US embassy cable - 05ABUJA1339

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001339 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, EPET, PHUM, KDEM, NI 
SUBJECT: NATIONAL POLITICAL REFORM CONFERENCE ENDS.  NOW 
WHAT? 
 
REF: LAGOS 1073 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John Campbell for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  Unable to reach consensus on key issues of 
resource control, presidential term limits, and whether 
former military leaders should be precluded from contesting 
future elections, the National Political Reform Conference 
(NPRC) ended deliberations July 12.  Conference chairmen plan 
to present to President Obasanjo the majority and minority 
positions for his consideration.  Most observers expect the 
President to forward the Conference's recommendations to the 
National Assembly.  What the National Assembly will do with 
the findings is unclear, particularly since the Assembly 
opposed the convening of the conference in the first place, 
believing it an usurpation of its prerogatives.  Had NPRC 
delegates backed what many believe to have been the 
President's "real agenda"--banning of military leaders and a 
single six-year term for the presidency, of which he would be 
the first beneficiary--we might have been able to expect 
Obasanjo to lobby the National Assembly to adopt the 
conference's conclusions.  However, since the verdict was 
mixed on these issues, the NPRC final report may end up 
relegated to a bottom shelf.  For now, South-South delegates 
remain cautiously optimistic that the National Assembly will 
approve some measure of increase in the percentage of oil 
revenues that are channeled back to their communities.  End 
Summary. 
 
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NPRC Sputters, Stalls, Then Dies 
-------------------------------- 
 
2. (U) Per reftel, NPRC Chairman Justice Niki Tobi was forced 
to recess the confab on June 14 when delegates from three of 
the six geographical zones represented walked out.  The 
conference leadership postponed reconvening the confab three 
times in an effort to give closed-door negotiations the 
opportunity to bear fruit.  However, these negotiations 
ultimately proved unsuccessful and on July 12 the leadership 
announced the end of deliberations.  We still anticipate a 
plenary closing session in the near future; though it is 
unclear whether all delegates will attend. 
 
3. (U) To recap, delegates differed on how much the federal 
allocation to the oil producing states should be increased. 
The maximalist South-South position was for an increase to 50 
percent from the prevailing rate of 13 percent.  The 
minimalist position was an increase to 25 percent with 
provisions for graduated increases later.  The confab, 
however, adopted an "elder's committee" recommendation to 
increase the derivation to 17 percent, with no future 
dispensations.  There is considerable controversy as to 
whether this was indeed the consensus reached by the elders 
committee.  NPRC chairman Tobi subsequently told the press 
that he was "misinformed" when he called for adoption of the 
17 percent proposal. 
 
4.  (SBU)  The proposal to ban former military leaders from 
contesting public office also proved controversial.  On May 
9, the committee studying this issue, put forth its 
recommendation that leaders who came to power through coups 
d'etat should be ineligible to stand for public office.  A 
few days later, the committee's chairman, Joseph Wayas, was 
attacked by unknown gunmen, but escaped unharmed.  Wayas' 
office was also vandalized.  This recommendation would 
eliminate presidential contenders Babangida and Buhari. The 
majority of delegates backed this position.  However, a 
significant minority argued that "democratic norms" mitigated 
against banning individuals. 
 
5.  (U) Lastly, delegates were unable to agree on 
presidential term limits and the rotation of power among the 
six geographical zones.  In the end, the status quo of 
four-year tenures for a maximum of two terms was preserved. 
However, like the resource control issue, it is unclear 
whether that represents the true consensus position, 
particularly since at the time it was adopted, one 
geographical zone had already walked out the conference. 
 
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Now What? 
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6.  (SBU)  Most observers anticipate that the conference's 
chairmen will present both majority and minority positions to 
President Obasanjo for his consideration.  The president has 
intimated in the press that he will forward the conference's 
recommendations to the National Assembly. What the National 
Assembly will do with the findings remains unclear at this 
point.  A few senators have, however, pointedly recalled that 
the Assembly strongly opposed the convening the confab and 
had therefore refused to appropriate funds for it, compelling 
the President to finance it from "private sources." 
7.  (SBU)  The South-South remains cautiously optimistic that 
in the end the resource allocation will be increased from the 
prevailing 13 percent to a figure ranging between 17-20 
percent.  Delegates from this zone predict that President 
Obasanjo will endorse 20 percent as a compromise position, 
appeasing at least somewhat, both the North and the South. 
They are less sanguine about the National Assembly's 
approval, but believe they have a reasonable chance of 
success. 
 
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Comment 
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8.  (C)  Faced with agitation since he came to power in 1999 
to organize a Sovereign National Conference (SNC), Obasanjo 
likely intended for the confab to divert this pressure and to 
derail the SNC that was being planned by the civil society 
group PRONACO (Pro-National Conference).  (Note: PRONACO is 
still moving forward to convene a SNC in October.  End Note). 
 The NPRC was also intended to assuage calls from different 
ethnic groups for greater political participation and fiscal 
federalism.  Lastly, presidential critics insist that it was 
also the vehicle by which Obasanjo hoped to exclude his 
rivals and secure an extension of term or new mandate.  The 
president has denied these allegations. 
 
9.  (C) In many ways, conference delegates proved the 
president's critics wrong.  Despite the virulent protests at 
the conference's inception concerning delegates' 
"hand-selection" and the president's proscribed "no-go" 
zones, confab members exhibited considerable independence. 
They refused to endorse what they believed to be Obasanjo's 
"real agenda," and instead seriously debated issues of import 
to the future governing of the body politic. 
 
10.  (C) The convening of the confab served as a release 
valve when the President was under significant pressure to 
hold an SNC and address core issues of resource control, 
power-sharing, and adequate political participation by all 
ethnic groups.  However, rather than mending these rifts, the 
conference only trained a harsh light upon them.  The good 
news of debt relief and the Supreme Court's decision in the 
president's favor mitigated the immediate impact of the 
NPRC's collapse.  However, the issues discussed at the confab 
will not disappear.  As the euphoria of the past few weeks 
recedes, we can expect them to return front and center. 
CAMPBELL