 million in financing. (It is not clear how many people would actually elect to withdraw their funds.) However, the GOE was already considering an increase in IESS holdings of government debt. The intended increase was to cover the prospects of low rollovers of previous debt, lower multilateral disbursements and promised higher capital spending. Credit Suisse First Boston (CFSB) also notes that there are short-term liquidity problems. The reserve fund only has $265 million in cash deposits, which would require the IESS to liquidate securities holdings to pay back the full $734 million to contributors. CFSB adds that the GOE,s liquidity problems will be further challenged by domestic debt maturities in September ($261 million) and January 2006 ($195 million). 7. (U) As part of the social security system reforms, Palacio proposed that future reserves be divided into two funds, only one from which the contributor could seek withdrawals. He said that next week, during his called-for extraordinary session of Congress, he would send proposals for a series of reforms, e.g., the restructuring of the social security system, and the Deposit Guarantee Agency (AGD - roughly equivalent to the former U.S. Resolution Trust Agency). According to press reports, within 90 days of the passage of the new law, the Minister of Economy could acquire an &open bank8 under the AGD and transfer it to the IESS. The AGD could use the proceeds to pay off the depositors of failed banks who have yet to recover their funds from banks taken over by the state in the 1999-2000 banking crisis. Palacio,s plan also proposes that the Minister of Economy would establish another bank for the benefit of IESS contributors, offering mortgages and loans to contributors. This proposal calls for much closer examination, given Minister of Economy Correa,s out-dated statist economic policies. Comment ------- 8. (C) The details of the extensive proposals from Palacio are still emerging, requiring more review and analysis before drawing definitive conclusions, which was probably one of Palacio,s goals in the first place. He has given everyone almost exactly what was requested, but it is not clear how (or if) he can pay for it all, both economically and politically. For now though, he has kept himself in office and caused enough confusion to send the Congress and public in enough different directions to prevent them from seizing any one issue that could unite them against him. Sooner, rather than later though the financing bill will come due, which might make Venezuelan assistance overtures more enticing. Also, much of Palacio,s proposed economic reforms seem to have come from Correa, which would imply that the prospects of his imminent departure from the cabinet are much less likely. 9. (C) By avoiding the hard, but clearly best choice (a full veto of the IESS bill), Palacio appears to confirm early impressions of him. He is more interested in keeping himself in office than taking controversial public stands that are in Ecuador,s best national interests. HERBERT
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