US embassy cable - 05JAKARTA9989

C O N F I D E N T I A L  JAKARTA 009989 
 
 
DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/IET 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/2025 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, MOPS, MARR, EAID, ECON, KJUS, ID 
SUBJECT: ACEH: KALLA BRIEFS ENVOYS ON "HIS" PEACE DEAL 
 
REF: A. JAKARTA 9963 - HAMID CLAIMS BROAD ACCEPTANCE 
     B. JAKARTA 9749 - INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF AGREEMENT 
     C. JAKARTA 9685 - GOI AND GAM REACH AGREEMENT 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL OFFICER MARK D. CLARK, REASON 1.4 (B AND D). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1.  (C) The Ambassador and heads of mission from Australia, 
Finland, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, Sweden, and the UK (also 
representing the EU) called on Vice President Jusuf Kalla on 
July 22 to receive the GOI's brief on the draft Aceh peace 
accord.  Kalla's presentation echoed that of lead negotiator 
Hamid Awaludin the day before (ref A), though Kalla focused 
more heavily on the importance of international pressure on 
the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), including actions by the 
Malaysian government against the outspoken member of the GAM 
negotiating team living there.  Kalla described an informal 
consultation process with key Parliament members prior to the 
August 15 signing, downplaying any domestic political 
opposition.  The GOI and GAM are keeping close hold the 
specific number of GAM's weapons identified for 
decommissioning.  The Vice President called on at least some 
of the international monitors to be in place by the end of 
August or early September.  Kalla saw the need to work 
through initial reintegration issues first, which he 
acknowledged would be difficult, prior to launching into new 
elections.  He anticipated several former GAM members sitting 
in the Aceh reconstruction board (BRR), and noted the need 
for up to 20,000 new homes.  Kalla demonstrated his strong 
sense of ownership of the peace deal, and signaled that the 
GOI has begun serious thought on implementing the accord. 
End Summary. 
 
Kalla Plays Up International Role 
--------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) Vice President Kalla, accompanied by chief 
negotiators Hamid Awaludin and Sofyan Djalil, and Foreign 
Minister Hassan Wirajuda, received the Ambassador and seven 
other envoys July 22 to review the draft Aceh peace 
agreement, his sixth such briefing of key diplomats in 
Jakarta since January.  The Ambassador and his counterparts 
congratulated Kalla and the GOI on the tentative agreement, 
remarking that the GOI had kept to the schedule Kalla had 
outlined during the early days of the talks.  Kalla in turn 
played up the international role in achieving this 
breakthrough, praising the countries represented for their 
efforts in generating pressure on GAM, for example through 
joint demarches that convinced GAM that it had no alternative 
post-tsunami but to negotiate.  The VP singled out Malaysia's 
actions, following his call to Deputy Prime Minister Najib, 
which included a police interview with the member of the GAM 
negotiating team living in Malaysia that convinced this GAM 
member to go along with other rebel leaders in support of a 
deal. 
 
3.  (C) Kalla was very complementary of Finnish facilitator 
Ahtisaari, who had pushed the talks forward in a constructive 
direction.  He also gave credit to GAM's Australian advisor 
Kingsbury, who, if sometimes difficult, provided needed 
reassurance to GAM leaders during the talks. 
 
4.  (C) Like his negotiator Hamid, Kalla mentioned the 
December 2004 tsunami as another key factor that brought the 
two sides to the table.  In addition, Kalla noted the GOI's 
early commitment to pursuing a peaceful resolution to the 
conflict, and one that was comprehensive, preserved GAM's 
dignity, and also respected Indonesian unity.  This approach 
had proven successful. 
 
TNI Chief a Strong Supporter 
---------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) On the Indonesian military (TNI), Kalla said TNI 
chief Endriartono Sutarto was very pleased by the deal and a 
strong supporter of the outcome.  Sutarto much preferred to 
have his troops out of that conflict, and back and available 
for other duties. 
 
Downplaying DPR Objections 
-------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) Kalla downplayed any difficulties in selling the 
agreement to the Parliament (DPR).  The Vice President said 
he would conduct the consultation with the DPR on the issue 
of granting GAM members amnesty, and on other important 
points, by inviting key Parliamentarians for discussions in 
his home.  Like Hamid, Kalla identified a revision of Aceh's 
special autonomy law as the single legislative action 
required, at least in the initial implementation phase (with 
the MOU calling for passage by March 2006 of a Law for the 
Governing of Aceh). 
 
7.  (C) The Vice President reviewed the general time frame 
for amnesty (to be granted within 15 days of the MOU 
signing), decommissioning GAM weapons and drawing down GOI 
security forces.  Kalla stated that the GOI and GAM had noted 
in the MOU the specific number of GAM fighters to be 
demobilized and weapons to be decommissioned, but both sides 
were keeping these numbers very close hold.  (Note:  In 
addition to these figures, the numbers of TNI and police who 
would remain in Aceh also are not available in the text that 
we have, and these presumably fall in this same "close hold" 
category.  End Note.) 
 
Anticipating Problems in Reintegration 
-------------------------------------- 
 
8.  (C) The Vice President admitted that the reintegration 
process could face significant problems that would need to be 
worked out prior to holding new elections in Aceh.  He 
expected that several former GAM members would take positions 
in the Aceh reconstruction body (BRR), which would be 
responsible for the bulk of the effort.  (Comment:  This is 
good news since the BRR has access to funds and expertise, 
along with a reputation for action and honesty.  End 
Comment.)  Some 10,000 to 20,000 new houses may need to be 
built as part of the reintegration package, Kalla offered. 
He noted that the GOI does not have a good estimate of the 
number of GAM members, and said GAM sympathizers in exile in 
Malaysia could number as high as 50,000, some of whom would 
return.  (Comment:  This estimate strikes us as 
unrealistically high.  End Comment.)  The reintegration 
effort would need to avoid creating social jealousy, and 
could not treat ex-GAM members differently from their 
neighbors.  Kalla provided little other detail about 
administering the reintegration effort. 
 
Monitors to Start Arriving by August 30? 
---------------------------------------- 
 
9.  (C) Kalla stated that EU and ASEAN monitors should begin 
deploying in Aceh by August 30, or early September at the 
latest.  Kalla noted the monitors' wide responsibilities 
covering all aspects of the MOU.  (Comment:  The UK deputy 
ambassador, who also represented the EU in this meeting, had 
mentioned privately that the EU had been scrambling to come 
to grips with the monitoring task.  Only Sweden and curiously 
Switzerland had offered people for the monitoring role so 
far.  End Comment.) 
 
Police Training 
--------------- 
 
10.  (C) The Ambassador noted our plan to provide human 
rights training to an initial group of police instructors 
drawn from Aceh.  He asked the Vice President to provide us 
with enough advance warning to consider and prepare for 
follow-on requests. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
11.  (C) Kalla took charge of this briefing, with Hamid 
Awaludin remaining largely silent.  The Vice President 
demonstrated a confident grasp of the MOU, gave short shrift 
to suggestions of domestic political challenges, and 
recognized the reintegration process would face problems. 
Overall, the meeting demonstrated that the Vice President 
feels strong ownership over the peace deal, and that the GOI 
is now giving serious thought to the challenges of 
implementing their pending agreement with GAM. 
 
 
PASCOE