US embassy cable - 05ABUJA1338

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 001338 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KUNR, NI, UNSC, UNGA 
SUBJECT: CHINESE AMBASSADOR TO NIGERIA CONFIRMS NIGERIA'S 
PUSH FOR AU-G4 COMPROMISE 
 
REF: A. USUN NEW YORK 1657 
 
     B. ABUJA 1154 
     C. ABUJA 1250 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John Campbell for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d). 
 
1.  (C) On the afternoon of July 22, Chinese Ambassador to 
Nigeria Wang Yongqiu visited the Ambassador to discuss UNSC 
reform.  He told the Ambassador he had met with the Acting 
Permanent Secretary of Nigeria's Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA), Mr. Asiru (phonetic), the previous afternoon, and that 
Asiru had confirmed Nigeria's plans to push the AU into a 
compromise with the G-4 on UNSC reform (Ref A).  Wang said 
that Asiru had told him that the Foreign Minister and the 
regular MFA PermSec were already in New York, and that both 
would attend the Ministerial-level meeting in London on July 
25. 
 
2.  (C) Wang said that China would be canvassing the AU 
countries for their responses to President Obasanjo's letter, 
in his capacity as AU President, requesting their approval 
for a compromise to the AU resolution calling for two 
permanent UNSC seats for Africa.  The deadline for individual 
country responses was Sunday, July 24, he said, and asked if 
the U.S. would canvas AU heads of state for their responses 
as well. 
 
3.  (C) According to Wang, Asiru was "confident that most AU 
countries would say yes" to Obasanjo's request for a 
compromise of some sort between the G-4 and the AU.  However, 
Wang said that China thought most AU members would not agree 
to Obasanjo's letter, but instead hold out for more 
concessions from the G-4.  Nonetheless, if Obasanjo was 
successful in gaining AU support, the outcome of the 
ministerial meeting in London would be a G4-AU compromise 
resolution to be presented to the UNGA by the end of July. 
Drafting of the compromise resolution would be done by the 
"four plus four," Wang said:  the four ministers from the 
G-4, and four from the AU. 
 
4.  (C) Wang raised whether the P-5 ambassadors should 
approach Obasanjo in order to express the P-5's strong 
opposition to the G4-AU compromise.  The Ambassador replied 
that the U.S. had repeated its message opposing the G-4 
resolution to the GON several times (Refs B and C), and he 
and Wang agreed that the GON was already quite aware of the 
P-5's objections. 
 
5.  (C) The Ambassador agreed to pass along China's 
suggestion to canvas AU heads of state for their response to 
Obasanjo's letter.  Wang thanked the Ambassador and said, "It 
is in our interest to keep these groups (the G-4 and the AU) 
from coming together." 
 
6.  (C) Comment:  The GON, of course, knows the U.S. position 
on Security Council expansion, as well as our objections to 
the G-4 draft.  Perhaps for that reason, GON officials have 
not been forthcoming about the operational details of their 
campaign to reach a compromise between the G-4 and the AU. 
They have not mentioned to us a July 25 London meeting of G-4 
and AU ministers, for example.  End Comment. 
CAMPBELL